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Abstract
The legal philosophy of Lon Fuller, both in his idea of internal morality and in his theory of
legal interpretation, is particularly useful for the purpose of making sense of the relationship
between law and morality vis-à-vis the legal profession. Legal ethicists have recently
developed accounts of legal ethics that are based on jurisprudential theories. These include
the exclusive positivist theory of Tim Dare, the inclusive positivist approach of Bradley
Wendel, and the substantive contextual judgment view of William Simon. Additionally,
David Luban has proposed and evaluated an insightful interpretation of Fuller’s legal
philosophy.
In this paper, I will argue that the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller provides the best
jurisprudential foundation for philosophical legal ethics and the norms of legal ethics. This
includes the treatment of topics such as the relationship between law and morality and the
duty of fidelity to law.
In addition to arguing these points at a purely conceptual level I make the case that a
Fullerian theory of lawyering is indispensable for making sense of a major recent case study
in the field of legal ethics, the “torture memos” written for the Bush Administration by the
US Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (the “OLC”).
Using a Fullerian approach to legal ethics, I will argue that the inappropriateness of these
memos goes beyond the failure of the OLC lawyers to interpret particular laws in good faith.
Rather, taking a view of law and lawyering inspired by Fuller’s legal theory, I will argue that,
of all of the reasons that one might criticize the OLC lawyers, it is of deepest importance to
understand the ways in which the OLC lawyers acted contrary to the ideal of legality in
drafting these memos.
I hope to provide insight into the philosophical foundations of legal ethics, as well as into a
major recent case study for legal ethics, and to highlight the connection between lawyering
and the vindication of the ideal of legality.
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Introduction
When discussing legal philosophy with his law students, Professor Allan Hutchinson
often begins by giving them an account of why they, as lawyers, should care about the subject of
jurisprudence in the first place. He argues that, as professionals who practice law, it is significant
for them to ask, “What is this thing called ‘law?’” It is often taken for granted that there is a
clear answer, but when engaging in the study of jurisprudence, we see otherwise. Legal ethicists
have taken up precisely this question over the past decade in an effort to better understand the
ethics of the legal profession.
From the 1940s to the 1960s, Lon Fuller worked on the project of creating a theory of
jurisprudence that was modest in its assertions but far-reaching in its scope. Fuller’s procedural
naturalism is a less metaphysically-committed theory than other natural law theories, yet it still
provides a deep and rich role for morality within the philosophy of law and thus also for the field
of philosophical legal ethics.

1

Part I, Section 1), of this paper will be a survey of the major

positivist theories of philosophical legal ethics. Subsequently, in Part II, Section 2), I will
introduce the legal theory of Lon Fuller, consider positivist objections to Fuller’s idea of the
internal morality of law and survey defences of Fuller’s ideas (including elaborations of Fullerian
thinking). I will also explore, in particular, N.E. Simmonds’ elaborations of Fuller’s legal
philosophy. At the end of Section 2), and throughout Section 3), I will consider the insightful
(lawyer-focused) reading that David Luban has of Fuller’s idea of the internal morality of law. In
Part III, Section 4) of this paper, I will develop the conceptual and normative features of my

1

Fuller made a prominent contribution to the field of legal ethics. Indeed, David Luban has said that “Lon
Fuller is the greatest American philosopher to devote serious attention to the ethics of lawyers” in David
Luban, “Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics” (1998) 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 801 [Luban, “Rediscovering
Fuller”] at 801. Of special note is the influence that Fuller had on the American Bar Association’s Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was promulgated from 1969 until it was replaced by the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983. This influence is chronicled in
ibid. at 806-807 and in even greater detail by John M. A. DiPippa, “Lon Fuller, The Model Code, and the
Model Rules” (1996) 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 303 [DiPippa, “Fuller, Model Code”]. One should also be aware of
Fuller’s numerous writings dealing with legal ethics as part of his larger interest in lawyers as actors in the
institutions that shape social order. Some examples include Lon L. Fuller, “The Philosophy of Codes of
Ethics” (1955) 74 Electrical Engineering 916 and Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected
Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed. by Kenneth I. Winston (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Fuller, Social Order],
especially the chapters entitled “The Needs of American Legal Philosophy” [Fuller, “American Legal
Philosophy”] at 269-283, “The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures” [Fuller, “Lawyer as Architect”]
at 285-291 and “Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer” [Fuller, “Philosophy/Lawyer] at 305-313.
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theory of legal ethics. My theory of legal ethics is inspired by Fuller’s theory and substantially
aligned with Fuller’s normative views about law. In addition to simply laying out my theory, I will
also undertake some normative and conceptual analysis of my proposal. In the last expository
portion of this paper, Part IV, I will apply the Fullerian theory that I have developed to the case
study of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) “torture memos”. Section 5) is a survey of the facts
and law of the case study that will be the applied ethical focus of this paper. In Section 6), I will
look at the question of how legal ethicists of various kinds have applied their theories of legal
ethics to critically asses the “torture memos” case study. In Section 7), I will apply my Fullerian
theory of lawyering to gain insight into the “torture memos” case study. Finally, in the
Conclusion of this paper, after recapitulating my arguments in this paper, I will briefly discuss
opportunities for future scholarly work related to the ideas presenting here.
As I begin the task of presenting a theory of legal ethics based on the work of Lon Fuller,
let me introduce two categories of discursive activity that will be useful for the purpose of
understanding the relationships between law and morality in legal philosophy, especially to the
extent that the structure of this relationship is relevant for the task of doing philosophical legal
ethics. David Dyzenhaus delineates these two categories in his work in legal philosophy as he
revisits the classic case study of the Grudge Informer that both Hart and Fuller addressed in their
famous debate just over 50 years ago. 2
This famous case study is set during World War II. A German woman informed German
authorities that her husband had made insulting remarks about Hitler while he was on leave
from the German army. 3 She wanted to get rid of him since she was having an affair. 4 Under

2

David Dyzenhaus, “The Grudge Informer Case Revisited” (2008) 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1000 [Dyzenhaus,
“Grudge Informer”] at 1002.
3
See H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 [Hart,
“Positivism”] at 618-620.
As Dyzenhaus also does in his paper, ibid. at 1004, n.7, the source that I cite for this case study is Hart
himself, except for a specific fact that was not mentioned by Hart and which is found in the actual
judgment. Thus, for almost all facts of Grudge Informer Case that are mentioned in this paper, I refer to
the citation of Hart given in the present footnote.
4
Oberlandesgericht Bamberg [OLG] [Bamberg Provincial High Court and Court of Appeal] July 27, 1949, 5
Suiddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung [SJZ] 207 (207-10), 1950 (Ger.) (judgment in criminal matter applying
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 239 (1871); See also Dyzenhaus’ citation of this case in Dyzenhaus,
“Grudge Informer”, ibid. at 1032 (Appendix), n.8.
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the “informer statutes”5, it was illegal to make these comments. However, the wife did not have
a legal duty to inform the authorities. Her husband was found guilty and sentenced to death. It
seems that he was sent to the front instead of being executed. After the war, she was put on
trial by the post-Nazi German government. Her defence was that she acted in accordance with
the informer statutes, which were the laws at the time. The post-World War II courts ultimately
found her guilty of illegally depriving a person of freedom, an offence under the German
Criminal Code of 1871, which had continually remained in force.
The categories drawn by Dyzenhaus in dealing with this case are (1) legal reasoning at
the “fundamental level”, in which “judges confront the question of the ideal of fidelity to law,
since they are faced with questions about what legality-the principles of the rule of lawrequires”6 and (2) legal reasoning at the “doctrinal level”, where “judges have to resolve issues
of substantive law, such as the issues of criminal law in the Grudge Informer Case”7. The
distinction sees one level of analysis, the “fundamental level” as a kind of reasoning in which the
relevant actors are to deal with basic questions about the nature of law. The “doctrinal level”,
on the other hand, is a level at which, given the answers adopted at the “fundamental level”,
the relevant legal official asks what the law of the particular legal system is as it pertains to the
specific problem at hand.
Dyzenhaus explains these categories in terms of the questions that would have been
asked by the post-WWII court in the case of the Grudge Informer:
At the fundamental level, the court faced the question of what to make of judges who are under
a duty to interpret positive laws that are morally obnoxious but, in its view, not so obnoxious that
one can make a natural law argument that they are invalid. At the doctrinal level, the court had
to consider how its sense of an answer to the first question meshed with its sense of how best to
interpret the substantive law. Assume that at both levels judges regard themselves as being
under a duty to find an answer that coheres with the animating principles of that levelrespectively, the fundamental principles of legality and the principles of the substantive body of
law. Because the Grudge Informer Case required the court to take a view not only of doctrine but
also of the nature of the judicial role, it is a fundamental case. 8

5

The term that Dyzenhaus uses for the Nazi laws that made it illegal to say the kind of things that the
husband said in the Grudge Informer Case, Dyzenhaus, “Grudge Informer”, ibid. at 1004; Dyzenhaus also
calls these rules the “informer laws”, ibid. at 1009.
6
Ibid. at 1002.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid. at 1010.

Page | 3

None of this is to say that there is a perfectly clean demarcation between fundamental
reasoning and doctrinal reasoning. At the simplest level, legal sources such as constitutions
often explicitly require respect for the rule of law. In such cases, at the very least, a doctrinal
question mandates the consideration of the two levels together in the process of reasoning.

9

Thus, the two levels cannot be kept perfectly on separate sides of an interpretive wall. N.E.
Simmonds, whose work I will discuss more broadly later10, shows, while discussing arguments
for a distinction like the one expounded by Dyzenhaus, that the relationship between
fundamental reasoning and doctrinal reasoning can be a contested issue within legal theory. The
relationship between these two kinds of analysis may depend on the question of whether one
kind of analysis guides the other or informs itself of the answers from the other. Simmonds
argues:
If doctrinal legal thought is typically guided by a basic rule of recognition [a central positivist
thesis], then the question ‘what is the law?’ is quite distinct from, and independent of, the
question ‘what is law?’ But if, on the other hand, doctrinal legal thought is reflexively guided by
reflection upon the nature of law as such, then the answer to the former question depends upon
the answer to the latter question. 11

Nevertheless, the questions that are asked at the two levels can be different in content,
focus, abstraction, and relevance to the legal system as a whole. To state the distinction in terms
of understanding levels of analysis about legal ethics, the distinction might be put such that the
doctrinal level asks what advice a lawyer should give to a client (i.e. what is the best
interpretation of the law), whereas the fundamental level asks what the proper function and
role of a lawyer is within law.
Interpretive points such as these are important to understand because questions about
whether law meets evaluative and necessary criteria such as the rule of law are ultimately going
9

Leave aside, for now, the question of whether these two levels can have an ontic effect on one another,
i.e. whether the answer at one level truly can determine the answer at another level. In the example
under consideration, all that I am focusing on is the use of the two levels in the process of reasoning.
10
Below in Section 2.3.2).
11
N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Simmonds, Law/Moral
Idea] at 171 [emphasis in original].
In a sense, one must also do some doctrinal analysis to assess questions at the fundamental level. One
must have a sense of what the law is at the doctrinal level in order to be able to determine that it is
“morally obnoxious” and thus raises the kind of fundamental level questions that Dyzenhaus proposes in
the case of the Grudge Informer, Dyzenhaus, “Grudge Informer”, supra note 2 at 1010; quoted at note 8,
above.
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to be resolved in the interpretative work of actors within the legal system such as judges and
lawyers. Thus, it is vital for any theory of philosophical legal ethics, including the one in this
paper, to give interpreters of legal sources a framework for understanding how exactly the
questions of legal philosophy apply to the specific legal case that they are addressing at the
moment. Dyzenhaus’ distinction between legal reasoning at the fundamental and doctrinal
levels goes a great way toward doing this. For the purpose of the present paper, the distinction
is helpful in understanding the ways in which positive law and morality can be said to come into
conflict. Having the categories of fundamental level analysis and doctrinal level analysis readily
available aids (1) in the task of drawing out principles of lawyering from Fuller’s legal theory, 12
and any theory of legal philosophy, for that matter, (2) in applying the principles of Fullerian
lawyering that I develop to the task of assessing the legal advice provided in cases studies such
as the infamous OLC “torture memos”,

13

and, (3) in understanding criticisms made by other

authors as they apply their own arguments and theories in legal ethics to case studies such as
the “torture memos”. 14

12

As I do in developing my theory of Fullerian lawyering, below in Section 4.4) at 101-102.
Below, in Section 7.2), especially as noted at 164-166.
14
Below, in Section 6.2), especially as noted at 130.
13
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Part I – Understanding Positivist Theories of Legal Ethics
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1) Legal Positivism and the Standard Model of Lawyering
In the past decade, legal ethics has taken great interest in using philosophical
approaches to deal with some of the central issues that arise in the field of legal ethics. My focus
here is on views of legal ethics that support the Dominant Model of legal ethics, namely, the
view supporting a strong role-differentiated distinction between professional morality and
personal morality.

1

The role-differentiated morality that has been set out in the Dominant

Model includes duties of zealous advocacy and client partisanship, in particular.

2

The legal

ethicist Rob Atkinson sets out is a “[F]undamental question of professional ethics”3 in the
following way for the purpose of distinguishing those who adhere to the Dominant Model and
those who adopt alternative views: “Should a professional always do all that the law allows, or
should the professional recognize other constraints, particularly concerns for the welfare of
third parties?”4 He says that, “This question divides scholars of legal ethics and thoughtful
practitioners into two schools: those who recognize constraints other than law's outer limit, and
those who do not”.5 The views that are featured in the present section of my paper belong to
the school that does not recognize constraints, as part of the field of professional ethics, on the
behaviour of legal professionals other than the limits set by law. The authors who argue for this
1

For account of the Dominant Model of lawyering and legal ethics see Alice Woolley, Integrity in
Zealousness: Comparing the Standard Conceptions of the Canadian and American Lawyer” (1996) 9 Can.
J.L. & Jur. 61; Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 51 [Farrow,
“Sustainable Professionalism”] at 63-67. Finally, see the historical word of Lord Brougham in Joseph
Nightingale, ed., The Trial of Queen Caroline, vol. 2, (N.p. Albion Press, 1821) at 8 whose idea about the
proper function of the lawyer have been cited as the inspiration for the Dominant Model of lawyering.
2
See generally Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism”, ibid.
3
Rob Atkinson, “How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of The Remains of the
Day” (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 177 [Atkinson, “Perverted Professionalism”] at 184.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. [footnote omitted]. Let me emphasize that Atkinson is not saying that one of these two groups does
not recognize “constraints outside of law’s outer limits” full stop. Of course, people whose views fall into
the second school mentioned by Atkinson would (or could) recognize that, all things considered, there are
constraints, such as general morality, on their behaviour besides positive law. Rather, this second group
does not recognize constraints outside of positive law in terms of the first order rules of professional
ethics. Note also that people with such a view may recognize moral or political arguments as second order
constraints, or a second order extra-legal normative framework (extra-legal in the sense of outside or
beyond the positive law), as part of professional ethics. One could say that this is the case at least with
respect to the particular exclusive/inclusive legal positivist theories discussed in my present paper. See
Atkinson’s discussion of such second order constraints or second order extra-legal normative frameworks
in ibid. at 188, in which he mentions the “ultimate grounding” and the “morality at the wholesale” level of
the views of legal ethicists who do not recognize first order or “retail level” extra-legal constraints within
professional ethics other than the first order constraints provided by the limits of the positive law.
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position most prominently within philosophical legal ethics uphold the Dominant Model of
lawyering on the basis of the major legal positivist theories of legal philosophy. In presenting my
Fullerian case later in this paper, I will, to varying degrees, argue from a procedural naturalist
perspective against all three of the positivist theories that will be considered and thus against
their defence of the Dominant Model of lawyering.

1.1) Law’s Authority – A Common Theme of the Major Positivist Theories of Lawyering
Before going into the specific details of the major positivist theories of lawyering, I will
begin by summarizing an idea that is a structural commonality between the major positivist
theories of lawyering as they are actually advocated by their proponents. The common feature
is Joseph Raz’s idea of the authority of law. Although not being the only way in which to express
positivism, the idea of the authority of law has so captured the imagination of legal
philosophers, and acts at such a first principles (or fundamental) level of positivism, that it is
worth isolating as a common foundation that is shared by the major positivist theories of
lawyering.
The two major theories of legal positivism in legal ethics, as in legal philosophy, are
exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. Their most noted proponents in the field
of legal ethics are Tim Dare and Bradley Wendel, respectively. The distinction between these
two kinds of positivism is explained in detail in the following two sections. Why is the idea of the
authority of law so important to the way in which both of the major positivist theories of
lawyering are actually argued? The reason is the relevance that the function of law has to both
legal philosophy and legal ethics. In legal philosophy, various functional accounts of law6,
including Fuller’s own view, treat law as a functional kind, meaning that law’s nature and
conditions are determined by its functions, or by the performance of law’s function in the case

6

Consider the debate in legal philosophy about functionalism within legal philosophy. For a view that is
generally favourable to functionalism see Michael S. Moore, “Law as a Functional Kind” in Robert P.
George, ed., Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 188
[Moore, “Functional Kind”]. An anti-functionalist view is given in Leslie Green, “The Functions of Law”
(1998) 12 Cogito 117 [Green, “Functions”]. Finally, a middle position is traced in Kenneth M. Ehrenberg,
“Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law” (2009) 29 (1) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 91.
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of laws or legal systems as candidates for membership in the category of “law”. This focus on
function carries down into legal ethics. 7
Dare spends significant time explaining the exclusive positivist view of the function of
law. Having a clear sense of the function of law is important to Dare because, as he argues, “The
point of the institution which supports a given role will feature significantly in any justification of
that role and its role-obligations...The nature of the lawyer’s role and role-obligations it imposes
depends upon the function of the role within the institution of which it is a part, and hence upon
the function of that institution”. 8 Thus, the point of law will shape the role and duties of the
lawyer.
Under the Razian account of law, the function of law is to be an authority in the
technical sense meant by Joseph Raz. A positivist of the Razian kind would say that the role of
law is to be an exclusionary reason that can be used to order society and settle disputes in a
situation in which various parties will be able to cite their own conflicting conceptions of the
good. 9 The law helps us get along despite our disagreements by stepping in as the authoritative
reason for practical action. 10 A purported legal system properly belongs to the category “law” as
long as the system provides peremptory norms11 that work as society’s recognized dispute
resolution process. Individual purported legal norms belong to the category “law” as long as
they are peremptory norms within the same dispute resolution process.
7

See the following sources for functional theories of legal ethics: Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?: A
Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009) [Dare,
Counsel of Rogues]; W. Bradley Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005) 91
Cornell L. Rev. 67 [Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”].
8
Dare, Counsel of Rogues, ibid. at 59.
9
See ibid. at 61, “The institutions and practices to which a procedural understanding of neutrality give rise
allow the creation of stable and just communities, despite the presence of a widespread diversity of
conflicting and perhaps even incommensurable conceptions of the good. They do so by mediating
between this diversity of substantive views and concrete decisions that communities must take”.
10
See Wendel’s endorsement of this view in “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 86-93. Wendel
puts the Razian argument in the context of resolving disagreements about the “torture memos” and
provides various thought experiments, including Raz’s own arbitrator example in Joseph Raz, The Morality
of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) [Raz, Morality of Freedom] at 41-42, to illustrate the way in
which the Razian account would work to resolve societal disputes. Wendel also illustrates, in “Legal Ethics
& Separation”, supra note 7 at 92, some features of how the Razian dispute resolution process works in a
democracy.
11
My reference to exclusionary norms in terms of their “peremptory force” or as “peremptory norms” is
borrowed from Simmonds’ reading of Raz in N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007) [Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea] at 162.
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To dig deeper into the details of this practical reasoning, one sees that reason-giving12 is
the central idea that animates Raz’s theory of the authority of law. It is essentially a theory
about the reasons that a person considers in the activity of practical reasoning.

13

For the

purpose of legal philosophy, it is especially tied to practical reasoning in the context of a dispute.
Raz argues that a necessary condition for the existence of law is that law must have authority,
meaning that, in the context of practical reasoning, law (conceived of as a social fact) is an
exclusionary reason for action. It thus replaces other types of reasons, especially, but not limited
to, the moral reasons that figure in an ethical dispute, and is not simply one among several
reasons (and kinds of reasons) for action.
Of special interest for legal philosophy is that morality is kept separate and distinct from
law as law plays its role in the activity of reason-giving. In Razian terms, Wendel describes the
place that law and morality have in this theory of practical reasoning and the dispute resolution
problem that is the impetus for what Raz argues is the function of law.

14

Wendel says, “Moral

questions, by their nature, do not tend to have right answers that can be achieved if only the
participants in a discussion persevere for long enough. The result of this kind of persistent,
good-faith disagreement is the inability to engage in cooperative social action, in this case the
effective defense of the citizenry”.

15

With the problem identified in the case of moral

disagreements, Wendel states, in general terms, the kind of solution that might be adequate to
the task of solving the problem of the inability to engage in cooperative social action. Wendel
says:
Because all citizens share an interest in working together to achieve [cooperative social action],
they have a reason to prefer some procedural mechanism for resolving the disagreement to the
inaction that results from the attempt to secure agreement based on deliberation. The goal of

12

To use a phrase from Michael S. Moore, “Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons” (1988) 62 S. Cal. L. Rev.
827 [Moore, “Razian Reasons”].
13
See Raz’s recent discussion of his theory as a theory of practical reasoning in his recent work Joseph
Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009) [Raz, Between Authority], c. 8.
14
For another source in which Wendel describes and endorses Raz’s thesis about the function of law as an
authority, see W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010) [Wendel, Fidelity] at 105-113. This book is perhaps Wendel’s most significant work in the field of
philosophical legal ethics.
15
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 96 [footnote omitted].
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that procedure is to construct a normative framework that can be used to generate premises in a
practical syllogism for officials who act in the name of society as a whole. 16

The solution works around the contours of the disagreement, rather than directly with
its substance. The solution thus stands back at some distance from the dispute. That is to say,
the solution does not resolve the dispute in terms of declaring any particular moral answer to
the question that is being debated. This is made clear when Wendel discusses the relevance that
this dispute resolution process has to the moral disagreement that may have inspired it17, as
Wendel explains:
The role of the lawmaking process is not to settle the moral issue permanently as a moral matter.
Rather, it is to reach a provisional settlement that works well enough, for now, to accomplish the
end in view.... the product of legislation is entitled to respect as an achievement-people
disagreeing in good faith have done the best that they could to settle on a resolution of
competing rights and values in a way that is respectful of the parties to the discussion. 18

Also of note regarding views that are based on the authority of law is that it is not
relevant for the function of law that there be a particular substantive norm chosen as the
content of the exclusionary reason. As Dare argues, “[T]here is nothing in positivism itself which
entails that communities must settle on any particular institutional legal arrangement. What is
distinctive about the positivist conception of law is not the content of the legal systems it
endorses, but the place of morality as a reason for action for those subject to law”. 19 There is no
conceptual reason within positivism that would make Wendel not endorse this statement also.
Even as an inclusive positivist, who, as will be discussed below, believes that morality can be
incorporated into the law by way of the rule of recognition20, Wendel is not compelled by
inclusive positivism, stated in its own terms, to say that any particular substantive content
(especially substantive moral content) is chosen as the exclusionary reason. The key to the
functional question discussed here is the reason-giving function of law, not the substance of the
norms.

16

Ibid. at 97.
Note that, although Wendel is discussing the relevance of the dispute resolution process to a moral
dispute, in particular, the same process would be used for non-moral (e.g. economic or coordination
debates) on the Razian theory.
18
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 97 [footnote omitted].
19
Dare, Counsel of Rogues, supra note 7 at 64 [emphasis in original].
20
Below, in Section 1.3), see my summary of inclusive positivism and Wendel’s use of this theory of
jurisprudence in his own theory of lawyering.
17
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Having discussed the dispute resolution process itself, Wendel summarizes a duty that
officials of legal systems have given the way in which legal systems are geared toward
accomplishing the function of law as characterized by the authority of law. The role of various
officials is designed to be responsive to the process’ functional role as a means of practical
reasoning. Wendel argues:
After this settlement has been accomplished [by way of the authority of law], it is incumbent
upon government officials, citizens subject to its directives, and lawyers who interpret the law
not to ‘unsettle the settlement’ by reintroducing contested moral values as a basis for action. 21

The details of what counts as abiding by this duty are part of the disagreement between
the exclusive and inclusive schools of positivist lawyering.
Finally, Wendel tells us (1) the reason that explains the role that a legal philosophy
based on the authority of law gives to legal officials and (2) what exactly would be wrong about
a legal official such as a lawyer failing to keep their actions within the bounds of this role and the
place that it has within the Razian dispute resolution process. According to Wendel:
The reason for this prohibition is not that his [i.e. the legal official’s] belief is incorrect or his
balancing of the relevant values is faulty.... [L]awmakers have already made a decision on the
matter, which stands for a decision of society as a whole, and must be respected as the product
of a process that is the best way to deal fairly with persistent uncertainty and debate over moral
questions such as the one the officer faces. For the officer to proceed on the basis of his own, allthings-considered judgment would be ethical solipsism-an act of disrespect to fellow citizens,
whose views on the matter are equally worthy of being taken seriously. 22

This common theme between the major theories of positivist legal ethics is thoroughly
Razian in terms of its endorsement of Raz’s view of the function of law as a dispute resolution
tool to be used in the act of practical reasoning. These two kinds of positivism part company in
significant ways despite this functionalist agreement. The most important disagreement will be
over the question of how the interaction of law and morality is affected by this particular
functionalist theory of the authority of law.

1.2) Exclusive Legal Positivism – Authority and the Immiscibility of Law and Morality
Exclusive legal positivism is one of the major schools of thought within positivism as a
theory of legal philosophy. In his book, The Counsel of Rogues?, Tim Dare provides his argument
for a jurisprudence of legal ethics that is based on exclusive legal positivism. I will use Dare’s
21
22

Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 97.
Ibid. at 97-98 [footnote omitted].
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account as my exemplar of exclusive legal positivism for the purpose of this paper because he
has been the major voice in advocating this theory.
Dare argues against the inclusive positivist jurisprudence of law that is used by W.
Bradley Wendel to develop a legal ethics theory of inclusive legal positivism. Under the exclusive
positivist view, the thesis that morality cannot be incorporated into the law is a virtue that
allows law to accomplish a particular moral virtue, namely the facilitation of a pluralist society
despite differing views on important issues. As Dare puts it, “[T]he account assumes that we can
identify law and the reasons for action it provides in a particular case without settling our
substantive moral disagreement about what we ought to do in that case; it assumes, that is to
say, the separability of law and morality”.

23

If morality can make its way into law, even in the

way that it is said to do so under inclusive positivism24, then the moral disagreement is subject
to return and the mediating function of law, the exclusionary reason-giving function within
practical reasoning, is lost. 25 It is said that one cannot solve a moral disagreement by recourse
to moral principles, the very same kinds of considerations that are being debated in the first
place. 26
Recall now the way in which exclusive legal positivists keep law and morality separate so
that the mediating and peremptory role of law is not lost when the law uses concepts that are
thought to belong to the category of morality. Even when moral concepts seemingly make their
way into the law, as argued by Ronald Dworkin and the inclusive legal positivists, exclusive legal
positivists will say that:
‘[M]orally laden’ provisions will be found in every developed legal system....The suggested
equitable statute of limitations, and other provisions...seem to refer to moral values, values that
one might expect to be part of disputed ordinary or background morality. According to
positivists, however, such provisions do not direct lawyers and judges to these terms as moral
terms. Instead they direct them to legal resources, to see what those terms require and how the
law has interpreted them. 27

23

Dare, Counsel of Rogues, supra note 7 at 63.
As discussed in the following section of this paper.
25
See Dare’s summary of Raz’s exclusive positivist critique of Hart’s inclusive positivism in Dare, Counsel
of Rogues, supra note 7 at 69-70.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid. at 65 [emphasis in original].
24

Accord ibid. at 71, “[The account that Dare supports] is more consistent with exclusive than with inclusive
positivism. On that account [i.e. exclusive positivism], moral terms that appear in law do not direct judges
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Dare goes on to put this statement in the context of an argument for the importance of
exclusive positivism to the function of law in being a mediating device, a source of Razian
reasons, which resolves disputes in a society with a plurality of views arising around moral
questions and other contested topics. Additionally, he states affirmatively, rather than
negatively as in the previous quote, the role that moral resources can play in the process of
reasoning about law. He says:
[P]ositivism need not deny judges and lawyers access to moral resources, albeit to moral
resources as they are incorporated into law in the guise of content-independent application
criteria for the ostensibly moral terms which occur throughout law. Such an account, I think,
comfortably describes legal practice, and better preserves the function of law as a device that
mediates between inconsistent views of the good. 28

Given this view of law and Dare’s view that the nature and function of law determine
the proper role of the lawyer, Dare turns his case against inclusive positivism and for exclusive
positivism into a case against inclusive positivist lawyering and for exclusive positivist lawyering.
On the basis of his exclusive positivist view of legal philosophy, Dare says: “The law allows
advocates of very different views on [moral, political, economic matters, etc.] to live together
despite their differences. The nature of the roles occupied by lawyer within the institutions of
law is settled to a large extent by this mediating function of law”. 29
Dare therefore argues that the lawyer should interpret value-laden terms as legal
values. He provides an argument for lawyers to constrain themselves from giving legal advice
that would be based on morality and which may thereby, according to Dare’s view, possibly
reduce the autonomy of the client to engage in the publically recognized forums for conflict
resolution. Dare’s theory is therefore closely tied to an interpretation of legal philosophy in the
jurisprudence of lawyering that also emphasizes client autonomy. It is also deeply related to the
issue of lawyers seeking to shape their practice in a way that is responsive to their own moral
views, which he, again, would say undermines the law’s ability to perform its Razian mediating
function. This undermining is something that may indeed be bound to happen if value-laden
terms within the law are treated as moral values rather than as legal values. A lawyer
to the resources of ordinary morality: they do not direct lawyers and judges to these terms as moral
terms. Instead they direct them to legal resources, to see what those terms require and how the law has
interpreted them, where that inquiry is an empirical inquiry into the legal pedigree rather than a moral
inquiry into the content of those terms”.
28
Ibid. at 73.
29
Ibid. at 59.
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attempting to make sense of moral terms incorporated into the law under an inclusive positivist
view of law would have some likelihood of reading those moral terms according to his/her own
particular view of morality. Dare thus argues in the following way against lawyers’ attempts to
practice law in a manner that is guided by their own view of the substantive morality of the
case. He says:
Lawyers who calibrate their professional efforts according to their own view of the good – or
indeed according to any particular view of the good – not only ‘privilege’ the view they favour
and disenfranchise the view of the client, they undercut the strategy by which we secure
community between people profoundly divided by reasonable but incompatible views of the
good....It is not up to lawyers to determine what we will do as a community, what rights we will
allocate and to whom. 30

Having stated what is wrong with a lawyer who seeks to allow his/her own view of
morality shape his/her practice of law, Dare states the case affirmatively for an exclusive
positivist view of legal practice. Dare argues:
...[Decisions about the client’s rights] are things to be decided, not in private in the offices of
particular lawyers, but in the public arena of politics where everyone can have a say, or in the
public domain of the courts where reasons must be given and opportunities exist for challenge
and representation. 31

In this theory, then, a lawyer’s avoidance of the use of morality in shaping his/her work
as a lawyer provides the benefit to practical reasoning of facilitating the Razian process of
reason-giving and the role of law in facilitating cooperation among individuals who may have
differing opinions about contested issues.
Of great interest in Dare’s theory is also the way in which he develops his support of
exclusive positivist lawyering in light of the values of the standard conception of lawyering,
which he supports. Take the following instance in which Dare argues about the way in which the
standard conception’s principle of neutrality32 aides the lawyer in facilitating, at a practical level,
the mediating function and the peremptory position of law under the exclusive positivist view.
Dare posits:
The complexity of the procedures upon which a pluralist community such as ours must rely
means that lawyers do have tremendous power in this regard. Because of their legal expertise,
30

Ibid. at 74.
Ibid. at 77.
32
Ibid. at 8, summarizes the principle of neutrality in the following way: “[The lawyer must remain
professionally neutral with respect to the moral merits of the client or the client’s objectives...the lawyer
must not allow their own view of the moral status of the client’s objectives or character to affect the
diligence or zealousness with which they pursue the client’s lawful objectives”.
31
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they are better placed than any other group of citizens to work in and with our legal and political
institutions. The principle of neutrality recognizes this power and its potential for abuse....It [i.e.
the principle of neutrality] guards against the possibility that someone might be denied rights
allocated by a legal system because its lawyers find those rights or their allocation to that person
morally objectionable. 33

Thus, the principle of neutrality guards against what Dare thinks is a normatively
perilous situation in which the application of a lawyer’s moral views undermine the Razian
function of law. The lawyer is required to perform his/her function in pursuit of the mediating
function of law even despite his/her own personal moral qualms. Additionally, of course, the
lawyer’s own moral status is said to be protected from association with the betrayal of his/her
own moral views by the principle of non-accountability, which makes the client, rather than the
lawyer, morally accountable for the actions done by the lawyer on the client’s behalf. 34
Although Dare defends what we can call the standard conception of the role of a lawyer,
he develops the duties of being a lawyer under the standard conception (the principle of
neutrality, the principle of non-accountability and the duty of partisanship or zeal) in a carefully
limited way. Dare’s moderated statement of the principles of the standard conception of
lawyering is particularly notable in the case of the principle of partisanship or zeal. Dare
distinguishes between pursuing the client’s interest (i.e. pursuing the principle of partisanship)
with “mere-zeal” vs. pursuing the client’s interest with “hyper-zeal”. 35 Simply, “mere-zeal” is an
expression of partisanship in which the lawyer seeks to secure for the client all that the client is
legally entitled to obtain under law, while “hyper-zeal” is another expression of the idea of
partisanship in which a lawyer will attempt to secure for the client everything that the law can
be made to give even when the provision of the particular benefit (i.e. what the law can be
made to give) in the case of the particular circumstances at hand is not the purpose of the law in
this case. 36 In support of the toned-down obligation of mere-zeal, Dare says, “The institutional
rights of law structure [the lawyer’s] responsibility. Their job is to act on the client’s behalf,
relative to the institutions of law. It is not their job to pursue interests that are not protected by
law”.

37

While insisting on the duty of mere-zeal (i.e. the duty to fully pursue all that the client is

33

Ibid. at 74.
Ibid. at 75.
35
Ibid. at 76.
36
Ibid. at 76.
37
Ibid. at 80 [emphasis in original].
34
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legally entitled to obtain under law), Dare also firmly supports mere-zeal as the proper limitation
of the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy. Yet Dare argues forcefully for the duty of mere-zeal so
as to keep away from what he would view as the problem of not being sufficiently committed to
zealously pursuing the client’s legal entitlements. He says:
Lawyers who fail to exercise mere-zeal, who take it upon themselves not to pursue legal
entitlements available to their clients when their clients wish them to do so, privilege whatever
moral view they are following in preference to that of their client and undercut the procedures
which allow advocates of a plurality of views to live together in communities. Furthermore,
though we often admire people who sacrifice their own interests for the benefits of others, the
moral quality of these sacrifices depends crucially upon it being the rights-holder who makes the
sacrifice. It [is] hard to imagine the circumstances in which I act well by sacrificing some entitles
of yours, though there are many circumstances in which we think well of you for doing so. 38

Thus, according to Dare, the lawyer’s duty of zeal is calibrated to the client’s legal
entitlements. This places proper and balanced limits on the temptations of hyper-zeal and the
temptation of a style of lawyering that would be insufficiently committed to zealous advocacy
on behalf of the client.
In makes his distinction between mere-zeal and hyper-zeal, Dare shows his agreement
with David Luban about the potential and factual excesses of the standard conception as it has
been applied (or misapplied) in practice. But, Dare does not believe these excesses to be
necessary features of the standard conception. 39 In fact, Dare argues that an exclusive positivist
theory of law that is derived on the basis of Razian reason-giving itself provides a reason for
acting with mere-zeal rather than hyper-zeal. Dare argues:
Notwithstanding its pedigree, however, I do not think the attempt to pin a duty of hyper-zeal on
the standard conception [of legal ethics] is warranted. Indeed the appeal to pluralism allows us
to see why lawyers do not have a duty of hyper-zealous advocacy...if [Dare’s view] is an accurate
account of the role of the lawyer, it seems to follow directly that it is not their function to allow
clients to satisfy interests beyond those allocated by law. 40

To see in greater detail the way in which hyper-zeal undermines the peremptory and
exclusive positivist function of law, consider again Dare’s quote above in which he says, “The
institutional rights of law structure [the lawyer’s] responsibility. Their job is to act on the client’s
behalf, relative to the institutions of law. It is not their job to pursue interests that are not

38

Ibid. at 77.
See Dare’s discussion of the separability of the Standard Model and hyper-zeal as well as his discussion
of the wrongs of hyper-zeal in ibid. at 78-86.
40
Ibid. at 78.
39
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protected by law”.

41

To go beyond mere-zeal would be to undermine the authority of law.

Rather than law replacing other kinds of reasons in resolving a dispute, the substantive law, in a
case where a lawyer secures for the client all that the law can be made to give, is replaced in the
process of practical reasoning by the interests of the lawyer’s client, which may or may not be in
alignment with the client’s legal entitlements. Hence, Dare argues against the hyper-zeal
expression of the standard conception of lawyering:
An understanding of the duty of zealous advocacy that portrays lawyers as being allowed or
obliged to use every lawful tactic to prevent the legal system addressing a case is simply
mistaken....It goes wrong because it fails to see how the duties of lawyers are derived from a
proper understanding of their roles. I am quite happy to concede that this may be a revision of
the standard and well-pedigreed understanding of the standard conception. If it is, then so be it:
it is one which gives proper place to the moral considerations which inform the lawyer’s role,
while holding on to the idea that such roles are subject to role-differentiated obligations. 42

Dare’s theory thus offers strong, but measured, ideals of service to the client on the
basis of a theory of law that does not allow morality to be incorporated into the law. His is an
exclusive positivist theory of lawyering.

1.3) Inclusive Legal Positivism – Authority, Recognition and the Miscibility of Law and Morality
As was the case with the previous section, I will use a particular theorist, Bradley
Wendel, as the flag-bearer of inclusive legal positivism. Here too, the reason for using Wendel is
his prominence in arguing for his preferred theory.
Despite the Razian functionalist foundation discussed above43, Wendel takes his theory
in a decidedly non-Razian direction. Wendel attempts to carve out a space for his theory in
between the exclusive positivist view of law and lawyering and the natural law view of law and
lawyering. The key to the inclusive positivist view is that morality can be a necessary condition
for the existence of laws within a particular legal system, can make its way into the legal system
as a norm and not even as a necessary condition, but that there is no necessary connection
between law and morality. Wendel thus tells us:
Between these extremes of legal advising as essentially an ordinary moral interaction and an
amoral domain of ‘pure’ law, there is a middle ground in which moral norms can be incorporated
41

Ibid. at 80 [emphasis in original]; quoted above at note 37 and accompanying text, in the present
section.
42
Ibid. at 80.
43
Above in Section 1.1).
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into positive law, but in which the moral obligation to obey the law does not depend on the
overlap between legal prescriptions and the demands of ordinary morality. This latter position
best describes the relationship between law and morality in legal ethics. 44

Wendel summarizes the view to which he subscribes in the following way, “Inclusive
positivists believe that moral principles may be a feature in a legal system in the sense that they
are identified as part of law by the rule of recognition, as long as there is a conventional practice
among officials of making decisions with reference to moral criteria”.

45

For example, a moral

condition may be part of a state’s constitution and might thus be a condition for the valid
creation of statute law by the legislature. Of great importance is that the moral conditions
brought in through this example are not connected by necessity to the validity of laws within the
legal system or to the validity of any legal system. The role of the rule of recognition is thus the
key that both allows moral values to become incorporated into the law but to not become
connected by necessity or to become conditions of validity in a way that would undermine the
separability thesis.

46

Thus, Wendel endorses the following account of the inclusive positivist

theory:

44

Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 72.

Wendel emphasizes both the various possibilities and the limits that his view places on the links between
law and morality.
Further to this point, ibid. at 100, “[There are] a variety of avenues for incorporating moral values into
law, despite the separation between law and morals that is a necessary aspect of the law's claim to
legitimate authority. The separation is not absolute, but it is important to notice the point at which moral
values enter the process of making and interpreting law. The standard lawyers' argument does contain a
grain of truth, which is that lawyers are not permitted to make all-things-considered moral judgments
about all facets of the work they perform in a representative capacity. This does not mean, however, that
morality is completely squeezed out of law...”
45

Ibid. at 102. Wendel also summarizes Hart’s idea of the rule of recognition as a rule (or multiple rules)
that “specifies binding criteria for legal officials to use in deciding whether a given norm is a rule that is
part of a legal system”, ibid; citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)
[Hart, Concept of Law] at 94-95, 100.
46
The separability thesis is the idea that there are no necessary connections between law and morality.
See Hart’s statement of this idea, without specifically using the term “separability thesis”, but instead
giving a definition of “positivism” in H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958)
71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 [Hart, “Positivism”] at 601, n. 25, #2 and doing the same in Hart, Concept of Law, ibid.
at 185-186. See, in Jules L. Coleman, “Negative and Positive Positivism” (1982) 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 at
140-141, the first use of the term “separability thesis” to refer to the definition of “positivism” just cited
from Hart. For an account of various takes on the separability thesis, see generally, Leslie Green, "Legal
Positivism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009), Edward N. Zalta, ed., online: Center for
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In this kind of ‘inclusive’ positivism, moral values can become part of law – a ‘social fact’ in
jurisprudential terms – to the extent they play a role in the conventional practices of judicial
reasoning. Classic examples include the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, the requirement of good faith and fair dealing in contract law, and the
reasonableness standard in negligence. 47

Interestingly, Wendel not only states the inclusive positivist theory in the traditional way
that is careful to protect the place of the separability thesis. He also points out that his way of
stating the inclusive positivist claim is consistent with the functional theory of law that Raz
proposes and that we saw Dare and Wendel adopt above.

48

Thus, when law incorporates

morality via the rule of recognition, this must not upset the law’s ability to act as an exclusionary
reason. Wendel states the details of the theory in the following way:
But in an important sense these incorporated moral terms are still separate from legal reasons, in
that it is not necessary to ascertain the truth of these moral principles in order to determine
whether a proposition of law incorporating them is actually part of the law in a given legal
system. Criteria for legal validity that included the truth of moral standards would be unable to
coordinate action in the face of disagreement, but criteria that could be applied in a contentneutral manner would be able to facilitate the coordination function of law because it would not
be necessary to resolve the disagreement in order to ascertain the legal validity of a given norm.
Discerning the legal validity of a norm would be a matter of locating it in the sources specified by
the relevant rule of recognition, and would not require an independent moral argument. 49

To that end, Wendel also illustrates the theory by means of a case study that will be
discussed later in my paper: the interpretation of a legal defence, necessity, which was
suggested as possibly being available in a situation involving the application of the legal norms
prohibiting torture. 50 If the defence of necessity is thought to incorporate moral terms into the
law, then how does it do so? Wendel explains that, here too, the way in which the moral term
“necessity” has been incorporated into law is based on the moral term’s ability to partake,
along with the rule of recognition, in the generation of a social fact, not on the moral term’s
objective substantive truth. The incorporated term becomes a standard of assessment in legal
interpretation by virtue of its status as a social fact. As Wendel explains:
the
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<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/>.
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Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 101 [footnotes omitted].
48
Above in Section 1.1).
49
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 101-102 [emphasis in original, footnotes omitted].
50
The “torture memos’” proposal of the use of the defence of necessity, including, among other things,
my summary of Wendel’s criticism of the “torture memos’” legal advice on this point, is discussed below
in Section 5) at 117, especially note 13; 119, especially note 21; Section 7.1) at 159-163; and Section 7.2),
note 50.
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Critically...the social fact that constitutes the pedigree of a legal norm is not an objectively true
moral judgment, but is instead the belief by the relevant legal official in a moral judgment. In the
case of [the defence of] necessity [as applied to a case like the “torture memos”], there is a
difference between these two would-be sources of law:
(A) The harm associated with torturing a suspected terrorist outweighs the expected
benefit of the information that may result from the interrogation, given the uncertainty
that the detainee has valuable information and the unreliability of information obtained
through torture.
(B) In analogous cases, decisions by judges interpreting the necessity defense show that
a court is likely to conclude that the harm associated with torturing a suspected terrorist
outweighs the expected benefit of the information that may result from the
interrogation, given the uncertainty that the detainee has valuable information and the
unreliability of information obtained through torture. 51

Wendel goes on to explain the consequences that would arise for a Razian theory if it
was indeed the moral terms’ objective substantive truth that was the standard of assessment in
legal interpretation:
[T]he authority of law would indeed be undermined if those subject to it could revisit the
underlying moral dispute and reengage in the controversy over the necessity of torture in a
particular case. But the italicized text in (B) locates the source of law not in a true moral
judgment about the necessity of torture, but in the beliefs and practices of judges issuing
opinions in which they consider the necessity of torture. As Jules Coleman puts it, the relevant
rule of recognition might contain a clause that refers to ‘some noncontentful characteristic of
moral principles.' The authority of law would be undermined by a rule of recognition that made
moral truth a criterion of legality, at least if we understand the rule of recognition epistemically,
because our disagreement about moral truth would lead to the inability of officials to identify the
law reliably. 52

Finally, for the purpose of explaining this aspect of Wendel’s theory, he provides a
response to the possible objection that this kind of inclusive positivism is incompatible with a
Razian theory of authority. The possible objection is that, although secondary instances of
reference to moral principle can be said to refer to moral terms as social facts, rather than to the
objective all-things-considered truth of moral claims, it would still appear that the initial
instance of reference to a moral principle (e.g. the first mention or use of a moral principle by a
judge) would incorporate a moral principle qua moral principle, rather than simply making use
of a moral principle qua social fact. If that is the case, then it would seem that the dispute
resolution process does not make reference to a Razian exclusionary reason in the first instance
of incorporating the moral term and thus does not, at that key moment, resolve a moral dispute

51
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Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 108 [emphasis in original].
Ibid. at 108-109 [footnotes omitted].
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by looking to a source that is outside of the substance of the moral dispute. Wendel gives an
answer which refers to H.L.A. Hart’s theory of adjudication:
At some point, though, surely a judge's decision is based on morality itself and not on a
previously incorporated moral judgment. The chain of judicial decisions must end somewhere,
with a kind of moment of Ur-Incorporation in which the judge made reference not to some other
judge's beliefs (which are social facts), but to her own beliefs about morality, which are exactly
the sorts of things that would undermine the authority of law if pervasively made a part of
conventional legal interpretation. In these marginal cases, Hart would say that a judge is engaged
in lawmaking (which he calls the exercise of discretion) rather than in legal interpretation, and
that there simply was no law on the relevant question prior to the initial act of judicial
creativity.... The judge's decision does not ‘thereby convert morality into pre-existing law,' but it
fills in a gap where the law previously did not exist.... Thus, the law can fulfill the action-guiding
function that is characteristic of any practical authority. 53

Thus, social facticity is said to be kept throughout the law by way of the ability of the
judge to instantiate the rule of recognition and to “fill the gap” with more (new) law rather than
a norm from morality.
Having set up this legal philosophical aspect of Wendel’s argument, we are in a position
to summarize the way in which he applies the part-Razian, part-inclusive positivist theory to the
context of lawyers. Wendel states, in general terms, these two main aspects of his theory. He
first makes the point that, in order to properly perform their task within an inclusive positivist
image of the legal system, lawyers will have to treat the law as having the ability, through the
rule of recognition, to incorporate moral values (again, conceived of as contingent social facts, in
the way mentioned above, rather than the substantive all-things-considered morally correct
answer or what they personally think is the substantive all-things-considered morally correct
answer). This includes a certain value-laden interpretive activity, but is limited in such a way that
it will not undermine the law’s ability to perform its authoritative function as an exclusionary
reason. Wendel thus sets out the lawyer-client relationship under his theory as follows:
Obviously, if one purpose of having lawyers is to enable clients to plan their conduct around the
possibility of legal sanctions, lawyers must be permitted to make reference to values that will
play a role in the decision-making process of judges. But the role of lawyers can be further
connected with the role of law. If one of law's objectives is to enable citizens to act together, as a
society, despite persistent moral conflict, then the duties of lawyers must be understood
derivatively as furthering this end of law. Thus, insofar as lawyers interpret and apply the law to
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Ibid. at 109 [footnotes omitted]. Note also that Wendel discusses the notion of a practical authority in
ibid. at 108-111.
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their clients' problems, they are required not to interfere with the law's capacity to coordinate
activity. 54

He goes on to explicitly state the limitation on the kind of moral reasoning that a lawyer
may do by saying, “My broad claim, which I have defended elsewhere, is that lawyers acting in a
representative capacity do not have an obligation to do right in the first-order moral terms that
would otherwise apply to an all-things-considered evaluation of what one should do. Rather,
lawyers have an obligation to do right with regard to the law”. 55
Of interest especially to the legal ethics aspect of Wendel’s theory is the way in which
he deals with some of the classic issues of legal ethics theory, especially the issue of the place of
the “Dominant Model” of lawyering and the duty of zealous advocacy. Like Dare,

56

Wendel is

careful to limit the ambit of the duty of zealous advocacy such that is it consistent with the legal
philosophy that underpins the legal ethics aspect of his theory. If the law is to act as an authority
in practical reasoning, i.e. as an exclusionary reason, then its ability to perform this function is
undermined, for example, by an approach in which the lawyer tries to use law as a mere tool,
make it give whatever s/he can and avoid its application when it is inconvenient for his/her
client. Wendel makes this position explicit and states the ways in which lawyers are to limit their
advocacy to be consistent with these functional purposes:
Lawyers may not treat the law instrumentally, as an obstacle to be planned around, but must
treat legal norms as legitimate reasons for action in their practical deliberation. Compliance with
the law means more than seeking to avoid sanctions – it entails an attitude of respect toward
legal norms. Because citizens are obligated to treat the law as legitimate – and lawyers, as agents
of their clients, cannot have any right to treat the law instrumentally that is greater than that of
their clients – lawyers are prohibited from manipulating legal norms to defeat the substantive
meaning of these norms. The torture memos are a perfect case study to illustrate the application
of a general jurisprudential thesis about the locus of moral responsibility in lawyering, because
they show how lawyers can commit a moral wrong vis-à-vis their obligation to serve as
custodians or trustees of the law, even while the law excludes recourse to first-order moral
considerations in practical reasoning. 57

From this summary, one can understand the details of Wendel’s theory of lawyering as
drawing from Raz’s theory of the authority of law and Hart’s inclusive legal positivism. Wendel’s
theory of lawyering is thoroughly positivistic and committed to the adversarial model of
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Ibid. at 105-106.
Ibid. at 72.
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Recall my summary of Dare’s view on this point, above, in Section 1.2) at 16-18.
57
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 7 at 72-73.
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adjudication, but places constraints on the standard model of lawyering, as does the theory of
Tim Dare.
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Part II – Legal Philosophy and the Internal Morality of Law
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2) Fuller and the Rule of Law
2.1) Fullerian Legal Theory – The Internal Morality of Law
We will review some of the key features of the legal theory of Lon Fuller here. This is
important for the purpose of this paper because, before developing a Fullerian theory of the
ethics of lawyering, it is necessary to have an understanding of whether Fuller’s legal theory has
anything instructive to say about the relationship between law and morality and whether
Fuller’s theory is sufficiently rich to support theoretical expansion from legal philosophy into
other fields of ethics such as legal ethics. Does this theory have the normative legs to walk or
were its limitations shown long ago by legal philosophers? Is there anything of moral value to
the principles of legality? These questions about Fuller’s legal theory will be answered by asking
whether (1) Fuller provides a theory of law that has a strong argument for being an accurate
account of law (certainly not in its totality, but in some philosophically relevant aspect and (2)
whether there is anything in Fuller’s theory that can sustain obligations (moral or otherwise).
Kristen Rundle provides the broad outline of the structure that can be used to undertake
such a project when, in her recent work on Fuller, she says, “[A] proper understanding of Fuller’s
jurisprudence requires that we begin with his enduring interest in the distinctiveness of law’s
form, and then, from this starting point, witness how he proceeds to interrogate the
implications of that form for the character, existence and normativity of law, and, indeed, for
the enterprise of legal philosophy itself”. 1 According to Fuller, law is formally distinct as a type
of governance by being an “enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
general rules”.

2

Dealing with issues of the existence of law, he sets out an account of the

conditions that a system must meet in order to govern human conduct in this way and thus to
be law. Building on these conditions, Fuller deals with the normative implications thereof and
develops his legal theory of procedural naturalism, which has implications for the basic
questions that legal philosophy asks, such as what law is and how law relates to morality. We
can understand more about the uniqueness of Fuller’s legal philosophy and the distinctness of
the form of law by having a thoroughgoing understanding of the elements which comprise

1

Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2012) [Rundle, Forms Liberate] at 2.
2
Ibid.
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Fuller’s procedural naturalism. Fuller provides these elements in Chapter II of The Morality of
Law, perhaps the most famous and most cited portion of Fuller’s work. 3
The functional aspect of Fuller’s account of procedural naturalism, provides a necessary
condition for the existence of law is that it perform the function of guiding human conduct
through the provision of general rules. From there, Fuller identifies eight desiderata that are
used to determine the question of whether a purported legal system performs the rule-setting,
conduct-guiding function of law. These desiderata are: (1) Generality – the legal system should
have general rules; (2) Promulgation – laws should be published; (3) Prospectivity – laws should
be prospective; (4) Clarity – laws should be clearly stated and understandable; (5) Consistency –
laws should be consistent with one another; (6) Possibility – laws should not command the
impossible; (7) Constancy – laws should not be subject to constant change; (8) Congruence –
consistency between the law as declared and as administered. 4 Fuller says that “A total failure
in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in
something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian
sense in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of contract”. 5 Plainly, one cannot
be guided by a rule that commands him/her to act, or refrain from acting, yesterday or by a law
that commands something that it impossible for him/her to do. Even more clearly, the truism
among Fuller’s desiderata, law cannot have general rules if it is inconsistent with the
desideratum of generality in virtue of, to take the extreme case, all laws being commands to
individuals rather than being stated for general application.
From that functionalist thesis, Fuller’s theory becomes classified under the heading of
natural law as he adopts a moral thesis which says that the rule of law and its desiderata, in
addition to being functional conditions, are also moral conditions for the existence of law.
Briefly, the desiderata of the rule of law are, as one aspect of their nature, moral conditions
because they (1) prevent certain evils from being done to citizens6, in specific terms, (2) pursue

3

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) [Fuller, Morality of
Law] c. II.
4
Ibid. at 39. Fuller undertakes a detailed exposition of these desiderata in ibid. at 46-91.
5
Ibid.
6
Most evidently, Fuller’s rule of law conditions prevent the moral evils that are addressed directly and
explicitly in his eight desiderata as related to the functional purpose of guiding human conduct. For
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certain moral values (such as respect for individual autonomy)7, in general terms, and thereby,
(3) in Fuller’s ambitious view, make legal systems tend away from evil, such as from the evil of
tyrannical regimes. 8
Jeremy Waldron has a sophisticated account of what I have just called Fuller’s
functionalist thesis and moral thesis, which together, in a two-step argument, make up Fuller’s
internal morality of law (Fuller’s Internal Morality Thesis). Waldron looks at the possible ways in
which these two steps might be expressed, the options available to legal philosophers in terms
of affirming or denying the theses and, finally, the positions taken by Fuller and Hart.

9

These

two steps show the logical structure of Fuller’s case for the internal morality of law, which
posits, as Rundle says generally about Fuller’s theory, that “[T]he question of whether one is in
fact governing through law is always measurable by the extent to which the morally significant
demands of lawgiving [as expressed in the desiderata of the rule of law] are met”. 10 According

example, the desideratum of prospectivity guards against what Fuller calls “the brutal absurdity of
commanding a man today to do something yesterday”, ibid. at 59.
7
Ibid. at 162-163.
8
Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630
[Fuller, “Positivism & Fidelity”] at 636, arguing that “coherence and goodness have more affinity than
coherence and evil”, at 637, arguing that “even in the most perverted regimes there is a certain hesitancy
about writing cruelties, intolerances, and inhumanities into law”; Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3 at
152-167, in which Fuller chronicles “the substantive aims of law” and the ways in which the internal
morality of law facilitates the pursuit of certain moral ends. In The Morality of Law, ibid. at 154, Fuller
asks, rhetorically, in response a Hartian objection about the compatibility of the rule of law with iniquity,
“Does [H.L.A.] Hart mean to assert that history does in fact afford significant examples of regimes that
have combined a faithful adherence to the internal morality of law with brutal indifference to justice and
human welfare?” In this statement, Fuller goes further than I could accept in terms of the idea that law
tends away from evil. Not only does he say that law tends away from evil, the thrust of his rhetorical
question suggests that law has very successfully avoided evil. As summarized below, in Section 2.3.3) at
62-63; and Section 3) at 72-73, with the example of the treatment of women, Luban has shown that such
a factual/historical claim would not be accurate.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that there do not exist elaborations upon Fuller’s theory of legal
philosophy that could lead me to agree with a more modest version of his idea that law tends away from
evil, especially in a way that is fitting for a discussion of the ethics of lawyers. I summarize these
elaborations below in Section 2.3.2) at 51-58; Section 3) at 73-76, especially; and Section 4.4).
9
Jeremy Waldron, “Positivism and Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller” (2008) 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1135 [Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”] at 1139-1144; N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007) [Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea] at 65, 81 also noted the two-step
(functionalist and ethical) structure of Fuller’s argument.
10
Rundle, Forms Liberate, supra note 1 at 4.
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to this view, “To abuse law is, at a certain point, to lose law”. 11 Doing particular kinds of moral
wrongs undermines the function of law and thus the legal validity of a purported legal system.

2.2) The Positivist Challenge – The Rule of Law is Not a Moral Condition
It is sometimes difficult to gauge the exact degree to which legal scholars accept Fuller’s
thesis. Legal philosophers, including Hart and Raz have expressed their agreement with that idea
that, in order for something to be law, it must be able to perform the Fullerian conduct-guiding
function of law to at least some degree. 12 Hart and Raz also agree, to a large extent, with Fuller
about the rule of law conditions that a system must meet in order to perform the conductguiding function of law. 13
On the topic of the morality of the rule of law, however, Raz sharply disagrees with
Fuller. Rather than being functional conditions for the existence of law with moral aspects to
them, Raz argues that the principles of legality are simply conditions of efficacy for a legal
11

Ibid; As Rundle also notes, ibid., discussing obstacles to the “understanding and embracing” of Fuller’s
view, Fuller’s idea of the internal morality of law sets an “[A]vowedly idealistic tenor of Fuller’s
project...set a high bar for a lawgiver, and thus also a high bar for what ought to be designated as a legal
system. It is a normatively demanding view of law”.
12
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1144-1169 catalogues the instances in which
Hart seems more amenable to Fuller’s view, especially the functionalist points; Joseph Raz, The Authority
of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Raz, Authority of Law]
at 219-226, in particular, the example that Raz gives at 226 about the minimal functional ability to cut,
which is required of a knife. While this point is used to criticize Fuller’s moral thesis, it is indeed an
acknowledgement, albeit in unenthusiastic one, of the merits of the functionalist aspect of Fuller’s case.
13
See H.L.A. Hart, “Problems of Philosophy of Law” in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 264 [Hart, “Philosophy of Law”] at 273-274, where Hart runs through
an account of the conditions of the rule of law, many of which are similar to Fuller’s, such as prospectivity,
clarity, promulgation, etc., while also proposing conditions, such as respect for the principles of natural
justice and lack of bias in the judiciary/judicial independence, not included in Fuller’s list of the eight
desiderata of the rule of law (but which Fuller would not necessarily reject since Fuller’s eight desiderata
are not meant to be taken as a closed list, see Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3 at 38-39, where Fuller
says “[T]he attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at least eight ways”
[emphasis added]).
See Raz, Authority of Law, ibid. at 214-219, where Raz gives a list of conditions similar to those of Hart and
Fuller, and where Raz also proposes conditions, such as judicial independence and access to justice, that
are beyond what Fuller proposes in the eight desiderata, Raz, Authority of Law, ibid. at 217.
Note also that, with respect to some of these additional criteria that Hart and Raz propose, such as judicial
independence/freedom from judicial bias and respect for natural justice, there might be a case to be
made that they could be subsumed under Fuller’s desideratum of congruence between the law as
declared and as administered.
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system to be able to perform its function and to be excellent as law. Raz argues that just as a
knife must have some minimal capacity to cut in order to perform its function and satisfy one of
the functional conditions of being a knife, so too must law have the ability to perform its
function of guiding human conduct. However, Raz argues that the eight conditions do not
actually promote moral values. They are simply conditions of efficacy and are morally neutral.
Additionally, the fact that the conditions of law’s efficacy are compatible with a great deal of
immorality indicates to Raz that they cannot be considered to be moral conditions, and certainly
not moral virtues.

14

On the basis that it fails in its moral claim, Raz argues that Fuller’s

procedural naturalist argument does not succeed and thus that Fuller does not prove any
necessary connection between law and morality.
Hart, on the other hand, is much more equivocal than Raz on this topic. Greater detail
on Hart’s differing views about the morality of the rule of law is found later in this paper.

15

Hart’s equivocations do not appear in any direct interactions with Fuller. When Hart is directly
considering Fuller’s proposal, Hart makes arguments like his clever comparison between Fuller’s

14

Raz, Authority of Law, ibid. at 224-226. For a debate specifically about this same argument, see
Matthew H. Kramer, “On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law” (2004) 63 Cambridge L.J. 65 [Kramer,
“Moral Status ROL”] on the positivist side of this argument and N.E. Simmonds, “Straightforwardly False:
The Collapse of Kramer's Positivism” (2004) 63 Cambridge L.J. 98 on the side of procedural naturalism.
Raz additionally makes an argument attempting to minimize the moral significance of the rule of law by
saying that it is merely a negative value that would prevent evils that either (1) could only be at risk of
materializing where there is law or (2) that are materialized wherever law is seen, although they are also
seen elsewhere in addition to law. See Raz, Authority of Law, ibid. at 224. I will not directly address that
argument in this paper. The reason is that the distinction between a negative and a positive moral value
for the purpose of the question of whether the procedural naturalist thesis goes through is largely trivial.
Whether the rule of law (1) provides us with moral values that must be achieved in order to have law or
(2) provides us with a set of conditions pertaining to moral evils, typically raised by law, that must be
avoided in order for us to have law, the result would still be that there are moral conditions that are
necessary conditions for the existence of law, which is the thesis of procedural naturalism. Of course, I will
not dispute that a positive value is more satisfying than a negative value. This is why I endorse Simmonds’
thesis, especially for the purpose of lawyering, about the moral value and relevance of the rule of law.
Simmonds’ thesis is contrary to Raz’s negative value thesis and is developed, below, in Section 2.3.2) at
44-49, where I summarize Simmonds’ case for the positive value of the rule of law in virtue of the rule of
law’s embodiment of moral values; below, in Section 2.3.2) at 49-51, in terms of Simmonds’ argument
that the criticism from compatibility with wicked regimes does not follow; and, below, in Section 2.3.2) at
51-58, where we can find my summary of Simmonds’ argument for the link between the rule of law and
justice as it pertains to the moral relevance of the rule of law.
15

Below, in Section 4.3.2) at 86-89.
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purported internal morality and the internal conditions of efficacy for poisoning another person.
16

Hart argues that there are indeed conditions that a person must meet in order to poison

someone. However, the achievement of such “excellence” does not recommend to us the
suggestion that the conditions for effective poisoning are moral conditions. The conditions of
law’s efficacy are like the conditions of efficacy for poisoning and are not moral conditions
merely by virtue of the fact that they are necessary for law to perform its function. When Hart is
making such arguments, I will place him into the Razian school of thought about morality and
the rule of law. This is the focus of the present section of the paper. At other times, however,
Hart is more willing to accept, either explicitly or implicitly, that the desiderata of the rule of law
are indeed moral conditions. For now, let us consider replies to the argument of which Raz has
recently been the champion and to which Hart sometimes subscribes. Throughout the section, I
will refer only to Raz because of his prominent role here, but please take “Raz” when he is
mentioned in this section to include Hart too when Hart takes the view on the anti-Fullerian side
of his equivocation about the moral status of legality.

2.3) Defending Fuller – Arguing for the Morality of the Rule of Law
2.3.1) The Positivist Critique Does Not Follow or Is Not Sound
I will begin with some general responses that have been given to the positivist critique
of Fuller’s theory of the internal morality of law. The authors whose work I cite here do not build
their own Fullerian theories of law. Rather, they have discussed the positivist criticism of Fuller
and see convincing reasons to conclude that the positivist critique of Fuller, especially as it has
been made by Raz, misses the mark.

16

In H.L.A. Hart, Book Review of The Morality of Law by Lon L. Fuller (1965) 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 [Hart,
“Book Review”] at 1285-1286, Hart famously argues:
“[T]he author's insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a ‘morality’ is a source of confusion
both for him and his readers.... [T]he crucial objection to the designation of these principles of good legal
craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification ‘inner,’ is that it perpetrates a confusion between
two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions of purposive activity and morality. Poisoning is no
doubt a purposive activity, and reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles.
(‘Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit’....) But to call these principles of the
poisoner's art ‘the morality of poisoning’ would simply blur the distinction between the notion of
efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its
various forms is concerned”.
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One of the major arguments that Raz offers for his view is that, even when the legal
system abides by the principles of legality, it is still possible for the legal system to be evil, on
balance. 17 This is a criticism of the moral status of the rule of law. One can state this particular
criticism in at least three versions. I will refer to the general argument just mentioned, a major
criticism given by Raz of the idea of the internal morality of law, as the “Compatibility and
Amorality Thesis”. Stated differently, the idea is that the positivist thesis regarding the rule of
law’s amorality has a relationship of some kind with the rule of law’s compatibility with
immorality. This argument has two weak versions and one strong version, the various measures
of strength referring to the boldness of the normative claims made by the different versions of
the thesis. According to one weak version, the rule of law does not constitute an internal
morality of law because, despite the fact that the rule of law makes, or may make, a
contribution to the “moral quality of law”18 in the direction of moral goodness, or away from
moral evil, the rule of law is still compatible with great immorality within the legal system. Thus,
this version argues for direct logical entailment of amorality from compatibility with evil and
does not make any claim, or does not necessarily make any claim (meaning that a variety of
stances are available), about the contribution (not the ability to settle the issue) that the rule of
law makes to the moral quality of law.
Another weak version, instead of being open to the idea that the rule of law could make
no contribution to the moral status of law, has the specific feature of accepting that the rule of
law makes a morally good contribution to the moral quality of law. In addition, rather than
holding that compatibility with evil entails a condition’s amorality, this second weak version
holds that what one should conclude, on the basis of the rule of law’s compatibility with evil, is
that the rule of law does not make a particularly substantial contribution to the moral status of
law, even though the rule of law does indeed make a positive moral contribution. Like the first
weak version, this second weak expression attempts to draw direct logical entailment from
compatibility with evil to a particular moral evaluation of the rule of law.
On the other hand, the strong version of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis states
that the rule of law does not constitute an internal morality of law because the rule of law, by

17
18

See note 14 and accompanying text, above.
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1163.
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reason of the fact that it is a condition of efficacy and thus a mere amoral functional condition,
does not make any contribution (even a prima facie contribution that, as it so happens, is
consistently unsuccessful at being determinative of the moral status of the rule of law) to the
moral status of the rule of law. The strong version, rather than attempting to go directly from
compatibility to amorality, introduces a definite moral thesis about the contribution that the
rule of law could possibly make to the moral quality of the rule of law. This contribution is nonexistent because the rule of law is capable of being used for, not just merely allowing, evil in no
lesser measure than it is capable of being used for good. In this case, compatibility is the product
of the reasoning process, the conclusion of the argument, rather than a premise or indicator of
law’s moral quality as moral or amoral.
In response to the weak version of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis, I will draw an
analogy to an argument made by Waldron about a related issue: the ability of the rule of law to
generate political obligation, i.e. a moral duty to obey the law.

19

Jeremy Waldron has made a

significant contribution to the understanding of the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller. Waldron
recognizes that Fuller, although being a procedural naturalist, viewed the principles of legality as
being deeply tied with the achievement of certain substantive moral and political goods. On the
topic of political obligation, Waldron argues that, even if some of the positivist theses about the
relationship between the rule of law and morality are true, positivists are still not justified in
concluding that the principles of legality are conditions of efficacy rather than conditions of
morality. This is the argument that I will analogize in order to demonstrate that the weak
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For surveys of the debate within legal philosophy over political obligation, the moral duty to obey the
law, see Leslie Green, “Law and Obligations” [Green, “Law and Obligations”] in Jules L. Coleman & Scott
Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002) 514 [Coleman & Shapiro, eds., “Handbook of Jurisprudence”]; George Klosko, “The Moral
Obligation to Obey the Law” in Andrei Marmor, ed., The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New
York: Routledge, 2012) 511; M.B.E. Smith, “The Duty to Obey the Law” in Dennis Patterson, ed., A
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2d ed. (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 457.
These authors deal with the debate in terms of (1) the various reasons for denying or affirming the
existence of the moral duty to obey the law (especially the proposed groundings of the duty) and (2) the
extent of the moral duty (generalized to the legal system or specific to particular laws, kinds of laws,
persons, roles, relationships with the law or relationships governed by law), if it exists.
The issue of political obligation is briefly mentioned as a future research topic for my theory of Fullerian
lawyering below, in the Conclusion, at 175.
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version of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis does not follow and that compatibility with
evil does not logically entail a conclusion about the moral contribution that the rule of law
makes to the moral quality of law.
In arguing about Hart’s response, which Waldron described as equivocal,20 to the idea
that the rule of law constitutes an internal morality of law, Waldron proposes that Hart might be
able to accept what I will call Fuller’s “Internal Morality Thesis”21 that the rule of law makes a
positive contribution to the moral status of law (thus giving up a strong version of the
Compatibility and Amorality Thesis on the question of the moral contribution of the rule of law
to the moral quality of law). At the same time, because the vindication of the rule of law is
compatible with great immorality within the legal system, Hart could reject the idea that such a
conclusion in Fuller’s direction in terms of this first question could be determinative of the
separate issue of political obligation. 22 In the same way that is done by the weak versions of the
Compatibility and Amorality Thesis, compatibility with immorality is also taken here to be
sufficient to prove that the concept that is compatible with immorality, in this case the rule of
law, cannot generate political obligation.
Hart could indeed take this viewpoint; however the conclusion would not be favourable
to the separability thesis. The reason for this is that the separability thesis demands a stronger
insistence on separability than Waldron’s option offers Hart. In addition to denying that there
are any necessary connections between law and morality, the separability thesis, obviously,
denies any arguments about political obligation that rely on theses made in natural law theories
of jurisprudence about the connection between law and morality. Simply, the separability thesis,
while denying a natural law thesis, also has to deny any argument about law that relies on these
natural law theses as premises within the argument. Taking up the viewpoint of which Waldron
suggests Hart might avail himself would involve remaining consistent with the separability
thesis’ denial of arguments that depend upon Fuller’s procedural naturalist case (i.e. refusing to

20

Waldron’s discussion of Hart’s equivocations on the topic of the internal morality of law is summarized
in greater detail below, in Section 4.3.2) at 86-89.
21
I will use the term “Internal Morality Thesis” to refer both to Fuller’s theory about the internal morality
of law and to refer to an aspect of my own Fullerian theory of lawyering proposed, below, in Section 4.3).
In either case, I will clearly indicate whether in am referring to Fuller’s own theory or to an aspect the
theory of philosophical legal ethics that I am building on the basis of Fuller’s jurisprudence.
22
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1163.
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use a natural law thesis as a premise in another argument) but would involve undermining the
separability thesis’ direct response to the procedural naturalist thesis itself.
Waldron points out that the principles of legality do not need to have determinative
force over issues such as whether there is a moral duty upon the inhabitants of a state to obey
the law, in order to support a natural law thesis of the kind that Fuller wants and for the
principles of legality to indeed constitute an internal morality of law. Waldron argues:
[T]he separability thesis is not only supposed to deny that whether or not a norm is law has
conclusive moral implications; it is also supposed to deny that it has any prima facie moral
significance. The separability thesis is certainly not satisfied by showing that although a norm's
being law has some moral implications, those implications are not strong enough to settle the
question of political obligation [i.e. the question of whether there is a moral duty to obey the
law]. 23

Thus, in this case, the separability thesis’ denial of the political obligation purportedly
generated by Fuller’s procedural naturalist internal morality of law, accompanied by the
acceptance of the idea that the rule of law does make an affirmative contribution to the moral
quality of law is not an account of legal philosophy that could sustain the separability thesis with
respect to the moral quality of law. This is because various positivist ideas, including the
separability thesis, require more than that purported conditions of moral normativity not have
the ability to determine the answer to a particular moral issue that is being asked about the law
(such as the moral issue of political obligation). Ideas such as the separability thesis, and the
separability thesis’ specific argument for the amorality of the rule of law, also require that the
relevant concept not have any prima facie moral relevance. The account that Waldron offers to
Hart explicitly does not do so and thus fails as a positivist thesis. Such a stance would be
deficient, and even counterproductive, in the effort to show that Fuller’s theory does not
provide an internal morality of law. To put this conclusion from Waldron in terms of the
Compatibility and Amorality Thesis, compatibility with immorality may show that the rule of law
cannot determine the issue of political obligation, and that the rule of law cannot determine the
moral quality of a legal system. However, this compatibility with immorality would not be
sufficient to show that the rule of law does not constitute a morality of law or does not have
prima facie moral value such that the separability thesis would be true.

23

Ibid. at 1164.
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Just as it would not be enough for a positivist argument on the topic of political
obligation to show that the rule of law is only prima facie morally significant, the same is true for
the moral status of the rule of law in relation to the moral status of the legal system. An
identical problem would arise for positivism when it comes to weak versions of the
Compatibility and Amorality Thesis, which would recognize, or be open to, the rule of law’s
ability to make morally good contributions to the moral quality of legal systems, but which
would then attempt to head off Fuller’s Internal Morality Thesis on the basis of the suggestion
that the rule of law cannot be determinative of the moral quality of legal systems. Just as in
Waldron’s argument about political obligation, and working off of the structure in the previous
quote, we see that it is not enough for the separability thesis to deny that the rule of law has
conclusive moral implications. The separability thesis must also deny the prima facie moral
significance of the rule of law. An author is not sufficiently supportive of the separability thesis
from a positivist perspective if s/he admits the functional thesis of Fuller’s theory of the internal
morality of law, accepts that the rule of law has some moral implications, but disclaims the
moral relevance of the rule of law because the vindication of the rule of law is not strong
enough to ensure that the legal systems in which it is vindicated are not morally evil.
Thus, even if one were to grant the premise that the rule of law is compatible with
substantial immorality within legal systems, a thesis that Fuller might accept but substantially
qualify or outright oppose24, it would not be entailed from that, as would have been argued
under weak versions of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis, that the rule of law is an amoral
condition or is not a particularly important moral condition. The rule of law would be shown to
not be determinative of the moral quality of the legal system, but could still have substantial
moral value. This moral value could contribute to the moral quality of law or have prima facie
moral significance in terms of the moral quality of the legal system. The separability thesis
requires a denial of all of these kinds of value. This reply to weak versions of the Compatibility
and Amorality Thesis cuts deep into what exactly would be required for a purely positivist theory
of law to succeed. It would require far more than showing that internal morality is not
determinative of law’s moral quality. Therefore, while the compatibility between the vindication
of the rule of law and evil within the legal system can be part of a positivist argument that the
24

Above at note 8 and accompanying text.
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rule of law does not provide an internal morality of law, the conclusion stated in the weak
version of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis does not follow logically from the premises of
the argument.
Seeing that this positivist criticism of Fuller would not prove the truth of the positivist
position on Fuller even if the criticism were true (i.e. seeing that this particular positivist
criticism of Fuller is not logically valid), I turn to arguments over what I have called the strong
version of the Compatibility and Amorality Thesis: the question of whether positivists are correct
to say that the rule of law is not a moral condition for the existence of law (i.e. whether the one
of the major premises in this particular positivist criticism of Fuller is sound). Arguing against the
strong version will require both that positivist arguments for the rule of law’ amorality be
undermined and that an affirmative case be put forward for the moral value of the rule of law. I
take up this case for the remainder of Section 2) and also for Section 3) of this paper. 25
Against the Razian and Hartian thesis that Fuller’s eight desiderata represent mere
internal conditions of efficacy, I begin with the work of Allan C. Hutchinson. Hutchinson has
criticized some of the strongest advocates of positivism, especially when they gloss over the role
that interpretation and contested meaning have in determining what the law is. He does not
adopt the strict fact/value distinction than many positivists would like to say is so wellestablished in law. 26 On the point of the internal morality of law, he rejects Raz’s attempt to demoralize, the rule of law. Hutchinson argues:
Although Raz would still likely insist that the Rule of Law is more aptly thought about in terms of
efficacy than morality, there is a significant difference between whether tools are suited to their
chosen function and whether law is sufficiently knowable to guide people’s conduct. To use Raz’s
example, it is one thing to criticize knives as being insufficiently sharp to accomplish their cutting
tasks, but it is another thing entirely to condemn law for punishing people when they have no
idea why and for what they are being punished. While conformity with the Rule of Law will
obviously not itself guarantee a ‘good’ legal system, its complete flouting will itself be a moral
failing and contribute to the goodness or badness of the legal system, regardless of the
substantive cut of its normative content. 27

The argument that Hutchinson provides here is that, in agreeing with the functional case
for the rule of law, Raz has adopted a “qualitative dimension to law’s existence”. 28 Importantly,
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Below in Section 2) at 37-63, Section 3).
Allan C. Hutchinson, “Razzle-Dazzle” (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 39 [Hutchinson, “Razzle-Dazzle”] at 57-58.
27
Ibid. at 54 [footnote omitted].
28
Ibid. at 55.
26
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this qualitative dimension is not analogous to the failure of a knife to cut. We can readily identify
moral wrongness in the action of punishing someone “when they have no idea why and for what
they are being punished”.29 Hutchinson briefly discusses the moral content of the “qualitative
dimension” to law’s existence when he mentions the function of law in guiding people’s conduct
and the failure to achieve this function when one is “punishing people when they have no idea
why and for what they are being punished”. This response to the positivist critique is developed
and turned into part of the affirmative case of some strongly Fullerian theories that will be
discussed later in this paper. 30
For now, let me turn to a response to an interesting critique of Fullerianism, especially
from the perspective of this paper. This critique is really just a subset of the more general
critique that the rule of law is compatible with a great deal of evil.

31

The criticism currently

under consideration takes the specific focus of the role that people have in bringing about the
evil with which the rule of law is compatible. Taking political realities into account, positivists
argue that the moral force of the principles of legality is undermined by the fact that rulers who
are hostile to the purported moral values of the rule of law may abide by the rule of law for their
own strategic reasons while working to create a system that is immoral overall. 32

29

Ibid. at 54.
This affirmative case is the proposal of positive or affirmative moral content within the rule of law. In
proposing such content, the authors that I discuss develop the idea of why it is morally wrong to violate
what Hutchinson has called the “qualitative dimensions to law’s existence”, ibid. at 55, and thus why it is
wrong to do things such as “punishing people when they have no idea why and for what they are being
punished”, ibid. at 54. See proposals about the positive moral content of the rule of law summarized
below, in this same section, note 33, and accompanying text, as given by Waldron; Section 2.3.2) at 44-49,
51-58, below, as suggested by Simmonds, whose theory is itself Fullerian; and Section 2.3.3) at 60-63, and
Section 3) at 68-69, below, as discussed by Luban. All three proposals for the affirmative/positive moral
content of the rule of law centre on the notion of respect for individual autonomy/human agency.
31
It is typically not set apart as a distinct objection from the objection that the rule of law is compatible
with evil. Nonetheless, the objection raises interesting issues about the people actually involved in
creating legal regimes, in this case evil regime, and is thus worth highlighting as an expression of the
compatibility with evil objection.
32
The best articulation of this criticism can be found in Matthew H. Kramer, In Defence of Legal Positivism:
Law without Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 63-70, where Kramer develops the
objection as “[A] first-person statement of [the] normative proposition”, at 63; Kramer, “Moral Status
ROL”, supra note 14, in which Kramer makes this positivist critique while considering the “reasons-foraction”, at 67, that play into the reasoning of legal officials in relation to the practical application and use
of the rule of law.
30
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Against the thesis that the moral status of the principles of legality are undermined by
the ability of scoundrels or evil rulers to pursue their goals even while abiding by the rule of law,
Waldron responds by showing how that attack on the moral quality of the principles of legality
also fails to prove the positivist thesis even though the substance of the attack is true. Waldron
says:
Many (if not all) legal positivists regard it as definitional that the function of law is to guide
conduct. That law cannot, in general, guide human conduct unless its directives are clear, public,
prospective, practicable, and relatively constant relates directly (as Fuller noticed) to the moral
ideal of respecting the human capacity for responsible agency and self-monitoring. The idea that,
if one is to rule human beings, one should work with this capacity-rather than short-circuiting it
through manipulation or terror-is an idea of considerable moral significance; a system of rule is
better if humans are ruled in this rather than in some other way. Of course, a ruler may have
reasons of his own for trying to guide the conduct of his subjects (rather than galvanizing it in
some other way), and those reasons need not themselves involve moral respect for the dignity of
human agency. No one is denying that rulers may have nonmoral reasons for abiding by the
principles of legality. But that does not deprive the principles of their moral significance, nor does
it mean that their criterial connection with law is purely a result of rulers' characteristic
opportunism. Law itself may be an enterprise unintelligible apart from the function of treating
humans as dignified and responsible agents capable of self-control; unscrupulous rulers must
make what they can of that fact when they decide, for reasons of their own, to buy into the
‘legal’ way of doing things. 33

Just as the inability of the principles of legality to have a determinative role on the
content of law or the moral quality of the legal system or a subset of norms within the legal
system does not imply that the principles are conditions of efficacy rather than conditions of
morality, so too it is the case that the status of the principles of legality is not determined by
their inability to have determinative role in the practical reasoning of and regarding a corrupt
ruler or regime.
Thus, having seen general arguments from both Hutchinson and Waldron against the
mere-efficacy criticism, the principles of legality stand planted firmly as moral conditions. The
Note also, beyond the topic of such less than benevolent rulers, my summary of Luban’s argument, below,
in Section 2.3.3) at 62-63, Section 3) at 72-73, where Luban shows the way in which actors in legal systems
can participate in the creation or allowance of the kind of evil that the rule of law should abhor (namely,
the subjugation of groups of people, e.g. women) while not totally undermining the validity of the legal
system on rule of law grounds. Luban argues that, unfortunately, the rule of law seems to be able to
tolerate the subjugation of vast groups of people within a society and legal system.
33

Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1167 [emphasis in original, footnotes omitted].
In Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 78-99, Simmonds, in response to Kramer, makes a similar
argument to Waldron’s, and furthermore argues that wicked regimes will frequently have affirmative
reasons to deviate from the rule of law.
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principles and the general Fullerian theory, therefore, are a key to an appreciation of the
relationship between law and morality and, for the purpose of this paper, the relationship
between law, morality and lawyering.
How far do the general arguments summarized in this section go in terms of arguing
against positivism? Hutchinson makes a point that both emphasizes the weakened position in
which his argument puts positivists of the Razian kind vis-à-vis Fuller, but also hints at the
possible compatibility between Fuller’s procedural naturalism and certain kinds of legal
positivism. Hutchinson says:
None of this [meaning Hutchinson’s arguments as quoted in this section of my paper] challenges
the basic and salutary positivist precept that law can be a vehicle for immorality as much as it can
be a bulwark against it. However, what it does suggest is that, if Raz is considered to be the most
die-hard of positivists in his adherence to a strict law/morality divide, then both Raz and other
positivists are left very exposed and in need of much greater defence than is presently on offer in
Between Authority and Interpretation. 34

I would suggest that the same is true for Waldron’s arguments as summarized in this
section. The arguments that I have summarized here from Waldron also do not challenge “the
basic and salutary positivist precept that law can be a vehicle for immorality as much as it can be
a bulwark against it”. However, as Hutchinson said of his own view, Waldron’s general criticisms
do present challenges for Raz and other positivists, especially given their acceptance of the
necessity of the rule of law. This argument is measured between its acknowledgement of at
least one part of the procedural naturalist thesis (i.e. that the rule of law is indeed a moral
condition) and its view of the consequences for positivism. Hutchinson is not arguing that
Fuller’s internal morality is compatible with every positivist thesis. Indeed, the idea of internal
morality is not compatible with the positivist separability thesis: the idea that there is no
necessary connection between law and morality.

35

However, Hutchinson’s argument does

suggest some non-trivial compatibility between the procedural naturalist and the positivist in
terms of the limits of the rule of law’s ability to determine, all things considered, the moral
status of a legal system. I briefly discuss some compatibility between Fuller’s view and Hart’s
positivism below.

36

I believe that procedural naturalism can have quite a lot in common with
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Hutchinson, “Razzle-Dazzle”, supra note 26 at 55 [footnote omitted].
The positivist separability thesis was discussed above in Section 1.3), note 46.
36
Below in Section 4.3.2) at 86-91.
35
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certain kinds of positivism, sometimes more in common than certain versions of positivism have
with one another.

2.3.2) Moral Robustness through the Rule of Law – Simmonds’ View of “Law as a
Moral Idea”37
Having considered some general arguments in reply to the positivist criticism of Fuller, I
turn now to the work of two theorists, Nigel Simmonds and David Luban, who have each
developed robust affirmative cases for Fuller and procedural naturalism.

38

Of these two,

Simmonds is actually a Fullerian, whereas Luban would be best described as having an
admiration for Fuller’s work. Neither of these two affirmative cases have the compatibility with
positivism that is possible in the case of the general defences of Fuller summarized in the
previous section.
A recent, rich, and particularly rigorous reading of Fuller’s legal philosophy has been
given by the legal philosopher N.E. Simmonds in his book, Law as a Moral Idea. Simmonds gives
a multi-faceted account of the ways in which Fuller’s principles of legality are not only functional
principles but are also moral principles.
Before looking at Simmonds’ response to the Razian/Hartian critique of the morality of
the rule of law, consider the reply that might be offered by Simmonds specifically to Raz’s
central jurisprudential thesis discussed above.

39

Simmonds’ view runs counter to the view of

Raz and his refutation of Raz would specifically make use of the rule of law to undermine Raz’s
jurisprudential proposal.

40

Simmonds would argue that the account of authority that Raz

proposes skates over a question about the nature of law. If we are to hold, as we are by Raz,
37

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9.
There are also other strong affirmative defences of Fuller. Robert S. Summers, for example, explains the
affirmative moral value of the rule of law in terms of fairness. The desiderate of the rule of law, Summers
says, “[S]ecure that the citizen will have a fair opportunity to obey the law [emphasis in original]”, Robert
S. Summers, Lon L. Fuller (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984) at 37. One could that that Summers’
affirmative case for the morality of the rule of law could be put in terms of Simmonds’ more which
ranging theory, which will be developed in the present section of this paper.
39
Above in Section 1.1).
40
Simmonds’ arguments here are primarily against the rule of recognition, but they would also apply to
theories of law that attempt to say that purported law can exist as law in virtue of its social facticity
before the purported law interacts with morality or the moral claims of citizens. Thus, the criticisms
summarized here apply to Raz’s idea that citizens can turn to law as an exclusionary reason in the process
of practical reasoning.
38
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that legal reasons are able to replace other kinds of reasons in the activity of practical reasoning,
then it is essential for us to know what it means to give a legal reason. What is the nature of a
legal reason? Or, what are the conditions for giving a legal reason?
Carrying over the case from Fuller’s theory about the rule of law, Simmonds argues that
we can only know that we are dealing with the category of law, and thus giving legal reasons, if
we know that we have law on the matter for which we are giving legal reasons. That is so
because, before we can purport to give legal reasons, we must be able to have some way of
categorizing our reasons as belonging to the category of “law” or “legal”. 41 How can a rule or a
norm, more generally, be categorized as belonging to the category of “law”? Simmonds argues:
A fundamental question for legal theory concerns the basis of legality. How does a rule acquire
the character of law? Not by the simple fact of enactment, we may say: for the enactment of
rules can create law only when the enactment was itself authorized by law. Nor by the simple
fact of acceptance by some powerful cadre of ‘officials’: for law is invoked by judges as a
justification for their decisions, and judges could not intelligibly invoke the mere fact of their
acceptance of a rule (for what might be wholly self-regarding reasons) as a justification for their
decision. 42

41

Before a person can act on the basis of a legal reason (and therefore an exclusionary reason) s/he must
know whether the purported exclusionary reason is indeed a legal reason. S/he must know how to
identify a legal reason.
Note also that Raz’s theory of law’s peremptory force suffers an extra set of problems that will not be
discussed in the subsequent sections of this paper because it applies so specifically to Raz’s argument
rather than to positivist theories in general. Simmonds argues in Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 162,
that Raz’s argument about law’s peremptory force is also undermined in terms of its positivism by its own
condition of peremptory force. Simmonds argues there that “[T]he idea of law is fully realized only when
we feel that we can rely upon the compliance of others, and this we cannot do in the absence of coercive
enforcement of the rules”. Simmonds does not connect the dots of this argument here, it is fairly
straightforward. If “coercive enforcement of the rules” is necessary for the full realization of law even
when law is conceived in terms of Razian peremptory rules, then we might ask whether there are any
conditions for the “coercive enforcement of the rules”. Here again, the rule of law comes in as a necessary
condition. To cite some quick examples, one cannot have coercive enforcement of the rule of the
desiderata of generality (i.e. the requirement that the purported legal system actually have rules) and
logical consistency are not respected. The rule of law and morality have here a way to establish a
necessary connection between law and morality not just by having priority of necessity in relation to Raz’s
theory of the authority of law, but by actually being part of the conditions for the full realization of the
idea of law under Raz’s own theory.
Additionally, as will be seen immediately following this footnote, Simmonds argues that social facts and
acceptance by officials are not sufficient to identify law. The rule of law is one of the conditions for
knowing that the reasons in question are legal reasons.
42
Ibid. at 159. Simmonds restates this idea at other instances. For example, he argues at 170: “[L]egality
cannot simply be a matter of the derivability of one rule from another, or the subsumability of an action
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Since legality is one of the necessary conditions for the existence of law, we can only
know that we have law if law accords sufficiently with legality (specifically with the principles of
legality). The rule of law, under this account, has priority as functional condition over Raz’s
functional argument from dispute resolution. Even if Raz does indeed provide a convincing
account of a functional condition for the existence of law, and even if it is able to forestall the
entrance of morality into law through an inclusive positivist approach, Raz’s theory could not
stand against the Fullerian approach because Fuller’s functional condition must be achieved
before Raz’s functional condition can even be considered. As in the case of a digital media
player, which must be able to store media (or possibly access some source for streaming) before
it can be used to output media for consumption, law must also have the capacity to guide
human conduct before it can be used to resolve disputes in the way that Raz proposes. 43
Under Fullerian procedural naturalism, the principles of legality (i.e. the functionally
prior conditions) are moral principles. We are back where we left off after Fuller made his
contribution to legal philosophy. Fuller’s idea, because it is a necessary condition for the
existence of law, is able to show a targeted necessary connection between law and morality
through the rule of law.
Simmonds takes this idea of the rule of law’s priority among the various conditions for
the existence of law and develops an adjudicative account from it. 44 He says:

under a rule. Such derivability or subsumability represents legality only when the rule invoked as a source
of validation is itself a law. The legality of that validating rule (its status as a law) cannot always be derived
from a superior rule, for this would involve an infinite regress. Nor can the regress be blocked by the idea
of derivability from a rule of recognition that is simply accepted by the judges rather than the validating
by a higher derivation. For a rule of recognition accepted by the judges can confer legality only if it is itself
the rule of recognition of a system of law”.
See Simmonds’ detailed rebuttal of Hart and Hart’s view about place of the rule of recognition as a
criterion of legality in ibid., c. 4.
43
This functional priority does not necessarily mean that the rule of law is more important or even more
functionally important than Raz’s functional point. It simply means that the rule of law must be satisfied
before the authority of law in any discussion about whether a particular social norm meets the conditions
of being “law”.
44

The following quotations on adjudication, including in the subsequent footnote, mainly cite the rule of
recognition as the positivist validity condition over which the rule of law has priority in terms of the
provision of a theory of adjudication. However, I have been suggesting over the past several pages that
Simmonds also believes that the rule of law has priority over the condition of law’s authority. It is fair to
suggest that Simmonds would be of the same view when developing his theory of adjudication. This is to
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In fact, the rule of recognition can only ever form an abbreviated statement of the way in which
the value of legality bears upon the judge’s duty. The judge’s duty is not fully reducible to a duty
to follow a basic rule of recognition, but a much broader duty of fidelity to law. To determine the
precise scope and content of this duty, a judge must reflect upon the idea of law, in the light of
our collective historical experience of attempts to realize that idea. The idea of law is the idea of
a domain of universality and necessity within human affairs, making it possible to enjoy a degree
of freedom and independence from the power of others, in the context of life within a political
community. 45

He develops it in more detail with respect to a specific aspect of the adjudicative task,
explaining:
Judges order sanctions against defendants, and justify this by setting out the relevant laws. They
do not justify the imposition of sanction by pointing out that the defendant has violated a rule
that the judges happen to accept. Nor do they justify the sanction by pointing out that the rule
violated was a just rule. Nor do they tell us that, given all of the circumstances, the enforcement
of the rule is morally justified. Instead, they point out that the rule violated was a law. This is not
an irrelevant classificatory footnote to the judgment, but its foundation: the judge does not
conclude that enforcing the rule is the right thing to do (given its derivability from the rule of
recognition, or its justice, or a host of other considerations) and then add that, as it happens, the
rule is a law. It is the fact that the rule is a law that provides the basis for the justification of the
decision. The conception of law implicit within this practice is one wherein the legality of a rule is
fundamental to its justificatory force. 46

With these arguments, Simmonds shows that, as it pertains to the rule of law, positivist
theories, including Raz’s theory about the authority of law, are incomplete, both as legal
theories and as theories of adjudication.
If Simmonds is correct in the argument just made and if the rule of law is indeed a moral
condition, then Razians will be disappointed to see that they cannot use law’s authority as a way
to argue that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and that the law does
not incorporate morality into it. This is where the debate over the moral nature of the rule of
say, Simmonds’ view of the rule of law’s priority over various positivist theses (including the rule of
recognition and the authority of law) would carry over in terms of the theories of legal philosophy that
have criterial priority when developing a theory of adjudication.
45

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 188-189. I will develop the points about freedom and
independence from the power of others at 44-49, just below, in the current section. Those points are
more relevant to the moral aspect of this argument, but I have reproduced them in this quote for the sake
of context.
On the present point, see also ibid. at 196, “The judge’s duty is one of fidelity to law, and this is never fully
reducible to a duty to follow a basic rule of recognition. For the fact that a rule of derivable from a rule of
recognition cannot intelligibly be offered as a justification for a judicial decision unless the judge can claim
that the system containing that rule is a system of law”.
46
Ibid. at 172.
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law becomes relevant. There is a line of defence available to Razians even if Simmonds is right
that one cannot know whether a legal reason is being given without knowing whether the
purported legal reason abides by the rule of law. If the above47 Razian arguments against the
moral quality of the rule of law are correct, Razians can then admit that satisfaction of the rule
of law, to them a mere condition of efficacy, is needed in order to provide positivistic Razian
reasons while continuing to maintain that legal reasons replace moral reasons in practical
reasoning, as a matter of political philosophy, and in terms of achieving what Raz construes to
be a necessary condition for the existence of law, namely, law’s authority. Razians will want,
then, to continue to assert that legality and its principles are purely conditions of efficacy and
are not themselves moral conditions. I have already given a general argument above from
Hutchinson and Waldron about why this line of defence will not succeed for Raz.

48

However,

there is a more morally-focused case to be made from a more committed natural law
perspective. Toward that end, let us examine Simmonds’ argument for considering the
principles of legality to be moral conditions.
There are two approaches that Simmonds takes in making his argument. The first is to
propose a plausible positive moral content for the rule of law. Simply, if the principles of legality
are moral conditions, which moral values do they pursue? Simmonds says that the rule of law is
tied to the value of the autonomy of human beings. This is a familiar argument about the
positive moral content of the rule of law. As Rundle says:
For Fuller, there can be no meaningful concept of law that does not include a meaningful
limitation of the lawgiver’s power in favour of the agency of the legal subject. This is not a moral
objective that is imposed on the enterprise of lawgiving from without. It is, rather, simply
something that follows from the formal distinctiveness of law as the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of general rules. 49

Simmonds, in making the argument on this front, draws out the relevance that such a
claim has for moral and political philosophy. In making this argument, he shows the way in
47

Above, in Section 2.2) at 29-30.
Above, in Section 2.2), Section 2.3.1) at 31-33, for my summary of the positivist critique of the moral
status of the rule of law (a critique which I called the “Compatibility and Amorality Thesis”); Section 2.3.1)
at 33-37, for my summary of scholarly responses to the weak version of the critique; and 2.3.1) at 37-39,
for my summary of scholarly responses to the strong version of the critique.
49
Rundle, Forms Liberate, supra note 1 at 2. See also ibid. at 3, where Rundle says, summarizing an aspect
of Fuller’s legal theory, “[L]aw is also intrinsically moral for how its form—that of governance of general
rules—presupposes the legal subject’s status as a responsible agent. Thus, law is also intrinsically moral
for how, if it is to function, it must maintain and communicate respect for that status of agency”.
48
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which such a view about the moral content of the rule of law explains various other theses
about governance by law. He says:
One possibility would be to say that the conditions of legality are the conditions of liberty as
independence. For the fact that a rule forms one part of a system of rules embodying those
conditions would explain many of the features that we tend to associate with legality. Thus it
would explain why we tend to associate legality with the subsumability of actions under rules,
and the derivability of rules one from another. It would also explain how the legality of a rule can
intelligibly form part of a justification for the state’s use of force, or for a judicial decision; and it
would explain why the precise nature of legality has been continuously contested, so that ‘the
nature of law’ continues to be a major philosophical problem that is not capable of being
resolved by simple description of familiar institution. Perhaps legal thought is at bottom a
continuous reflection upon the possibility of realizing (and so fully comprehending) its own
guiding ideals. 50

In the course of playing out a thought experiment about the move from a pre-legal to a
legal world, Simmonds looks into the role that the rule of recognition and the rule of law play in
this transition. As a conclusion of this allegory, he argues, “If the invention of a rule of
recognition can be regarded as a step from the pre-legal to the legal world, this is perhaps
because the invention embodies a new insight: the understanding that it is only by creating a
domain of universality and necessity within human affairs that values of freedom and
independence can effectively be realized”.

50
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51

The way in which law creates a domain of

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 159.
Ibid. at 184. See the allegory at 182-189 [emphasis in original].

Rundle, in Forms Liberate, supra note 1 at 2 [footnote omitted] helpfully discusses what it means, from
the perspective of moral and political philosophy (with a focus on the value of individual autonomy) to be
in one particular kind of pre-legal world (or non-legal world) as opposed to being in the legal world.
“Fuller’s vision of law begins and never sways from the view that to label something as ‘law’ is to
designate a distinctive mode of governance. Law is a formally recognisable alternative to rule by men, and
this difference is made especially clear when we consider the status that is enjoyed by the subjects of a
legal as opposed to some other kind of order. To be a legal subject, Fuller insists, is not merely to be a
member of ‘a subservient populace ready to do what they are told to do’, but rather to be a participant in
a distinctly constituted social condition in which one is respected as an agent”. Seeing this kind of
distinction can help fill out the details of transition that Simmonds is discussing and make clear what is
gained by governance through law.
N.B., though, that Simmonds is not in agreement that the rule of recognition does mark the step from the
pre-legal to the legal world. After constructing a thought experiment dealing with the step from the prelegal to the legal world, in which Simmonds shows the way in which a legal system could come to exist
solely on the basis of the clear definition and enforcement of what would have been customary rules for a
society that resolved conflicts largely by compromise rather than my the strict application of rules,
Simmonds, in Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 186-187, says, “The activity of doctrinal scholarship has its
roots here, in the attempt to articulate as discrete rules the pattern of expectations and practices that
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universality and necessity within human affairs is of course, in the view of Fuller and Simmonds,
through the rule of law. 52
Importantly, again, Simmonds develops the idea into a theory of adjudication. Refer to
the earlier quotation53 in which Simmonds mentions the relevance that freedom and

have made up the customary life of a community. There may also be an effort to integrate the provision
of formal legal procedures and remedies with the background of customary understandings within which
they operate. At some much later stage a distinct set of criteria for the ‘validity’ of legal rules might
emerge (a ‘rule of recognition’). But, far from being the step that marks off the legal from the pre-legal
world, the development of such criteria tends to be an expedient aimed at addressing deficiencies in what
is already fully recognizable as a legal order....The step from the pre-legal to the legal world is to be found,
not so much in the introduction of a specific institution such as the rule of recognition, but in the growing
appreciation that, by creating a domain of universality and necessity within human affairs, we may realize
forms of freedom and independence that would not otherwise be conceivable”. Preceding the existence
of a legal system would have been a customary society in which members could not count on the
application of those customary norms to resolve disputes but would instead need to proceed on the basis
of compromise for the sake of continued harmony between the disputants, without the benefit of clear
rules to structure the relationships and dealings between the members of society.
52

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, ibid. at 188. In the last several pages, above, notes 45, 46 and
accompanying text, and, more generally discussed at 41-44, above, in the present section, I summarized
how Simmonds applies the functional step in the argument to the case of adjudication. Here, I explain
how Simmonds applies the ethical step in the two-step Fullerian procedural naturalist argument (this twostep argument was discussed above, in Section 2.1), especially note 9 and accompanying text) to the case
of adjudication. In the present citation, ibid. at 188, consider that Simmonds, making the ethical step in
the argument, says, “[I]t is insufficient to explain how judges might be guided by the rule of recognition,
for judges must justify their decisions. The mere fact that the decision is derivable from a rule of
recognition accepted by the officials could not intelligibly be offered to the litigants as a reason that
justifies the decision. For this reason, we should not think of legality as simply a matter of derivability
from a basic rule of recognition. For such derivability will confer legality only if the system, of which the
rule of recognition forms part, is itself a system of law. The features that qualify a system as legal in
character (features provisionally identified in Fuller’s eight desiderata) necessarily entail the provision of
domains of optional conduct that are independent of the will of others. It is the provision of such domains
of conduct that forms the value of legality, and provides the basis for the legal judgment’s justificatory
force” [emphasis in original; Simmonds refers to his discussion in ibid., c. 4 as well].
He does the same in ibid. at 191, arguing “To provide a justification, the rule must be derivable from a
system that exhibits certain properties that go beyond the acceptance of criteria of recognition. Those
properties will mark the system as one that approximates to the ideal of the rule of law; and they will be
logically tied to the notion of freedom as independence from the power of others.
There is, therefore, no sense of ‘law’ in which law can be detached from the value that we call ‘the rule of
law’, or in which legality is reduced to a simple matter of derivability from a rule of recognition...What
follows from this is that judicial invocations of the law, in the context of justifications for decisions, must
be construed as ultimately appealing to the ideal (of the rule of law) from which they derive their
justificatory force”.
53
Above at note 45.
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independence from the power of others have in allowing judges to apply the law in a way that is
consistent with the judge offering the law as a justification for the application of the norms that
will be imposed. Of particular interests here is the fact that Simmonds also states the
adjudicative aspect of the argument from the perspective of those who are subject to
adjudicative decisions by the court. He says:
[L]egal systems offer us less interpretive guidance the further they depart from the requirements
of justice. The more remote from justice that a body of law may be, the greater the scope that it
will leave for the exercise of ungrounded choice by the judge who must interpret its provisions.
Since legality is the set of conditions within which we can be independent of the power of others,
and since subjection to the choices of the judge is a clear subjection to the power of another,
significant departure from justice tends to breed departure from legality. 54

This reverse perspective on the act of adjudication is important for a full understanding
of the relevance of Simmonds’ theory to practical reasoning, and thus as a robust counter
theory to Raz’s authority-based and positivistic account of law and law’s relationship to practical
reasoning.
This proposal is important both for ethical reasons and also for reasons of specific
relevance to political philosophy. At a purely ethical level, if the conditions of legality are the
conditions for the exercise of independent decision-making, the conditions for human beings to
be self-guiding, then the conditions of legality play a central role in one of the most widelysupported and perhaps foundational values of ethics.

55

At the level of political philosophy,

autonomous decision-making is one of the central values in understanding why government (or
the state) itself and the use of force by the government (or the state) are justified. This, indeed,
is one of the central questions in understanding why law, as a set of norms imposed by the
54

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 198. Simmonds’s view on the relevance of justice in
relation to the rule of law is considered below, in this same section at 51-58. For now, let us focus on the
relevance that the present quote has for the purpose of proposing an adjudicative model that is based on
respect for individual autonomy.
55
Numerous philosophical theories of ethics, government, etc. have treated personal autonomy as an
important ethical value. To choose only a few examples from the rich western canon on the subject,
consider: (1) the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
trans. & analyzed by H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1964) at 69-71, 74-77, 87-89, 9799, 110-115; the political philosophy (especially the state of nature theories of) John Locke, Second
Treatise of Government, ed. by C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980) at 5265, 107-124 & Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1994) at 106-110, 136-145; finally, see the more recent political philosophies of John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999) at 171-221 & Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) at 10-53.
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state, is justified. Thus, Simmonds provides a robust way of understanding the moral value of
the rule of law.
To put this into a helpful moral framework, consider a distinction that Jeremy Waldron
has drawn between two different kinds of moral significance. These two are: (1) contingent
moral significance and (2) non-contingent moral significance. Contingent moral significance is
when a value is morally significant “[S]imply because the properties of a system of rule[s]
associated with observance of the [value, in this case the principles of legality,] happened to be
properties that other moral principles made morally significant”.

56

On the other hand, non-

contingent moral significance is when “[T]he moral significance of the [value, in this case the
principles of legality,] were not coincidental, if it were such that the principles of legality
themselves embodied certain moral principles or moral values”.

57

Simmonds’ account of the

moral value of legality is clearly an example of non-contingent moral significance. The principles
of legality do not simply have moral value because they happen to promote personal autonomy.
They themselves embody the value of personal autonomy, are themselves valuable as a way of
organizing government and a political society, and finally, in the case of Simmonds’ argument
about the possibility of achieving certain values (notably the rule of law and justice) only in
conjunction with one another58, have “criterial connections”59 with law and provide the avenue
by which other moral values have the same kind of criterial connection with law.
The second kind of argument used by Simmonds in arguing that the conditions of the
rule of law are moral conditions is a refutation of the idea that the moral character, or lack
thereof, of the rule of law can be determined simply by pointing out that wicked regimes are
capable of abiding by the rule of law. This defence of Fuller was considered above in my
summary of the arguments given by Hutchinson and Waldron.

60

Simmonds gives a similar

argument, but it is worthy of independent consideration in light of the arguments given by
56

Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1165 [emphasis in original].
Ibid.
58
More below, in this same section at 51-58, about the ability to abide by, or vindicate, certain moral
values only in conjunction with one another.
59
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 9 at 1140, at which Waldron explains criterial
relations as being a situation in which a concept, idea or other condition is “among the necessary criteria
for the proper application of” a concept, and at 1141 where he uses the term “criterial connection” within
the meaning just given for criterial relations.
60
Above in Section 2.3.1).
57
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Simmonds about the positive moral content of the rule of law in the first of these two
arguments. Simmonds’ second response to the critique of procedural naturalism points out that
it simply does not follow that a set of principles is not ethical in nature simply because it is
possible for a government to act in accordance with the principles and yet still be immoral. The
conclusion that a norm or set of norms are amorality61does not follow from the norm’s/set’s
inability to secure goodness as the definitive moral quality of the system of which the norm/set
of norms is a condition of validity. 62 The rule of law does push in a particular direction. The nondeterminativeness of that push does not imply moral neutrality. Simmonds, arguing on the basis
of the positive moral content of the rule of law, says:
Hart emphasizes the importance for legal theory of the ‘internal point of view’, and claims that
this point of view need not be a moral attitude of any sort. Officials, he tells us, can accept and
apply a system of law for entirely non-moral prudential reasons. In this, he may well be correct.
But, unfortunately for his argument, all of the contexts in which officials can accept and follow
such a system for non-moral reasons are parasitic upon moral considerations, or are dependent
upon the [legal] system already existing. Given the existence of a system of law, the officials of a
wicked regime may well find that they can exact and enforce laws that advance their wicked
goals. But this does not demonstrate that the establishment of a system of law where none exists
would itself help to advance their wicked goals. A system of law involves certain commitments, in
particular a commitment to use force only against those who have violated the rules, and such
commitments would not be serviceable for wicked goals, for (contrary) to that claims of some
positivists) such restrictions on the use of violence would not serve to increase the efficiency of
the regime’s pursuit of its goals, but would rather impede that pursuit. Wicked regimes may
maintain existing legal systems, but when they do this they do it in order to exploit the moral
value that is widely associated with government by law, or simply because the strategic
behaviour of the individuals composing the regime makes it impossible to capture the gains that
would flow from a wholesale abandonment of legality. 63

If that is true, then a wicked regime may abide by the rule of law but it does so against
an ethically rich counterforce.
Other legal philosophers, such as the natural law theorist John Finnis, have also argued
that the fact that a wicked regime can abide by the rule of law does not prove that the rule of
law is an amoral condition of efficacy. Finnis says that “A tyranny devoted to pernicious ends has
no self-sufficient reason to submit itself to the discipline of operating consistently through the
demanding processes of law, granted that the rational point of such self-discipline is the very
61

I.e. A norm’s status as a mere condition of efficacy rather than also as a moral condition (a norm
belonging to the category of morality).
62
Simmonds’ argument is highly similar on this front to those of Waldron and Hutchinson summarized
above in Section 2.3.1).
63
Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 188 [footnotes omitted].

Page | 50

value of reciprocity, fairness, and respect for persons which the tyrant, ex hypothesi, holds in
contempt”. 64 According to Finnis, this is because “Adherence to the Rule of Law (especially the
eighth requirement, of conformity by officials to pre-announced and stable general rules) is
always liable to reduce the efficiency for evil of an evil government, since it systematically
restricts the government’s freedom to maneuver”. 65 Thus, although the rule of law can exist in
both the context of a just regime and a wicked regime, the fact that a regime can abide by the
principle in both contexts does not show that the rule of law is merely a morally neutral
condition of efficacy. In fact, the rule of law, although not being able to prevent all wickedness,
works directly against it in specific ways. The rule of law may not always be able to redirect a
state that is enacting wickedness into its law; however, this inability does not mean that the rule
of law is indifferent towards the moral quality of a state’s law, especially given that the rule of
law attempts to guide the law away from specific kinds of moral wrongs. This is the insight of
Simmonds and Finnis in terms of the moral status of the rule of law.
In addition to making the case just stated in favour of the internal morality of law,
Simmonds expands the argument for the morality of the rule of law in an innovative way. He
does so by dealing with the debate over the ontology of normative values at the levels of moral
and political philosophy. Specifically, his concern is the debate over the ontological relationship
that normative values have with one another. Simmonds rejects both pluralism about values,
which holds that “[V]alues [are] distinct and competing”66 such that “[P]olitics must at some
point be a matter of ungrounded choice between equally fundamental and incommensurable
values”, 67 and the opposing view, monism about values, which holds that values are “[M]utually
entailing or at least mutually compatible”68. Against monism, he says that values can come into
conflict such that the vindication of one does undermine the vindication of the other,

69

and,

against pluralism, he criticizes it on the basis that it can “[E]ncourage an anti-rationalist and
voluntarist approach to politics that emphasizes the need for sovereign decision and discourages
64

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) at 273 [emphasis in
original].
65
Ibid. at 274.
66
Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 176. Simmonds discusses pluralism about values in more
detail in ibid. at 74-76.
67
Ibid. at 176.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid. at 74-76, and also acknowledged throughout 177-180, especially 180.
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reasoned reflection on politics”.

70

Simply, monism proposes a vision that is not realistic and

pluralism proposes a view of the relationship between values that makes reasoning about them
too readily cynical and prepares us to stifle the use of reason through the whole process of the
pursuit of values (we must simply choose between values). As an alternative to the
understanding of the relationship between values, Simmonds proposes that:
Perhaps values stand in a more complex relationship, both to our practices and to each other,
than we are inclined to imagine. Perhaps our practices express values that they fail to realize, so
that we can understand the practice only by its approximation to, and orientation towards, the
value. Perhaps certain values (complex political goods, such as that aspect of freedom that
consists in independence from the power of others) can be fully understood only by reflection
upon their embodiment in practice. Since practices can exist and possess an identity only within
broader patterns of ethical life, they may embody values that are to a large extent distinct yet
nevertheless bound together in complex ways. Perhaps, for this reason, some values can
compete yet can fully be realized only in conjunction. 71

Simmonds uses this approach in reasoning about the relationship between the rule of
law and other values. If legality does have moral value, then taking this moral value into
consideration, especially in the context of practical reasoning, will require the consideration of
whether, and how, other values, such as justice, and even respect for individual autonomy (the
value that is embodied in the rule of law), fit into Simmonds’ normative structure, a structure in
which some values can move in different directions and yet be vindicated only in conjunction
with one another.
Simmonds elaborates this account of the relationship between values in the context of
discussing the notion of fidelity to law. He raises a problem related to fidelity to law that is
involved in the interpretive activity of adjudication, saying, “If we assume that the law consists
of a finite body of rules, we are committed to the idea that there are penumbral cases that are
not resolved by the rules. How then does the judge’s duty [of fidelity to law] bear upon the
decision of those cases?” 72 Simmonds is talking here about substantive legal rules. Pursuing this
line of reasoning, Simmonds notes that no “default strategy”, i.e. no default rule that is
specifically supposed to providing assistance for substantive interpretive challenges in
penumbral cases will work because the boundary between core and penumbral cases cannot be
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Ibid. at 76.
Ibid. at 176.
72
Ibid. at 196.
71
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discerned. 73 Thus, such a rule would be unhelpful because, “Fidelity to law requires an effort to
reduce such uncertainties whenever reasonably possible, and it therefore precludes adoption of
a default strategy”. 74 On this basis, Simmonds concludes that:
In the penumbral case, the best the judge can do (from the viewpoint of legality) is to decide the
case justly. For justice consists of objective principles that apply to all cases with equality and
impartiality (to doubt this is to say that there is no justice, only beliefs about justice). In the
absence of a clearly applicable legal rule, the closest that the judge can come to respecting the
value of independence from the will of another is to be guided by his understanding of the value
of justice. 75

It is interesting that, in Simmonds’ view, the impetus for the judge to give an
interpretation that is guided by justice comes not only from the requirements of general
morality but also from the duty of fidelity to law. Additionally, Simmonds argues that the
impetus for a judge to be guided by justice applies not only to penumbral cases but to every
case that arrives before him/her. This is because of Simmonds’ reasoning that ambiguities
between core and penumbral cases make the boundary between these two categories
indiscernible. 76
But how, exactly does a justice-guided interpretation reduce uncertainties about law?
The explanation proposed by Simmonds is that a commitment to justice-guided interpretation
moves the legal system away from the uncertainty that is created by allowing the legal system
to proceed on the basis of ungrounded choice, a source of uncertainty. He says, “[L]egal systems
offer us less interpretative guidance the further they depart from the requirement of justice.
The more remote from justice that a body of law may be, the greater the scope that it will leave
for the exercise of ungrounded choice by the judge who must interpret its provisions”. 77 But in
the opposite direction, a justice-guided interpretation provides grounding for legal
interpretation by orienting that interpretation towards a value that is objectively worth
pursuing. This cannot be done, however, without the rejection of pluralism about values, which
posits ungrounded choice not as a virtue, but as a reality of reasoning about values.
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Ibid. at 196 [footnote omitted].
Ibid. at 197.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid. at 196.
77
Ibid. at 198.
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Dealing also with the question of the relationship between values, Simmonds argues
about what it takes to vindicate the moral values of justice and legality. As noted just above, 78
Simmonds re-emphasizes that, often, an individual moral value cannot be achieved on its own.
Instead, the moral value must be achieved in conjunction with other moral values, even moral
values that, in some respects (although certainly not in totality) conflict with original moral value
that one hopes to vindicate.

79

In Simmonds’ account of moral ontology, one ethical value will

sometimes depend on another, or two or more values may be mutually supporting. Simmonds
makes the case that this is true of the moral values of justice and legality:
Since legality is the set of conditions within which we can be independent of the power of others,
and since subjection to the choice of the judge is a clear subjection to the power of another,
significant departure from justice tends to breed departure from legality.
What this suggests is that, while justice and legality are distinct and can compete with each
other, legality can only fully be achieved where justice is achieved also. For only when the law is
just will the judge’s ‘justice-guided’ interpretations be a smooth and natural fit for the law. 80

Of special note is that Simmonds argues that justice and legality are in a relationship
that is mutually supporting, specifically a relationship of mutual necessity. Thus, he says:
But not only can legality only be fully achieved where justice is also achieved, but the reverse also
holds: justice cannot be fully realized without legality. For the judge’s decision is just only if it can
be shown that the sanctions inflicted upon the defendant contain nothing arbitrary: every
feature of the treatment of any litigant must be shown to stem from some general consideration
that applies impartially to everyone....[I]determinacy can be overcome by having established
rules of law that implement some specific scheme for the realization of justice....Legality and
justice are distinct concepts and values, and are capable of competing with each other. But each
of the two values can be fully realized only in conjunction with the other. Outside the context of
law, the idea of justice can seem empty and arbitrary: even if invoking justice is not like banging
on the table to reinforce a demand, it still seems to leave plenty of room for individual variation
of opinion. Detached from its background in justice, the law will be a set of rules permeated by
penumbral situations where the will of the judge must be decisive. Only in the union of legality
and justice is either idea fully realizable. 81

The ontological aspect of Simmonds’ unique proposal about the morality of the rule of
law is thus based on a mutually necessary connection between justice and the rule of law,
where the rule of law supports our pursuit of justice by helping us avoid indeterminacy in our
institutional pursuit of justice and justice supports the rule of law by orienting our pursuit of
justice away from ungrounded choice (another kind of indeterminacy). This mutual necessity is
78

Above, in the present section, note 71 and accompanying text.
Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 9 at 176-182.
80
Ibid. at 198.
81
Ibid. at 198 [footnote omitted].
79

Page | 54

seen in the context of the idea of fidelity to law and shaped by a recognition of complex
relationships between values, as proposed in Simmonds’ account of moral ontology.
As a brief note in relation to Simmonds’ view of the mutual necessity between justice
and the rule of law, consider Fuller’s own discussion of the connection between legality and
justice. He develops an early version of the arguments that Simmonds elaborates so richly, and
which I hope to introduce into consideration within the field of philosophical legal ethics. Fuller
argues that a legal system must vindicate the rule of law to some extent for it to even be
possible to ask basic questions of justice with respect to that legal system, which he refers to as
a “meaningful appraisal of the justice of law”.

82

Additionally, Fuller explores the way in which

the rule of law contributes to the vindication of justice, arguing a ruler or lawmaker will act
more morally responsible “[I]f he is compelled to articulate the principles on which he acts”.

83

More broadly, Fuller argues about the necessity of law for the vindication of moral values within
society, including the way in which law gives these values practical/applied/actionable meaning.
84

In the two passages just cited, Fuller is boldly making an argument that might be used to

support one end of the mutual necessity between law and morality. He is articulating one way in
which legality is necessary to stave off the kind of indeterminacy that would undermine the
vindication of justice.
Moreover, while discussing the practical pursuit of the rule of law, Fuller makes a point
relating to interpretive guidance and the connection between law and morality. His argument
here can be seen as containing an implication of the structure of value relationships (especially
with respect to the practical vindication of values) in light of Simmonds’ proposed mutual
necessity between the rule of law and moral values. This is an idea that could be developed with
a particular interest on justice as a moral value if one were to want to take that focus. Fuller
argues that the implementation of moral rules within a legal system has a certain kind of
relationship with the vindication of the desiderata of the rule of law. Fuller says that, “[T]o the
extent that the law merely brings to explicit expression conceptions of right and wrong widely
shared in the community, the need that enacted law [abide by certain desiderata such as the
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Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3 at 157, and continued at 157-159.
Ibid. at 159.
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Ibid. at 205-207.
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desiderata of promulgation, clarity and retroactivity] diminishes in importance”.

85

Using

Simmonds’ language, one could argue that Fuller’s proposed structure is sensible because the
vindication of morality reduces ungrounded choice. Some desiderata are perhaps partially
designed to ensure that law can provide guidance in case of ungrounded choice. This may mean
that, for the ungrounded choice to be legal and to guide conduct, the ungrounded choice must
be promulgated, clear and prospective. However, if the choice is not ungrounded, then,
understandably, the importance of strictly vindicating some desiderata may lessen because the
purpose of the desiderata is achieved in other ways or is less applicable to the case at hand.
Let me develop this idea at a deeper level using some of Simmonds’ ideas. If the
mutually necessary connection between the rule of law and justice addresses parallel challenges
in each value, then perhaps the vindication of one value can address the challenge to the extent
that the vindication of the other value is less necessary with respect to addressing the parallel
challenge. Therefore, if the mutually necessary connection between the rule of law and justice
addresses the challenge of indeterminacy as that challenge pertains to the vindication of both
values, then perhaps the reduction of indeterminacy by way of the vindication of one of the
values, let us say justice, can lessen the need to vindicate the rule of law to the extent that we
pursue the vindication of the rule of law for the rule of avoiding the problems of indeterminacy.
Practically speaking, the reduction of indeterminacy by way of the vindication of the value of
justice may mean a lesser need to spell out every aspect of law by way of statutory law. Some
benefits that statutory law provides with respect to indeterminacy may achievable by way of the
vindication of justice, for example.
The Fullerian arguments cited and expanded upon here provide support for, and
development of the structure and implications of, the idea of mutual necessity proposed by
Simmonds as part of the ontological aspect of Simmonds’ argument. The result of Simmonds’
analysis, especially taken in light of Fuller’s own views, is a robust place for morality within the
law by virtue of the moral value that legality itself embodies and with which it is necessarily
connected.
Returning to the Razian model, then, it turns out that since, on Simmonds’ view, legality
is a necessary condition for giving legal reasons and since legality cannot be achieved without
85

Ibid. at 92.
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justice, it is also necessary that purported legal reasons be consistent with justice in order for
them to indeed be legal reason. Under this view, justice is in a transitive relationship of
necessity with law. If justice is a necessary condition for the rule of law and the rule of law is a
necessary condition for the existence of law, then, by way of the mediating condition of the rule
of law, justice has a necessary connection with law. On Simmonds’ view, before we can even
talk about law’s authority, we must establish the existence of law (or at least the satisfaction by
law of conditions (such as the condition that law must be able to guide conduct) that are both
necessary for its existence and necessary to even be able to ask the question of authority). If one
of the conditions for the existence of law is the vindications of the rule of law and of justice,
then these two conditions take conceptual priority over the ability of law to act as an authority.
The vindication of justice thus has criterial priority, by way of its necessary condition with the
rule of law, over the authority of law as a condition for the existence of law.
For the Fullerian, this argument both broadens the reach of procedural naturalism (in
applying to conceptual analysis of law, theories of adjudication, and now, even practical
reasoning about law) and makes it more of an ethically rich theory. If correct, the argument is
deeply problematic for the Razian and for other positivists who wish to critique the procedural
naturalism of Lon Fuller as merely being a condition of efficacy. It may still be true that the
peremptory answer that is provided when one considers legal reasons in light of the rule of law
and associated moral values such as justice would not accord with the answer that morality
would have purely on its own terms, all things considered. Thus, this does not mean that the
entirety of morality would be determinative over the nature, content or moral excellence of law.
An exclusionary reason might ultimately be a legal reason that is shaped substantially by the
necessary moral requirements introduced by the rule of law and yet still deviate from the norms
of general morality overall. Legal reasons, even abiding by the necessary moral conditions of the
rule of law, may replace certain kinds of moral reasons that underlie a dispute, and which would
be determinative of the resolution of the dispute under general morality. Thus, legal content
that abides by the rule of law, and even its necessarily connected values of justice, may still be
overall inconsistent with the demands of general morality and this may be completely proper
from a legal point of view.
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However, even despite the circumscribed reach of morality in terms of the standards of
legal validity under Simmonds’ theory, the legal reasons under this theory would no longer be
the kind that Raz supports. Crucially, legal reasons would no longer be purely social facts. Legal
reasons could not replace other reasons solely on the basis of their facticity. Because of the
criterial priority of the rule of law and the status of the rule of law as a moral condition, there
would, instead, be an ability to replace reasons in a dispute only with a norm that is in
accordance with the robust internal morality of the normative source (i.e. law). This is a strong
defence of the Fullerian rule of law thesis, which holds that law must answer, in some key ways,
to morality.

2.3.3) Luban’s Fuller – “Natural Law as Professional Ethics”86 – Morality through Roles
David Luban’s reading of the legal philosophy of Lon Fuller is so deeply tied to the ethics
of lawyering that it is indeed properly classified in a robust sense as both a work in legal
philosophy and in legal ethics. Luban’s discussion of Lon Fuller and legal ethics comes several
years before my contribution to this field.87 Luban reads Fuller’s legal philosophy as providing
guidelines for the lawyer in his/her role as maker and shaper of policy, as a lawmaker.88 Perhaps
of greatest significance is that Luban, more than anybody else, treats the relationship between
legal philosophy and legal ethics as a two way street. Indeed, as Tim Dare has said89, the nature
of law (in terms of concepts and resulting institutions) will have a profound impact on the
features of the lawyer’s role on what constitutes the proper approach to the task of giving legal
advice. However, according to Luban’s reading of Fuller, the nature of the task of lawyering also
has profound implications for our understanding of the nature and concept of law. Indeed,
Luban even argues that looking at Fuller’s theory “as a professional ethics of lawmaking” 90
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David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Luban,
Legal Ethics] at 99.
87
See especially David Luban, “Rediscovering Fuller’s Legal Ethics” (1998) 11 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 801
[Luban, “Rediscovering Fuller”].
88
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 86, c. 3.
89
Above in Section 1.1), note 8 and accompanying text; citing Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?: A
Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009) [Dare,
Counsel of Rogues] at 59.
90
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 86 at 117.
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provides an answer to the question of what makes Fuller’s account a natural law theory.91 Luban
explains that according to his reading of Fuller, the internal morality of law “derives moral
requirements of the lawmaker’s job from features unique to the lawmaking enterprise. Unlike
other natural law theories, however, the morality implicit in Fuller’s concept of law is the
morality of lawmaking, not the law made”.

92

In a dramatic statement of the profundity of the

relationship between law and lawyering, Luban says, “If the possibility of the independent legal
advisor is an illusion, so is the possibility of law, understood as anything more than the directives
in a society of bad men [in Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s sense] and sheep”.93
Consider first why Luban says that Fuller’s theory is about lawyering. If the internal
morality of lawmaking was about a role, would it not be the role of legislating or governing?
Luban replies:
Rulers make decisions and devise policies, but decisions and policies are not yet laws. Embodying
decisions and policies in the form of laws is a tricky business, technically difficult in exactly the
same way that embodying private parties’ intentions in a legal contract is difficult – and the
people who carry out each of these lawmaking tasks are (what else?) lawyers. Thus, the rule of
law relies on the professional ethics of lawyers (even if they do not call themselves lawyers or
belong to the bar). 94

Luban is working with an expansive definition of “lawyer” here. It is based on function
rather than traditional formal criteria such as even licensing. Taking this view, the most
important thing from the perspective of the functional aspect of the rule of law is that guiding
conduct according to law requires a specific kind of expertise in the lawmaker, a kind of
expertise95 that is characteristic of lawyers. This expertise is both used to draft laws and to
provide advice on them to the non-lawyer.
91

As stated above in Section 2.2) at 29, especially notes 12, 13 and accompanying text, the great issue of
contention about Fuller’s theory is not the idea that the rule of law is a necessary functional condition for
the existence of law. On the contrary, the issue is whether the rule of law is also a moral condition. To
what extent does the rule of law substantiate natural law theory by providing a necessary connection
between law and morality? See my summary of the positivist criticism of Fuller on this point about the
moral status of the rule of law in Section 2.2), above.
92
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 86 at 117.
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Ibid. at 160.
94
Ibid. at 100 [emphasis in original].
95
For example, Luban in the previous quote, ibid., cites the role of transactional lawyers in translating the
wishes of two parties into a contractual document that encapsulates their agreement in a way that
accords and plays off of the norms of society. See also Fuller’s philosophical, and partly sociological,
discussion of transactional lawyering skills in Lon L. Fuller, “The Lawyer as an Architect of Social
Structures” [Fuller, “Lawyer as Architect”] in Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of
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Having established the functional role that lawyers occupy in ensuring that law plays its
functional role in guiding conduct, Luban explains the moral aspect of the rule of law in a way
that accords with more conventional readings of Fuller. In Luban’s account of Fuller, the
enterprise of law “presupposes a moral relationship between governors and the governed – a
moral relationship aimed at promoting the self-determining agency of the governed”. 96 Similar
to the values identified by other authors such as Simmonds, Luban says that the values
underlying Fuller’s theory of internal morality are “respect for the governed, respect for the
autonomy of the governed, and trust in the governed”. 97 Citizens depend on both the lawyeras-legislator and the lawyer-as-interpreter. They depend on the lawyer-as-legislator to enact
laws and create and maintain a legal system that abides by the internal morality of law and thus
indirectly supports the general moral values of respecting the autonomy of citizens. In the
context of a system of law that cannot be effectively navigated by a non-lawyer on his/her own,
the citizen depends on the lawyer-as-interpreter to steer him/her through this system.
Explaining in deeper detail his view of how morality makes it into Fuller’s theory, Luban
says:
[Fuller] is not tendering a general commitment to moral realism, but rather making the more
specific claim that institutions, particularly legal institutions, although they are entirely human
creations, have moral properties of their own – properties that their designers may never have
intended or even thought about, and that are connected only indirectly to general morality.
Identifying the morality of institutions, the virtues and vices of participating in them, is a matter
of discovery, not invention – a matter of reasons rather than fiat. 98

One should be careful to not conclude from this that Fuller, or the Lubanian Fuller,
rejects moral realism or what the legal philosopher Brian Leiter calls strong objectivism. 99 One
might even make the case that Fuller’s theory of the morality that makes law possible would fail
in normative terms unless the internal morality of law is understood in terms of such strong

Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed. by Kenneth I. Winston (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Fuller, Social Order] at 285287, in particular, as well as the continued philosophical and sociological analysis at 287-291.
96
Luban, Legal Ethics, ibid. at 126.
97
Ibid. at 112.
98
Ibid. at 118.
99
Strong objectivism is particular way in which to interpret the metaphysics of a particular subject. See
Brian Leiter, “Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence”, Book Review of Law and Objectivity by Kent
Greenawalt, (2002) 72 Tex. L. Rev. 187 [Leiter, “Book Review”] at 192; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter,
“Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority” (1993) 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549 [Coleman & Leiter, “Determinacy”]
at 607.
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theories of moral reality. 100 In any case, rather than arguing that Fuller rejects moral realism or
strong objectivism, Luban is saying that objective/general morality (i.e. a source of morality not
an ontological thesis about that source) is only indirectly relevant to the function of law through
the moral properties of legal institutions, or the internal morality of law.
Fuller would likely have been pleased overall with Luban’s reading of his theory and the
special linkage that is drawn between the rule of law and lawyering. Indeed, when discussing
examples of systems that failed to live up to the rule of law, Fuller mentions legal officials such
as judges and lawyers among those who failed in their duties to prevent the erosion of the legal
character of the system. In the case of pre-WWII Germany, Fuller says:
Hitler did not come to power by a violent revolution. He was Chancellor before he became the
Leader. The exploitation of legal forms started cautiously and became bolder as power was
consolidated. The first attacks on the established order were on ramparts which, if they were
manned by anyone, were manned by lawyers and judges. These ramparts fell almost without a
struggle. 101

Thus, Fuller would at least have recognized that the relevance of his theory is readily
understood through the roles of the actors within the legal system, including lawyers
prominently.
Luban also provides a refutation of the positivist argument that the values of the rule of
law of are of functional importance rather than being morally valuable themselves. Luban
explains the functional importance (i.e. the first half of making Fuller’s functionalist procedural
naturalist case) that Fuller’s theory places on morality through the image of sinking into
nothingness by sinning or doing evil. As a purposive or functional concept loses its ability to
perform its function, it not only becomes a bad instance of the functional thing that it is, it also
has the potential to no longer properly belong to the purposive or functional category. We see
no resistance from Raz to this first part of the theory. As noted above102, Raz and other
positivists are willing to recognize the rule of law as a necessary condition for the existence of
100

Below, in the Conclusion, at 172-173, I note the opportunities for future scholarship on the topic of the
relationship between my own theory of Fullerian lawyering (my theory being presented below in Section
4)) and meta-ethical theory, which is not discussed as one of the concern of this present paper. I should
hasten to note, however, that I am not arguing that it is Luban’s view that we should read Fuller’s theory
in terms of a theory such as moral realism. Rather, I am merely saying that the statement quoted does not
rule out a take on Fuller that is based in meta-ethical theories such as moral realism and that it is possible
to make a case that Fuller’s jurisprudence might depend on such meta-ethical theories.
101
Fuller, “Positivism & Fidelity”, supra note 8 at 659.
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law. Thus, Raz would likely be happy to say that a legal system does indeed sink into a
nothingness (from the perspective of its membership in the category of law) when a legal
system does not abide by the rule of law.
However, Luban additionally explains the moral aspect of the Fullerian procedural
naturalist case when he gives an elaboration that refutes Raz’s insistence upon treating the
requirements of the internal morality of law as conditions of efficacy rather than as moral
conditions. Luban’s argument is in line with Hutchinson’s case against Raz, but Luban gives the
argument the distinct flavor of being made through the concept of the morality of the role of
the lawyer. Using the examples of a steam engine103 and a light switch rather than a knife, Luban
says:
There is nothing distinctively moral about converting stream power to usable mechanical energy
or turning lights on and off.... Matters are different, however, when the purposively defined
entity is a person defined though her social or occupational role (‘parent’, ‘physician’, ‘lawyer’,
‘lawmaker’), and the means by which she fulfills the role’s purpose create a long-term
relationship with other people. In such cases, the standard of success implicit in the purposive
concept is not just fulfillment of the occupation’s ends narrowly conceived. Instead, the standard
of success is fulfillment of these ends in a manner consistent with the moral relationship, for if
the role-occupier chronically betrays the moral relationship, the other parties will dissolve it.
Under this standard a relationship that originates only as a means to an end becomes
incorporated into the end itself. 104

Although Luban provides a powerful defence of Fuller’s idea of internal morality and ties
this defence squarely to the role of the lawyer, Luban does not go with Fuller in thinking, with
reasonable confidence, that this truth makes law tend away from evil. Luban perceptively points
out that, even in societies that abide by the rule of law, certain groups of people have suffered
evils of the very kind that rule-of-law-values are supposed to prevent. For example, Luban
argues, women have not been accorded the same rights to determine the course of their own
lives as men.

105

But the rule of law is supposed to protect the rights of people to lead

autonomous lives by regulating their conduct under a system of rules that guide conduct. And
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yet, even with these rules, some groups have not enjoyed the same benefits to an autonomous
life.
The preceding has been an explanation of Fuller’s theory of law and several
contemporary takes on his work. I have presented arguments responding to Raz’s criticism of
the rule of law as merely a condition of efficacy. This was needed because if there is nothing
moral to the principles of legality, then it will be impossible to argue that the rule of law
represents an internal morality of law and it will be difficult if not impossible to derive a theory
of ethical lawyering that is based in the ethics and jurisprudence of Lon Fuller. Let us now
consider how these theories can be used to derive approaches to lawyering that accord with
Fuller’s theory of law.
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3) Luban’s Fuller – “Natural Law as Professional Ethics” – Doing the Morality of the
Lawyering Role
In the previous section, I discussed the way in which David Luban interprets Fuller’s legal
theory to be both a theory of lawyering and a theory of law. I will continue discussing Luban’s
ideas but with a slightly different focus. The purpose of citing Luban previously was as a source
for the argument that Fuller’s theory of law is truly a natural law theory, and that the rule of law
is a moral condition for the existence of law. In this section of the paper, I will take a bigger
picture approach to Luban’s interpretation of Fuller. Rather than using Luban’s argument to
prove a point about Fuller’s legal philosophy, I am interested in filling in the details of Luban’s
interpretation of Fuller as a theory of both legal philosophy and legal ethics. Here, I will treat it
as one of the contenders in positing a theory of legal ethics that is based on analytical
jurisprudence. What is the view of legal ethics that Fuller’s theory is held out by Luban to be?
Luban’s account of a Fullerian theory of law can be summed up in the following
statements:
(i) “[T]he most significant actors [in a legal system] are not judges, nor as [H.L.A.] Hart
believes, officials more generally, but lawyers. The lawyer-client consultation is the
primary point of intersection between ‘The Law’ and the people it governs, the point at
which the law in books becomes the law in action”.
(ii) Luban argues that the role of a lawyer as an advisor is just as important as the
lawyer’s role as an advocate.
(iii) “[B]ecause lawyer-client consultations occur behind a veil of confidentiality, the
integrity of the legal system depends to an enormous degree on the rectitude of the
legal advisor”.
(iv) “[L]awyers advising clients about the law’s meaning must not deflect their own
interpretive responsibility on to hypothetical others, whether those others are courts or
non-judicial actors [i.e. must not give legal advice to a client in a way that simply
predicts the action of a legal official]. Instead, [a lawyer’s] obligation is simply to explain
the law in books. So, in the end, [Luban identifies] law with the law in books, as
mediated through the interpretive community of lawyers”. 1
A great portion of Luban’s work is dedicated to the task of arguing for the
jurisprudential importance of the lawyer’s interpretive role. The first major step in this argument
1

David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Luban,
Legal Ethics] at 131-132.
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is for Luban to show that greater interpretive engagement is needed from those governed by
the legal system than simply that they act according to a system of positively-stated rules. Luban
is interested in the task of showing that more needs to be said about the way that legal norms
relate to human conduct than that the norms be positively-stated and thereby oblige citizens
who live under them. There is an interpretive story that must be told in between the positive
statement of the norms and the norms being followed by citizens as obligations. In telling this
story, Luban adds a great deal of substance to Fuller’s view about the normative and ontological
relationship between law and the work of officials within the legal system when Fuller said that
law is an enterprise that is “[D]ependent for its success on the energy, insight, intelligence, and
conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of this dependence, to fall always
somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals”. 2
Taking an evaluation of Hart’s legal theory as his starting point, Luban argues that Hart is
wrong in the way that he thinks the ideas of internal and external perspectives towards norms
take shape in terms of being conditions that determine the status of a system of norms as a
legal system. The internal and external perspectives are views that people can take towards
norms that purport to be in force in a particular context. Luban cites Hart’s definition of the
internal perspective, in which one “accepts and uses [legal norms] as guides to conduct” and the
external perspective, in which one is “content merely to record the regularities of observable
behaviour” and to draw correlations from these observations that give reportable accounts
about the rules that the society in question regards as providing a standard for normative
evaluation but by which the observer does not feel normatively bound. 3 Hart argues that the
conditions that these concepts provide with respect to the existence of law are (1) that officials
of the legal system must take the internal perspective with regard to the legal system’s
secondary rules and (2) that most citizens must abide by the positively-stated primary rules
most of the time. 4 If this is achieved, then in Hart’s view, there is a legal system. Thus, for the

2

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) [Fuller, Morality of
Law] at 145.
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H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) [Hart, Concept of Law] at 89;
Luban’s citation of Hart can be found in Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 1 at 136.
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note 1 at 137.
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purpose of determining the existence of a legal system, it is not essential that citizens who are
not legal officials take either the internal or external perspectives on law. As long as citizens
obey the positively-stated primary rules most of the time, the purported legal system has met
the minimal standard of citizens’ obedience for the purpose of assessing its validity as a legal
system. To put this in the terms of the conditions just outlined from Hart’s theory, (1) officials
must state the positive law and use it as a guide to conduct and (2) citizens must follow the
norms qua obligations.
Luban argues that such an account of the nature of law and legal systems is incorrect. 5
Problematically for Hart, the way that his theory of internal and external perspectives is set up,
as summarized in the previous paragraph, is such that, although it was, in part, intended to
demonstrate the way in which law is actually different in nature from the Austinian command
theory of law (which I will summarize shortly)6 and thus to close off the command theory in
terms of the way that the legal system is to deal with the concept of “obligation”, Hart’s view is
consistent with a slightly modified version of the command theory of law. As I will summarize
now, Luban shows how the Hartian command-like theory can even be framed and criticized by a
slightly different analogy to Hart’s own “gunman writ large” thought experiment.
Recall that the command theory of law, also a positivist theory but a different kind from
Hart’s own, is the idea that law is the command of the sovereign. 7 Hart’s classic retort to this
argument is that such a theory does not have the ability to normatively oblige citizens, an ability
that should be properly attributable to a legal system.

8

This is because a sovereign who is

For Hart’s discussion of the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see Hart, Concept of Law,
ibid. at 79-99, especially at 81, where Hart provides a definition for the terms “primary rules” and
“secondary rules”, which roughly translates to the idea that primary rules are the substantive rules of the
legal system and that secondary rules are rules about rules (i.e. rules about activities such as making and
amending rules).
5
For the entirety of Luban’s argument, as summarized in the following several paragraph of this paper,
see Luban, Legal Ethics, ibid. at 137-143.
6
The most widely-known proponent of the command theory of law is John Austin. For his account of the
command theory, see John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, ed. by Wilfrid E. Rumble
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Lecture 1 [Austin, Province of Jurisprudence] at 18-37. See
also the beginning of Hart’s account of this theory in Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 3 at 6-8.
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merely regularly obeyed lacks legitimacy. Such a system, rather than instantiating law, is
analogous to a gunman writ large. Obedience is secured by the threat of force, rather than by
any normative force. Therefore, to a Hartian, the lack of normative legitimacy is sufficient to
keep a set of rules outside of the realm that is proper to legal systems.
Turning now to the problem for Hart, consider (1) his opposition to purported legal
systems that lack normative legitimacy because they are analogous, in terms of their ability to
create obligations, to the illustration of the gunman writ large and (2) in applying the concepts
of internal and external perspectives, his statement that one of the sets of features that
distinguishes legal systems from the gunman writ large is (a) the instantiation, to at least of
minimal level, of internal perspective among the officials of a legal system, and (b) citizens’
obedience of legal norms as obligations, even if merely from the external perspective. Through
Luban’s analysis of these two ideas, we will see why he comes to the conclusion that “It isn’t just
the fact of [citizens’] obedience, but their reasons for obeying, that make a system of primary
and secondary rules enforced by an official class into a legal system”.

9

Luban argues that the second of Hart’s positions in the previous paragraph, causes
problems in light of the first position staked out in the same paragraph. As Luban explains, a
system in which the officials adopt the internal perspective but the citizens do not is a system in
which, “[O]rdinary citizens regard the law as nothing more than a coercive structure imposed on
them by officials”. 10 This is described by Luban as a “make-believe legal system” that operates
in a mafia-like way, with rules that the mafia, i.e. the officials, create and use to assess the
behaviour of one another but which hardly has normative legitimacy with respect to the average
citizen who is also forced to abide by the same rules.11 Thus, legal officials state the positive law
and do indeed take the internal perspective. However, due to the missing middle step that
would lead to normative legitimacy, citizens who would follow the positively-stated law in such
a situation would not be treating the rules as an obligation, but rather as a command backed by
force. What is missing is a step to create interpretive engagement, an interpretive step that
gives the legal rules normative status and thus makes the law more than a mere command.
What is the importance of what we might call this normative-interpretive step?
9

Luban, Legal Ethics, ibid. at 139 [emphasis added].
Ibid.
11
Ibid. at 138.
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Citing Fuller, Luban makes the case that a system that lacks this interpretive step also
has a paucity of reciprocity between lawgivers and citizens.

12

In order to move away from this

system that lacks normative legitimacy in relation to its citizens, the law must create the
requisite normative reciprocity between lawmakers and citizens and thereby bring citizens, in a
certain proportion, into the internal perspective along with legal officials. It is for this reason
that Luban comes to the conclusion that, “While not all citizens need to adopt the internal point
of view toward all the laws all the time, a substantial number of citizens must adopt it toward
most laws much of the time”. 13
For there to be such reciprocity, for society to be governed by obligatory rules and for
citizens to be brought into the internal perspective, law should meet certain conditions of
normative legitimacy. Luban, again citing Fuller, says that the use of “commands or directives”
must be done in such a way that “lawgivers and citizens...share ‘notions of the limits of legal
decency and sanity’” and that there is a requirement that “legal rules...be communicated
intelligibly to citizens and...impose reasonable expectations on them”. 14 What are the standards
that lawgivers must meet in order to show legal decency in dealing with citizens as well as
communicating intelligibly and imposing reasonable expectations on them? This is the point at
which the theory becomes Fullerian in the most easily recognizable way. Luban gives the rule of
law the status of necessary condition in the process of doing the normative-interpretive process
that turns a positively-stated legal norm into a reason for action that actually conveys normative
information to the citizen.

15

Desiderata such as the requirement of prospectivity protect the

interests of legal decency; the desideratum of promulgation and clarity assure that legal rules
are communicated intelligibly; and the desideratum of logical possibility assures that legal rules
impose reasonable expectations. The lawyer cannot convey normative information and reasons
unless the information, reasons, and the way in which both are conveyed abide by the rule of
law. There may also be other conditions needed for citizens to adopt the internal perspective,
instead of treating the law as merely being an externally-originated command that is backed up
by force. Nonetheless, the rule of law is indeed one of the necessary conditions for this to
12
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happen and thus to create legal obligations and normative reasons for obedience to the law.
What is interesting about this argument by Luban is that, just as the rule of law was argued by
Simmonds to be a necessary precondition for the law to perform a Razian function of being an
exclusionary reason, so too here Luban argues that the rule of law is a necessary precondition
for the law to achieve the kind of normative status that law must have in order for the Hartian
argument against the command theory of law to succeed. 16
In the previous few paragraphs, I have been summarizing the reasons from which Luban
thinks that there must be a normative-interpretive process that gives law its normative
legitimacy (and its ability to oblige). In addition to greater normative-interpretive depth, Luban
brings forward an epistemic issue that must be dealt with by any theory that takes seriously the
interpretive aspect of the law’s ability to act as the normative guide that it supposed to be and
thus to oblige us in the relevant way. This is the stage of the argument at which Luban fully
brings out the interpretive aspect of the normative-interpretive step that is needed to create
legal obligation. Of special relevance is that this is also the stage at which the morality of law
becomes interpreted by Luban as a morality of lawyering. Put briefly, lawyers are in a special
position of knowledge and skill. This position gives them the capacity to undertake the
normative-interpretive activity that would allow them to impose or interpret (i.e. be involved in
lawmaking and advising about the law made) in a way that would satisfy the normative
conditions (i.e. the rule of law) for creating obligations for other citizens. Most people who are
supposed to be subject to the normativity of law are not in a position to undertake the
normative-interpretive activity because they are not practically capable of sufficiently
understanding or acquiring knowledge about the law for such interpretation activity to even
16

This points to an interesting and, I would argue, successful argument on the part of theorists who have
recently made the Fullerian case. One of their approaches has been to piggyback on some of the most
insightful aspects of the major positivist theories and to point out that such features are not possible
without the features of law, namely the rule of law, that occupied the focus of Fuller’s work. Interestingly,
both of these entry points, the role of law as a means of dispute resolution in pluralist societies (in Raz’s
theory) and the nature of law as a normative set of reasons rather as commands (a Hartian contribution),
are normative theses about the rule of law. The observation to draw here may be that before legal
systems can do any of the normative things that law is supposed to do (positivists do indeed argue that
part of what makes law the kind of thing that it is said to be is the normative role that law is supposed to
have), the legal system must abide by the rule of law. It would, presumably, be harder to make an
argument about purportedly purely descriptive positivist ideas. For example, we might find it more
difficult, although perhaps not impossible, for the rule of law to be a necessary condition to the
identification of law as a social fact.
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take place. This applies to citizens generally but also to other groups of people who might not
initially have come to mind when considering Hart’s account of the way in which a society and
its various members must adopt the internal perspective in relation to legal norms.

17

Luban

states the problem in the following way:
As Hart notes, ‘ordinary citizens’ – perhaps a majority – have no general conception of the legal
structure or of its criteria of validity...The ordinary citizen may take the internal point of view
toward rules without knowing exactly what those rules prescribe, or even how to find out on his
own...It is too much to expect that non-officials share those standards – what Hart calls the rule
of recognition – which are technical and recondite. But what Hart says of ordinary citizen holds
for most officials as well. Why should we suppose that pest-control officers, driving examiners,
building inspectors, police detectives, and state pension administrators grasp the rule of
recognition? Why suppose that the President of the United States grasps it? It seems most likely,
in fact, that they have no better knowledge of the structure of precedent or the canons of
statutory interpretation than do other, ordinary citizens... 18

Given the nature of such a problem, if law is to have the important normativeinterpretive step between the positive statement of the law’s legal norms and the norms’
obliging of citizens, there must be a group of citizens who can solve the epistemic issue and thus
allow for the normative-interpretive activity to take place. This group, according to Luban’s
reading of Fuller, is the legal profession, specifically, lawyers. Luban says, “[T]he people in
government whom we expect to master the rule of recognition in the legal system are not

17
18

Hart, Concept of Law, supra note 3 at 89.
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 1 at 140.

Later, at 142, Luban tones down the degree to which he argues that citizens, both ordinary citizens and
officials, are unable to engage in reasoning about and interpretation of the law. He says: “Legal reasoning
is not rocket science, nor is it an arcane glass bead game played among adepts. Its distinctive methods are
continuous with other forms of reasoning; but they are specialized enough, and require enough
background knowledge, that lawyers’ arguments rather than lay arguments form the central case of the
internal point of view”.
I suspect that Luban is aware here that if the law were to most people as rocket science is to them, then
not even the intermediating normative-interpretive role of lawyers would truly be enough to bring most
people into the internal perspective. For this case to work, Luban needs lawyers to perform a necessary
task, but the law surely cannot be taken from the internal perspective if lawyers must be consulted to
understand every point and if, even after detailed explanation, most people will still not be able to make
much of the concepts, as would often be the case for the layperson even after having rocket science
explained to them.
Note that this epistemic point also provides a powerful argument about the need for access to justice,
ibid. at 143, n. 34 and accompanying text.
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‘officials’ in general, but lawyers in particular.” 19 He goes on to say that, “Arguably, a necessary
precondition for a rule-of-law regime is the existence of a uniformly trained, politically
independent, and suitably large and vigorous legal profession. Lawyers are, after all, the primary
point of contact between private individuals and institutions and the law”. 20 Lawyers translate
the law for clients and represent them in their disputes before the institutions of the law.
Without this interpretive process, which facilitates both basic and sophisticated
epistemic access to the law, there is no sense in which there can be reasons for obeying the law.
In Luban’s view, then, lawyers make the internal point of view possible and raise an interesting
distinction in relation to the internal perspective. Luban says:
[T]here can be more than one internal point of view...ranging between that of ordinary citizens
or officials who adopt the law as their own, but know it only as ‘the law’ without having any clear
idea how to identify it or argue within its distinctive vocabulary and mode of reasoning, and that
of the trained lawyer who maneuvers comfortably within it. 21

As Luban says, “If the possibility of the independent legal advisor is an illusion, so is the
possibility of law, understood as anything more than directives in a society of bad men [in the
Holmesian sense) and sheep”.

22

In fact, it is even more problematic than Luban says. He is

certainly correct, given his view of law, to say that the ability of law to normatively oblige
citizens would be lost without the lawyer. Additionally, however, taking into consideration the
epistemic difficulty makes it even worse. Without independent legal advisors to solve the
epistemic aspect of the problem, it is as if the gunman is barking orders at us in a language that
we cannot understand. The gunman, or the legionary to consider another example, is speaking
to us in Latin and we speak Gallic exclusively. Some of the information may be carried through,
perhaps even through threatening gesticulations of his sword. Nonetheless, without the role of
the lawyer (the role of the lawyer being broadly conceived as Luban does23) we are neither in a
position to understand, in any proper measure, the nature of the orders given by the source, nor
therefore to be part of the process in which we can come to be obliged.

19

Ibid. at 140 [emphasis in original].
Ibid. at 141.
21
Ibid. at 142.
22
Ibid. at 160.
23
Recall the passage quoted in Section 2.3.3), note 94 and accompanying text, above; where I cite ibid. at
100.
20
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Just how important is the role of lawyers, whether they are engaged in the creation and
drafting of policy at the government level, for example, or giving legal advice to a client about a
discrete legal dispute? Luban makes the following argument on that subject. Comparing the role
of lawyers generally to the role of a particular body at the top of the judicial branch of the
government of the United States, Luban says,
A single Supreme Court decision can influence the behaviour of thousands or even millions of
people for decades to come. However, the Fullerian argument reminds us that Court decisions
can have this effect only to the extent that those beneath the Court in the hierarchy of authority
take up and support the decision rather than passively resisting it or maneuvering around it.
From a genuinely realist point of view, the latter phenomena matter at least as much as what the
Court does. 24

Making a point about the real world efficacy of any particular positively-stated legal
norm, Luban holds that the ability of legal norms to oblige is filtered through the interpretive
community that controls the ground level treatment that it receives as well the epistemic
conveyance of the normative content to the population at large. Thus Luban argues further that:
A better metaphor than [Dworkin’s idea of] law’s empire is law’s landfill, the dregs of legal
authority contained in the millions of lawyer-client conversations on which our actual legal
civilization is erected....the advice of lawyers to clients involves genuine interaction, conferring
the legitimacy necessary to make law out of the ‘gunman writ large’. For better or worse, their
morality is the law’s morality. 25

Luban lays out a powerful and seamless natural law theory of law and lawyering.
According to this theory, a positivist theory of law lacks the normativity to create legal
obligations. Lawyers are a necessary part of the creation of these obligations and their morality
in performing their normative-interpretive process is therefore the law’s morality. This is the
level at which Fuller’s morality of law acts as a morality of lawmaking and provides us with a
unified procedural natural theory of law and lawyering.
What does Luban himself make of this Fullerian theory of “Natural law as professional
ethics” that he has explicated? 26 Recall Luban’s argument, summarized above27, that one cannot
treat the satisfaction of the rule of law by the legal system as a guarantee that law or the legal
system tends away from evil. The objection that Luban makes to this theory is one that presents
24

Ibid. at 146.
Ibid. at 160.
26
Ibid. at 99.
27
Above, in Section 2.3.3) at 62-63. Recall especially the example given at note 105 and accompanying
text in that same section.
25
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a powerful limitation to the normativity of Fuller’s natural law theory. Luban argues that a
society can abide by the rule of law and yet expressly exclude others, such as women, “from the
community whose freedom it aims to enhance”. 28 Such a society may abide by the rule of law,
yet there is considerable reason to think that it does not tend away from evil because it contains
a vast amount of injustice when it comes to the treatment of groups of people that are not
granted the full benefit of the concern of the rule of law. If lawyers participate in this process in
such an unjust society, then it becomes the case that the morality of the rule of law, conceived
of both in terms of the law made and the lawmakers (i.e. the lawmaker’s morality) is compatible
with a great amount of evil, and, more importantly, does not tend away from evil.

29

The

morality of the lawmaker, in this case, is said to allow the failure to achieve the autonomy of the
group that is being so mistreated. It seems, then, that the morality of lawyering under the
Fullerian view that Luban articulates fails to tend away from evil in meaningful ways.
Luban’s criticism here seems true if one takes the moral normativity of the rule of law to
be found only in the respect for human autonomy. However, things change once one comes to
the conclusion, as Simmonds does, that there is even more to the morality normativity of the
rule of law than respect for human autonomy and once one realizes the criterial position of the
rule of law (including in its more morally robust expressions) in relation to other criteria for the
existence of law. Recall that, according to Simmonds, a legal system cannot abide by the rule of
law unless the legal system also satisfies the demands of other related moral values such as
justice.

30

It seems perfectly plausible that there could be a legal system with a less morally

robust notion of the rule of law as presented by Luban, in which the conditions of the rule of law
are satisfied and which is thus oriented towards the promotion of the autonomy of certain
individuals while expressly excluding others, such as women, from the community whose
freedom it aims to enhance. However, that same plausibility is not present if our notion of the
28

Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 1 at 128.
Ibid. at 126-130.
30
I do not claim that Simmonds’ view provides such a strong moral buttress that it can guarantee that law
always tends away from evil. However, the argument that Simmonds provides significantly reduces the
number and kinds of evils that are compatible (compatibility considered in the sense of principles,
meaning harmoniousness as a matter of degree, more harmonious than not, rather than the binary on/off
sense of rules) with the rule of law. His argument also provides a theoretical avenue through which we
could plausibly argue for the necessary connection between the rule of law and other moral ideas, thus
further reducing the scope within which evil can be consistent with the rule of law and have a deleterious
effect on the degree to which law tends away from evil.
29
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rule of law is conceived of in the more morally robust way that Simmonds present. I will not
launch into a treatise on justice here. Nevertheless, it is antithetic to the very idea of justice that
a legal system could satisfy the demands that justice makes of that legal system while
simultaneously excluding certain persons within that society (e.g. women) from the community
in relation to which the legal system attempts to satisfy the demands of justice. One of the
central ideas of justice, under the heading of procedural justice, is that such disparate treatment
is not to be practiced.31
From the perspective of the rule of law and its particular necessary connection with
justice, the exclusion of women or any other person from being part of the community whose
freedom law aims to enhance is particularly egregious. The rule of law, because of the necessary
connection between the rule of law and at least certain aspects of morality, will be concerned
with any failure of the legal system to fulfill the requirements of justice, but it will be a particular
concern for the rule of law when the legal system perpetuates an injustice that denies a person
the benefit that is designed to be protected and enhanced by the rule of law. Thus, while one
might be able to modify the rule of law as conceived of by Luban (a conception that does not
include a necessary connection between the rule of law and justice) to generate the kinds of
moral wrongs that Luban mentions, one cannot do the same with the rule of law as conceived of
by Simmonds (a conception that includes a necessary connection between the rule of law and
justice).
To make the conclusion concrete, the implication of this rebuttal is that, given the
necessary connection between the rule of law and justice, under Simmonds’ view, and the
argument made in the previous paragraph, the status of legal systems as belonging to the

31

I acknowledge that, for a complete account of such an argument, one might have to engage in a
discussion about the various types of justice (e.g. procedural, retributive, distributive, etc.). It may be that
only certain types of justice have a necessary connection with the rule of law. My conjecture at this stage
of my thinking is that many kinds of justice are necessarily connected with the rule of law (although they
may not all be as onerous as one another to be satisfied for the purpose of their necessary connection
with the rule of law). Certainly, I would argue, procedural justice is one of those that are necessarily
connected. Procedural justice is related in its normative concerns to desiderata of the rule of law, such as
the desideratum of generality, and some instances of the desideratum of congruence between the law as
stated and the law as enforced. Thus, there is at least enough of a relationship between the rule of law
and justice to make it such that the unjust treatment of women by the legal system is assessed for the
purpose of determining, via the relationship between the rule of law and justice, the degree to which the
rule of law is satisfied and thus the degree to which a legal system exists.
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category law is lesser in the case of those legal systems that treat women, or other members of
society, in such a way that these persons are excluded from the community, the freedom of
which law aims to enhance. Does this mean that these societies do not have law? I am hesitant
to say that this is the case because the exclusion of groups such as women from the full benefits
of the rule of law has been so deep and so long-lasting. The result of adopting such a view would
be that law might be said to have not existed until the middle of the 20th century even in the
industrialized world. That seems implausible to me. In that sense, I am, admittedly, setting a
lower minimal standard of justice that must be vindicated within the legal system so as to not
undermine the legal system’s abidance of the rule of law to such an extent that the status of the
legal system would be undermined by its failure to vindicate justice, with which the rule of law is
necessarily connected. 32 However, because of my extrapolations of the Simmondian argument,
I am indeed prepared to say that, as these formerly excluded groups have been brought into the
community whose freedom the law seeks to enhance, and as the procedural injustice faced by
these groups has become lesser, the various legal systems that have made these progressive
steps have made themselves less at odds with the objective normative ontology in which we
find the necessary connection between justice and legality. The rule of law has been enhanced
as societies have treated more people as proper beneficiaries of its protections. Thus, these
various advances have made their respective legal systems more in line with legality, and thus
fuller members of the category of “law”.
If one considers the aspect of Luban’s argument which says that the rule of law will not
give us all of the normativity that we might want law to have, I am in full agreement because of
Luban’s argument about states that have sufficiently vindicated the rule of law in order to have
a legal system and yet have shown indifference to the wrongs committed against large groups of
people, such as women, whose freedom the rule of law aims to enhance. However, in light of
Simmonds’ powerful interpretation of the Fullerian theory of law, we can expect quite a bit

32

Another consideration of Simmonds’ Fullerian theory might set a higher standard of justice that must be
met so as to not undermine the vindication of the rule of law to such an extra that the purported legal
system actually fails to belong to the category of law. Doing so would likely lead to the conclusion that
many more purported legal systems are not legal systems at all. Such a strong view of the minimal level of
justice consistent with the rule of law might, even when not reaching the conclusion that a purported
legal system does not belong to the category of law, see many more instances than I would of legal
systems that as less fully “legal” because of their failure to vindicate justice.
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more than Luban imagines we can actually get when he says that it is too optimistic to think that
the rule of law makes law tend away from evil. We can expect more normative, and particularly
moral, substance to make its way into the rule of law, and thus also into a theory of lawyering
developed off of the rule of law, than would be done under a Fullerian theory that is viewed as a
rich procedural theory with a bare minimum of morality or even than a Fullerian theory that is
understood as a rich procedural theory with an equally rich understanding of libertarian
autonomy but which ends there in its ability to contribute moral ideas. With moral values such
as justice built in, law’s tendency away from evil, and thus the tendency away from evil of
lawyering that lives up to law’s values, may be more powerful than Luban imagined.
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Part III – A New Proposal for the Philosophy of Lawyering
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4) Legal Ethics as a Moral Idea, Embracing Fullerian Normativity
4.1) The Need for Theories of Legal Ethics that Go Beyond Positivism
Positivists have at times recognized a permission for lawyers to discuss more than the
positive law in advising clients. This admission could not help but have been made given that
such permission is granted in various codes of conduct that govern the legal profession.
However, William Simon argues that the positivists are mistaken in thinking that this is the only
way in which lawyers will end up discussing moral values, as well as other values, with their
clients. To this end, Simon says:
The Dominant View does concede grudgingly that clients are often interested in more than the
‘law,’ as the Positivist defines it. No one would deny that a client might wish to voluntarily repay
a time-barred debt because of ethical or reputational reasons. Thus the [American Bar
Association’s] Model Rules [of Profession Conduct] say...that the lawyer, in advising the client,
‘may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors....’ But the rule creates only a license, not a duty (and the option here is simply
discussion, not active protection). This permissive stance seems a function of the Positivist’s
mistaken view of legality, which converts many important legal concerns into (mere) ‘moral,
economic, social, and political factors’. 1

But this permission-based stance is not an accurate description of the relationships
between law, lawyers and their clients. There is a connection between law and morality that the
positivist theories do not appreciate and which make the discussion of moral values not just
permitted, but a necessary feature of good lawyering. This is what positivist theories of law and
lawyering miss. This argument can come from a myriad of naturalist directions. Take, just as an
example, the case made by one of the most prominent naturalist philosophers of legal ethics,
William Simon. He states his own case for a relationship between lawyering and morality that
goes beyond the permission for a lawyer to discuss moral considerations in the course of giving
legal advice.
In William Simon’s Dworkinian view, a discussion of moral values in law and legal advice
is inevitable given that moral considerations necessarily enter into the interpretation of legal
sources that are laden with values that come from sources outside of the law, including from
1

William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) [Simon,
Practice of Justice] at 43. Simon cites Rule 2.1 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The Model Rules are available at American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
online:
American
Bar
Association
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professio
nal_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html> [ABA, Model Rules].
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morality.

2

Given the nature of this interpretive process and the particular normative aspects

that make it complete, Simon would argue that a lawyer must indeed engage in moral
interpretation as part of the task of being a lawyer and interpreting the law.
Simon’s theory about the role of value-laden terms in law presents an interesting
contrast to the positivist theories of legal ethics, including the functional ones based on the
Razian reason-giving of Dare and Wendel. 3 The necessity for a judge to interpret value-laden
principles in assessing the legal merit of a case that comes before a court, and thus the
analogous necessity of a lawyer’s undertaking a similar interpretative activity when giving legal
advice, provides an entry place for morality. This entry place for morality, furthermore, does not
bring interpretive necessity as an outside influence on the law. Rather, the interpretive task is
internally facilitative of the values and exigencies of the legal system because it is indeed the
legal system itself, and its own interpretive requirements, that call for the lawyer to take moral
values into account in giving content to the moral terms that are found in the law.
Therefore, and conceptually against the argument made by Dare that lawyers pre-empt
the function of the legal system when lawyers take into consideration moral values in advising
the client, under Simon’s Dworkinian theory, a positivist legal system, as a source of normativity,
cannot be a peremptory guide in the pre-interpretive way that Razians such as Dare seem to
envision. The relevant legal terms and principles acquire their meaning only in the interpretive
actions of the court and with lawyers taking part in that process. Lawyers are, all the while,
engaging in the interpretation of principles and values (including moral values) in the advising
and advocacy stages.
This is Simon’s theory explaining the need for legal ethics to go beyond positivism. I find
it sympathetic in many ways. My own view is based on the work of Lon Fuller. In the same way
2

See generally, Simon’s Dworkinian theory of lawyering set out in Simon, Practice of Justice, ibid.,
especially for my present purposes at 38-40.
3
Theories such as those of Dare and Wendel had not been articulated at the time during which Simon
wrote the source that I am citing. Simon has not since then published a wide-ranging retort to these
theories. He has, however, critiqued theories of lawyering that are based on positivism in William H.
Simon, “Role Differentiation and Lawyers' Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives” (2010) 23
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 987 [Simon, “Role Differentiation”], and engaged directly with the ideas of Wendel in
William H. Simon, “Authoritarian Legal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn”, Book Review of
Lawyers and Fidelity to Law by W. Bradley Wendel (2012) 90 Tex. L. Rev. 709 [Simon, “Book Review”], in
which he reviewed W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010) [Wendel, Fidelity].
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that Simon does, my argument is that positivism’s understanding of the relationship between
law and morality is incomplete for the purpose of explaining and normatively prescribing the
features of the practice of lawyering. My case is developed throughout the rest of Section 4) and
draws on sections 2) and 3), in which I summarized arguments explaining the way in which
Fuller’s legal philosophy shows that positivism misses something fundamental about the full
normative nature of law.

4.2) Moral Robustness and the Fullerian Nature of my Theory
The Fullerian argument that I am about to present in this section of the paper could be
developed to varying degrees of normative moral power. Another way that this could be said is
that the degree of normative moral power of a Fullerian theory of legal ethics depends on the
reading of Fuller that we adopt. Fuller’s own original work and various interpretations of his
work suggest differing views on the robustness of the morality that can be incorporated into law
via the rule of law. I argue that versions of Fullerian legal philosophy that have what I call “thin
moral normativity”, are consistent with significant aspects of a wide range of answers to the
questions of legal philosophy and philosophical legal ethics (including certain forms of
positivism, if the positivist views are dialed down, such as by weakening the separability thesis)
and with the application of these varied theories to the case study of the “torture memos”.
Within this group of “thin moral normativity”, I include interpretations of Fuller’s legal
philosophy that do not believe that a great deal of morality can make its way into law through
the rule of law. The moral norm that is incorporated under such a view is typically some limited
version of respect for autonomy.
On the other hand, there are also versions of Fullerian legal philosophy that have what I
call “thick moral normativity”. Such views, with the most notable and robustly moral being
Simmonds’ view, argue that a rich moral value of respect for individual autonomy is
incorporated into law by way of the rule of law. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly,
Fullerian theories that have “thick moral normativity” hold that other moral values, such as
justice, are incorporated into law or have a mediated necessary connection with law by way of
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their relationship with the rule of law and the latter’s relationship to law. Simmonds, again, is
the most prominent example. 4
I will develop a philosophical account of lawyering that, being based on the views of Lon
Fuller, has a particular and focused interest in the relationship between law and morality. Within
that project and the task of bringing it to bear on legal ethics, large portions of the theory,
including the principles of my theory that are stated below, 5 will be amenable to theories that
are willing to accept, or find friendly company, with only “thin moral normativity” and its
advocates. A Fullerian theory of legal ethics could find philosophical allies in numerous and
varied schools of thought, even among those that are modelled after the ideas of Fuller’s
interlocutors. Thus, while I will push back against specific points within other philosophical
theories of legal ethics, I will not, in my discussion of the general principles of Fullerian
lawyering, argue wholesale against certain rival theories of philosophical legal ethics that may
be amenable to such views. Indeed, a notable aspect of my Fullerian account is the degree to
which it may allow for a rapprochement between the jurisprudential theories of Hart and Fuller
through the application of their jurisprudential theories to philosophical legal ethics. The aspects
of my theory that are drawn directly from Lon Fuller may find allies in a great variety of legal
theories.
The use of the terms “thin” and “thick” to describe various conceptions of the rule of
law will be familiar to those who have studied legal philosophy. 6 I wish to draw a distinction,
however, between the “thin” and “thick” as they are often used in legal philosophy and the way
that I intend to use the words. The usage in legal philosophy is to refer to “thin” and “thick”
conceptions of the rule of law. The ideas referred to in this usage have also been called
“procedural” and “substantive” conceptions of the rule of law, relating respectively to
descriptions of “thin” and “thick” conceptions of the rule of law.

7

However, this usage runs

together two ideas that should be distinguished analytically. Legal philosophers have discussed
“thin” or “procedural” in lights of the procedural or formal requirements that these “thin”
4

See my summary of this aspect of Simmonds’ theory above in Section 2.3.2) at 51-58.
Below in sections 4.3), 4.4).
6
Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, eds., The Rule of law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987)
[Hutchinson & Monahan, Rule of Law] at 100-102.
7
Paul P. Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework” (1997)
21 P.L. 467 [Craig, “Rule of Law Framework”].
5
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account place on law. Such requirements include ideas like independence of the judiciary and
Fuller’s eight desiderata. 8 Conversely, they have noted at least two reasons for which a person
could classify the rule of law as “thick” or “substantive”. These reasons are: (1) substantive
values, such as justice, have a necessary connection with the rule of law, or perhaps more
specifically, a necessary connections with procedural justice (i.e. the value being embodied in
“thin” or procedural conceptions of the rule of law

9

and (2) justice, or other moral values

besides the traditionally-argued respect for individual autonomy, are part of the very definition
of a particular conception of the rule of law or are embodied by the rule of law such that one
cannot know what the rule of law means without working out what justice means. 10 If this is the
definition of “thick” or “substantive” conceptions of the rule of law, then Simmonds’ view
undoubtedly qualifies as such a conception of the rule of law because of the necessary
connection between law and justice in his theory.
However, it is a mistake to use the necessary connection between the rule of law and
substantive moral values such as justice as reasons for classifying a conception of the rule of law
as a “thick” conception. When one shows a necessary connection between the rule of law and
the vindication of a moral principle, it is not the conception of the rule of law that becomes thick
but the moral/normative relevance of the rule of law. The desiderata of the rule of law and the
values embodied by the rule of law itself remain the same and a moral value, such as justice, has
ontological relevance to the nature of law only with respect to the role that the moral value
plays in the vindication of the principles of the rule of law and does have ontological relevance
to the law of law in virtue of the moral aim of vindicating justice’s own freestanding value. On
8

Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) [Fuller, Morality of
Law] at 39; Craig, “Rule of Law Framework”, ibid. at 467; H.L.A. Hart, “Problems of Philosophy of Law” in
Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 264 [Hart,
“Philosophy of Law”] at 273-274; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2d ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Raz, Authority of Law] at 214-219; See also Section 2.2), note 13,
above, for my discussion of Hart and Raz’s general agreement with Fuller in listing the desiderata of the
rule of law; Hutchinson & Monahan, Rule of Law, supra note 6 at 101; Grant Lamond, “The Rule of Law” in
Andrei Marmor, ed., The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York: Routledge, 2012) 495 at
495; Andrei Marmor, “The Ideal of the Rule of Law” [Marmor, “Rule of Law”] in Dennis Patterson, ed., A
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2d ed. (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 666 at
666, n. 1 and accompanying text.
9
Hutchinson & Monahan, Rule of Law, ibid. at 101-102. Significantly, in Section 2.2), note 13, above, I
discuss “thin” or procedural conditions proposed by Hart and Raz beyond Fuller’s eight desiderata.
10
Craig, “Rule of Law Framework”, supra note 7 at 477-479.
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this account, the rule of law’s vindication merely becomes more morally/normatively relevant
because we see that the desiderata and the values embodied by the rule of law can only be
vindicated if robust and crucial moral values such as justice are also vindicated. On the other
hand, when justice is part of a particular definition of the rule of law or is embodied by the rule
of law, then the rule of law itself does indeed become “thick” and “substantive. The thickening
of the moral relevance of a term and of the term itself are analytically distinct and should not be
run together as ways by which to categorize conceptions of the rule of law. Therefore, the
former of these kinds of reasons for classifying a conception of the rule of law as a substantive
conception (namely, the necessary connection with moral values) is better used to refer to
moral relevance while the purported embodiment of justice within the rule of law remains a
proper reason for classifying the rule of law in terms of a substantive concept, if such an
embodiment can be successfully argued.
If this distinction is made, we see the possibility of a more precise categorization of
concepts. The taxonomic and normative possibilities for the rule of law become the following: a
procedural conception of the rule of law and a substantive conception of the rule of law in terms
of the rule of law’s ontology and a “thin” and “thick” moral normativity within each of those two
categories. Thus, the possibilities are the following: (1) a procedural conception of the rule of
law with “thin moral normativity”, not recognizing a necessary connection between the rule of
law and other moral values but recognizing the rule of law’s embodiment of the value of respect
for individual autonomy, (2) a procedural conception of the rule of law with “thick moral
normativity”, recognizing a necessary connection between the rule of law and moral values such
as justice, (3) a substantive conception of the rule of law with “thin moral normativity”, perhaps
recognizing less morally rich of onerous moral values, besides respect for individual autonomy,
as embodied in the rule of law and (4) a substantive conception of the rule of law with “thick
moral normativity”, recognizing a rich or onerous moral values such justice as not merely
necessarily connected with the rule of law but as embodied in the rule of law. In this paper, I am
speaking of a procedural conception of the rule of law and discussing the moral relevance or
power of the conception when I discuss “thin” and “thick” moral normativity.
Although the broad outlines of my theory are compatible with many other theories of
legal ethics, the way in which I will express my generally-stated principles of Fullerian lawyering
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is less so. My specific view of the best way in which to apply my Fullerian principles of lawyering
is with a “thick moral normativity” within the natural law approach and thus is in line with the
work of the Fullerian arguments of Nigel Simmonds. For this reason, when I fill in the normative
details of my Fullerian theory of legal ethics, my particular expression of that theory (i.e. of the
two general principles that I will discuss immediately in the two subsections below) will find
more allies among theorists who are comfortable with “thick moral normativity” and a stronger
natural law approach.

4.3) First Principle of Fullerian Lawyering – The Internal Morality Thesis
4.3.1) The Content and Grounding of the First Principle
The philosophical theory of lawyering that I will propose works on two theses, both of
which are Fuller’s. First, considered through Section 4.3) of this paper, is Fuller’s Internal
Morality Thesis, which is the basis for my first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Because the
internal morality of law and its principles of legality are necessary conditions for the existence of
law, law cannot disclaim at least this incorporation of morality. Nor can lawyers and judges,
when engaging in legal interpretation, disclaim to know the moral truths that are necessarily
incorporated into the law by the internal morality of law, the reflection on these specific moral
truths being necessary for the task of legal interpretation. Thus, when lawyers discuss cases or
problems in which the vindication of the internal morality of law is a concern (e.g. in a case
dealing with a prosecution for a criminal statute that was not properly promulgated), the
lawyers and judge in the case cannot claim to be discussing these norms/values in a way that
denies that they are moral values that are necessarily part of, and connected to, the legal
system. This is the case even if the norms/values (in this case, the norm requiring proper
promulgation as respect for individual autonomy) are also something else, i.e. functional
conditions. When a defendant’s lawyer in such a case explains, to the client, the legal argument
to be made on his/her behalf, the lawyer cannot avoid bringing morality into the discussion with
the client, explicitly or implicitly, because the issue is one based on moral values that have been
brought into the legal system by way of necessity through the role of the internal morality of law
(i.e. the rule of law) as necessary conditions for the existence of the legal system.
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A lawyer who practices his/her profession in a way that instantiates the virtues of law
and lawyering should be able to recognize such principles both (1) when these values are
engaged by the nature of a case (e.g. one involving a retroactive law or a law that lacks clarity) is
such that rule-of-law values come to bear directly on a particular case, and (2) when there are
requirements stated in the positive law for the client (i.e. the government, perhaps exclusively,
in this category) to abide by the rule of law. The lawyer should recognize, in a robust way, the
ethical dimension at stake to the extent that the morality is embodied by or necessarily
associated with the rule of law. Furthermore, an appreciation of the fact that moral conditions
are incorporated into law also means abiding by the functional and moral conditions of the rule
of law. So, one cannot claim that my first principle is merely an epistemic condition of knowing
that the rule of law has incorporated moral conditions into the law. My first principle of Fullerian
lawyering also means abiding by the desiderata of the rule of law.
With respect to these points, theses about the analytical separation between law and
morality do not raise problems for legal interpretation such as to interfere with the
requirements of my first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Law cannot claim to act as an authority
apart from morality when it comes to moral truths that are necessary conditions for the
existence of law. Contrary to the Razian view, law cannot claim to replace moral reasons for
action when these particular moral reasons are necessary conditions for the existence of law. 11
Law also cannot claim to bring these moral values into the legal system in a contingent way on
the basis of the rule of recognition.
This means that there are no theses about analytical separation between law and
morality that could take ontological precedence over the rule of law to necessitate that lawyers
disclaim, or behave in a way that disclaims, the incorporation of morality into law that happens
by way of the rule of law. If lawyers ought to act in a certain way given that the nature of law is a
certain way, then the rule of law’s ontological relationship with law makes it the case that none
of the positivist theses about law and lawyering can remove the internal morality of law from
law’s necessary ontological furniture and thus from the features of the nature of law that

11

The Razian view is discussed above in Section 1.1), especially notes 10, 13 and accompanying text; the
latter footnote citing Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and
Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Raz, Between Authority], c. 8.
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determine the way that lawyering should be done and, as I will argue throughout this section,
what the lawyer should know and attempt to vindicate.

4.3.2) The Shape of the First Principle
Consider the way in which this first principle might be expressed such that it can be
amenable to legal theorists of many kinds, including Dworkinians and inclusive positivists. The
particular incorporation of morality that lawyers would not be able to disclaim knowing would
be a thin kind, perhaps merely a less robust, even morally anemic in the view of some, kind of
respect of individual autonomy. There would be no extension into other moral concepts.
Lawyers would have to recognize the incorporation of the moral value of individual autonomy
and to apply this value as is relevant to the provision of legal advice.
I would argue, in making this case on my first principle about being unable to deny the
incorporation of morality into law through the rule of law, that my Fullerian position has
somewhat of an ally in HLA Hart at some times. As I will summarize in the subsequent
paragraphs, Jeremy Waldron (in his papers on the Hart-Fuller 50th anniversary symposium) and
N.E. Simmonds argue either about Hart’s equivocal reply to Fuller’s internal morality argument
or about how some of Hart’s arguments, whether from the Hart-Fuller debate or elsewhere, are
inconsistent with the assertion that the principles of legality are merely conditions of efficacy,
not moral conditions. 12 Waldron points out Hart’s agreement with Fuller, especially in works in
which Hart’s explicit target was not Fuller.

13

With respect to the Internal Morality Thesis,

Fuller’s procedural naturalism and Hart’s inclusive positivism (in Hart’s more agreeable
moments on this point, as well as the theories of lawyering derived from these two conceptions
of legal philosophy, Fuller’s and Hart’s) are potential allies against exclusive legal positivism. At
least on this point of entry for morality into law, the very modest natural law thesis that is
procedural naturalism has more in common with inclusive legal positivism than inclusive
positivism has in common with exclusive legal positivism. Exclusive positivism, after all, denies
the inclusive positivist thesis that moral conditions can be made part of the legal system and
12

Jeremy Waldron, “Positivism and Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller” (2008) 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1135 [Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”] at 1147-1160; Simmonds discusses Hart’s response to
Gustav Radbruch in N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)
[Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea] at 173-176.
13
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, ibid. at 1157, 1167.
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become conditions of validity for particular legal system by way of enactment through the
positive law.14
Let us take up my first reason for arguing for the compatibility of my first principle of
Fullerian lawyering with a wide variety of other theories, among them inclusive positivism. This
opening reason is Hart’s equivocal response to Fuller. In a prominent recent paper, Jeremy
Waldron catalogues Hart’s equivocal responses to the central Fullerian thesis of the internal
morality of law.

15

Readers of this paper will be well aware of cases in which Hart rejects any

admissions of the moral character of the principles of legality.

16

Thus, one side of the

equivocation is already covered. Let us then consider the side of the equivocation in which Hart
leans toward recognizing the moral character of the principles of legality. Waldron cites the
following examples, among others. First, there is Hart’s essay in Paul Edwards’ Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. In that entry, Hart describes principles by which laws, even good laws, must abide or
else the laws may cause injustice. He says:
Laws, however impeccable their content, may be of little service to human beings and may cause
both injustice and misery unless they generally conform to certain requirements which may be
broadly termed procedural....These procedural requirements relate to such matters as the
generality of rules of law, the clarity with which they are phrased, the publicity given to them,
the time of their enactment, and the manner in which they are judicially applied to particular
cases. The requirements that the law, except in special circumstances, should be general (should
refer to classes of persons, things, and circumstances, not to individuals or to particular actions);
should be free from contradictions, ambiguities, and obscurities; should be publicly promulgated
and easily accessible; and should not be retrospective in operation are usually referred to as the
principles of legality. The principles which require courts, in applying general rules to particular
cases, to be without personal interest in the outcome or other bias and to hear arguments on
matters of law and proofs of matters of fact from both sides of a dispute are often referred to as
rules of natural justice. These two sets of principles together define the concept of the rule of law
.... 17

14

See generally Joseph Raz, “Authority, Law and Morality” (1985) 68 The Monist 295 [Raz,
“Authority/Morality”]; Joseph Raz, “Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law” in Raz, Authority of Law,
supra note 8 at 37; Andrei Marmor, “Exclusive Legal Positivism” [Marmor, “Exclusive Positivism”] in Jules
L. Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002) 104 [Coleman & Shapiro, eds., “Handbook of Jurisprudence”]; Danny Priel,
“Farewell to the Exclusive–Inclusive Debate” (2005) 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 675 [Priel, “Farewell
Exclusive-Inclusive”].
15
Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 12.
16
See e.g. H.L.A. Hart, Book Review of The Morality of Law by Lon L. Fuller (1965) 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281
[Hart, “Book Review”], discussed above in Section 2.2), note 16 and accompanying text.
17
Hart, “Philosophy of Law”, supra note 8; quoted in Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 12
at 1144-1145.
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These principles are variations on the same principles as in Fuller’s eight desiderata of
legality.

18

Next, Waldron cites the way in which Hart makes his argument in the case of the

Grudge Informer.

19

This example gives us an equivocation on just one of the principles of

legality, namely, prospectivity. Hart opposes the strategies proposed by natural law theorists
such as Gustav Radbruch and Lon Fuller, who argue that the case should be handled essentially
by holding that, due to some kind of immorality (whether that of the of the substantive variety
in the case of Radbruch20 or of the procedural variety in the case of Fuller21) the Nazi informer
laws, under which the wife in the case informed on the husband, should not be given the normal
fidelity that is given to law and that she should thus have been punished for the wrong done to
her husband. Hart says that, although it is wrongful to punish someone under a retroactive
criminal statute, it would be better to do so than to act as if the informer laws did not truly have
the status of law because they had done some moral wrong. He argues:
Odious as retrospective criminal legislation and punishment may be, to have pursued it openly in
this case would at least have had the merits of candour. It would have made plain that in
punishing the woman a choice had to be made between two evils, that of leaving her unpunished
and that of sacrificing a very precious principle of morality endorsed by most legal systems. 22

If retroactivity is odious here, Waldron argues, then Hart has no ground to say that it is
merely a condition of efficacy when debating Fuller. N.E. Simmonds too has taken note of
equivocations on the topic of the moral status of Fuller’s eight desiderata, especially in dealing
with Radbruch’s arguments about retroactivity in the Grudge Informer Case. As Simmonds says:
The relationship between Hart’s criticisms of Radbruch, and his legal positivism more generally, is
considerably more complex and ambiguous than one might at first think. Hart objects to
Radbruch’s position on the basis that it obscures a conflict of value that arises when legal
systems must consider the possibility of punishing people for wicked acts that were permitted by
the enactments in force at the time. If this situation involves a conflict of value, what are the
18

Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 8. Recall that Fuller’s eight desiderata are listed above in Section
2.1), note 4 and accompanying text. Hart also adds some conditions to Fuller’s eight desiderata in the
passage quoted in the previous footnote, as discussed above in Section 2.2), note 13.
19
Recall the facts of the Grudge Informer Case, summarized above, in the Introduction at 2-3. See
especially note 3, in the Introduction; citing H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 [Hart, “Positivism”] at 618-620.
20
Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und ibergesetzliches Recht [StatutoryLawlessness and SupraStatutory Law], 1 SUDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [SJZ] 105, 105-08 (1946) (Ger.), translated in 26
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2006) [Radbruch].
21
Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630
[Fuller, “Positivism & Fidelity”] at 648-657, 660-661.
22
Hart, “Positivism”, supra note 19 at 619; quoted in Waldron, “Hart’s Equivocal Response”, supra note 12
at 1148.
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relevant values? Would we not have to say that they are the demands of retributive justice (or,
perhaps sound penal policy) on the one side, and legality on the other? And does this recognition
of legality as a value not conflict with the positivist insistence that law as such is not a value? 23

Finally, among the examples cited by Waldron is a quote, from the Hart-Fuller debate, in
which Hart briefly treats the desideratum of generality as having moral relevance. Hart says:
If we attach to a legal system the minimum meaning that it must consist of general rules-general
both in the sense that they refer to courses of action, not single actions, and to multiplicities of
men, not single individuals-this meaning connotes the principle of treating like cases alike,
though the criteria of when cases are alike will be, so far, only the general elements specified in
the rules. It is, however, true that one essential element of the concept of justice is the principle
of treating like cases alike. This is justice in the administration of the law, not justice of the law.
So there is, in the very notion of law consisting of general rules, something which prevents us
from treating it as if morally it is utterly neutral, without any necessary contact with moral
principles. 24

Knowing about these equivocations is an important step in understanding the
theoretical closeness, and appeal, that procedural naturalism has to the inclusive legal positivist,
despite the past battles between the two most celebrated proponents of these views.
Second, however, in making my case for the compatibility of my first principle of
Fullerian lawyering with other theories of law and lawyering, including lighter forms of
positivism, I argue that, when the decision to subject the rules of society to law is taken, society
makes a decision that honours both Fuller’s functional account of the internal morality of law as
well as a Hartian incorporation of morality into law through the rule of recognition. This works
both as a social fact, in the choice to be governed by law, and as a necessary condition once the
choice is made to govern society by law, rather than another means that does not respect
personal autonomy, such as tyranny. In the following quote, Simmonds, although attacking a
positivist conception of the rule of recognition, outlines a way in which a procedural naturalist
could make use of the idea. He argues:
Furthermore...it is insufficient to explain how judges might be guided by the rule of recognition,
for judges must justify their decisions. The mere fact that the decision is derivable from a rule of
recognition accepted by the officials could not intelligibly be offered to the litigants as a reason
that justifies the decision. For this reason, we should not think of legality as simply a matter of
derivability from a basic rule of recognition. For such derivability will confer legality only if the
system, of which the rule of recognition forms part, is itself a system of law. The features that
qualify a system as legal in character (features provisionally identified in Fuller’s eight desiderata)
necessarily entail the provision of domains of optional conduct that are independent of the will
23

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 12 at 174.
Hart, “Positivism”, supra note 19 at 623-624 [emphasis in original]; quoted in Waldron, “Hart’s
Equivocal Response”, supra note 12 at 1148-1149.
24
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of others. It is the provision of such domains of conduct that forms the value of legality, and
provides the basis for the legal judgment’s justificatory force. 25

On this view, there is indeed room in a Fullerian theory for social facticity to play a role
as a condition for the existence of law. The key factor, however, is that the rule of recognition
itself cannot, by its facticity alone, be a condition for the existence of law. Rather, the rule of
recognition has its own conditions for proper application. These conditions include moral
conditions bought into the rule of recognition itself by the rule of law in virtue of the rule of
recognition’s membership in the category of “law”. It is hard, at first, to believe that a Hartian
could do anything other than firmly reject this view. However, taking the above-stated
equivocation into account, it might be reasonable to think otherwise. After all, if a Hartian is
willing to accept the rule of law, in its thin moral nature, as a condition for the existence of law,
then one would surely ask whether the rule of recognition would be guided in its lawrecognizing role by the constraint that it can only perform this function in a system of rules that
qualifies as a legal system and in a way that is consistent with the rule of law, as Simmonds
notes in the quote just provided.
Additionally, if one is willing to recognize that the principles of legality are necessary for
the existence of law, then it may be the case that one can also come to the conclusion that a
judge, or other interpreter of the law in the relevant role, cannot make use of the rule of
recognition to recognize norms which have content or formal qualities that violate the rule of
law. Thus, one might argue that a judge cannot properly recognize a norm that requires the
person subject to the law to perform an impossible action, or to follow a norm that is thoroughly
unclear. Do we have any suggestion that Hart, even at the more Fullerian side of his
equivocation, would go this far? We do indeed in Hart’s discussion of the relationship between
the rule of law and inclusive legal positivism. He shows a willingness to put water in the
positivistic wine when moral norms are incorporated into the legal system by the rule of
recognition. Importantly, the view that Hart takes here cuts against the idea that positive law
must act as a Razian exclusionary reason. Hart says:
It is of course true that an important function of the rule of recognition is to promote the
certainty with which the law may be ascertained.... But the exclusion of all uncertainty at
whatever costs in other values is not a goal which I have ever envisaged for the rule of
recognition.... Only if the certainty-providing function of the rule of recognition is treated as
25

Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 12 at 188 [emphasis in original].
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paramount and overriding could the form of soft positivism that includes among the criteria of
law conformity with moral principles or values which may be controversial be regarded as
inconsistent. 26

If the rule of recognition’s pursuit of positivistic certainty can be toned down for the
sake of a moral norm that has been brought into the system contingently and through the rule
of recognition itself, it is possible that Hart, in the unwittingly Fullerian side of his equivocation,
might also be willing to tone down positivistic certainty for the sake of a moral value that is
necessarily built into the legal system as a condition of its existence through the rule of law.
The difference between these two views, the procedural naturalism of Lon Fuller and
the inclusive legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart, is a slight one even when we put Hart at the most
positivist end of his equivocation to Fuller. The two views become practically indistinguishable
when Hart is on the Fullerian side of the equivocation. A Hart who recognizes the functional
necessity and moral quality of the rule of law and who is willing to compromise on the clarity
achieved by the rule of recognition is much closer to being an ally of Fullerian procedural
naturalism than he is to being an ally of the exclusive positivism of Joseph Raz.
We have, in this, a recognition already built into the field of legal philosophy itself, of a
theoretical closeness between weak positivist theories such as inclusive positivism and weak
naturalist theories such as procedural naturalism. This is true all the more in the case of the
philosophy of lawyering, especially given the requirements of legal ethics and the interpretive
principles that I am proposing on the basis of the legal ethical guidance that can be derived from
the rule of law. My principles of lawyering, generally stated, make no stronger claim of the link
between law and morality, as a philosophical and interpretive matter, than I would make in legal
philosophy. Additionally, the duty to take stock of the ways in which morality and law are
intertwined is strong at the level of theorizing about lawyering because one is directly engaged
in a professional relationship that affects a client’s experience of the law. Thus, when thinking
about the act of lawyering, Luban’s arguments about the function of the professional lawyerclient relationship strengthens the impetus to bring out the fullness of the normative context. It
also makes the Fullerian side of the inclusive positivist equivocation all the more persuasive.

26

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) [Hart, Concept of Law] at 251252 [footnotes omitted].
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Having stated the Internal Morality Thesis of my theory of Fullerian lawyering in a way
that (due to its “thin moral normativity”) shows its capacity for consistency with a wide variety
of legal philosophies, I have developed my first principle in a way that is in line with Fuller’s own
jurisprudential theory, which also shows a great capacity to be read in a variety of ways that are
consistent with one or another of a wide variety of theories of legal philosophy. Let me now turn
to the task of developing my Fullerian theory in a way that gives a more robust account of the
moral principles that can be incorporated into the law by way of their relationship with the rule
of law. This is a “thick moral normativity” that comes from the work of Nigel Simmonds,
especially his idea that some moral values such as justice have a necessary connection with the
rule of law.
In order to bring this “thick moral normativity” to bear on my first principle, I must give
an account of the moral values that are incorporated into law either (1) directly through their
participation in the normativity of the rule of law (as in the case of respect for human
autonomy) or (2) by a relationship in which the rule of law mediates, by way of the principle of
transitivity, a necessary connection between the moral concept and the rule of law (as in the
case of justice). Recall that I said above:
Because the internal morality of law and its principles of legality are necessary conditions for the
existence of law, law cannot disclaim at least this incorporation of morality. Nor can lawyers and
judges, when engaging in legal interpretation, disclaim to know the moral truths that are
necessarily incorporated into the law by the internal morality of law... 27

How does this play out in the case of “thick moral normativity”? One must be more
careful here. If “thick moral normativity” simply means a richer incorporation of respect for
autonomy than is done under “thin moral normativity”, then officials of the legal system, such as
lawyers, can be reasonably expected to know and engage with the moral value as in the case of
“thin moral normativity” and nothing more is required of lawyers than would be required from
“thin moral normativity”. Respect for individual autonomy is the animating value of the legal
system (i.e. a value that is at the core of a necessary condition for the existence of law and thus
a value that is protected and advanced, at least to some extent, in any legal system). Thus
officials of the legal system can be expected to have a robust appreciation and interaction with

27

Above, in Section 4.3.1) at 84.

Page | 92

this normative value for the purpose of carrying out their work as officials within the legal
system. But what if I mean much more than this when I discuss “thick moral normativity”?
If, to choose one of Simmonds incorporations of a richer, “thick moral normativity” is
conceived of as including moral values that are necessarily connected by way of the transitivity
that is facilitated by the mediating role of the rule of law, then things are different. As noted
earlier, in such a case, justice achieves status as a necessary condition for law (and thus
becomes necessarily connected with law) because justice is a necessary condition for the rule of
law and the rule of law is a necessary condition for justice.

28

The requirements of my first

principle of Fullerian lawyering become much more substantial under such a reality. Lawyers are
then required to acknowledge and perform the service of lawyering in a way that coheres with
the incorporation of the moral value of justice into law.
We should be aware of the possibility that the ability of a legal official to appreciate and
interact with moral values may be reduced because of the normative separation (the transitivity
or indirectness) that exists, even in my procedural naturalist view, between the law’s
normativity and the moral normativity of moral concepts other than those contained directly
within the rule of law itself. We might think that lawyers will be less able to appreciate and
interact with ideas that become of importance to the legal analysis by way of mediation through
the rule of law’s necessary connection to law rather than originating directly in a positive source
of law or even by one of a single step of necessary connection.
A philosophical distinction will be helpful for us in understanding that the transitive
relationship of necessity that exists between the law and justice does not necessarily have any
effect on the ability of legal officials to appreciate and interact with justice. The distinction is
between the major philosophical branches of metaphysics and epistemology. The criticism that I
have summarized here posits that epistemic opacity can result from the relationship of
transitivity that is the means by which justice comes to be a necessary condition for the
existence of law. This means indeed that there is some metaphysical distance in the relationship
of necessity between law and justice. However, that in itself does not mean that the transitivelyconnected moral concept (i.e. justice) is any more epistemically opaque or unclear than if it was
28

See Simmonds’ argument for the mutual necessary connection between justice and the rule of law
summarized above in Section 2.3.2) at 51-58, especially 53-57. This argument is very briefly noted as a
“mediated necessary connection” above in Section 4.2) at 80-81.
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necessarily connected to law in one step rather than through the mediating value of the rule of
law.
For example, if an information-technology expert needs to use a particular piece of
hardware in order to accomplish a particular task and the hardware only runs a particular
operating system, then the use of the operating system is a necessary condition for the tech
expert to accomplish the particular task. There is a transitively-mediated relationship of
necessity between the operating system and the ability of the tech expert to perform the task
and thus, let us also say, to work in his/her institution, craft or sector of the economy or
industry. There is a metaphysical or causal distance here between the tech expert and the
operating system. However, the distance in terms of the necessary connections does not in any
way imply an epistemic opaqueness or reduced clarity between the tech expert and the
operating system. In fact, in my example, as I argue is also the case with law and justice, the tech
expert ought to have relevant and substantial knowledge about the operating system given the
role that s/he will be playing. This is not to say that there can never be opaqueness between
things that are mediated by the transitivity-based relationship of necessity. I am merely arguing
that the metaphysical fact of transitivity-based necessity does not, by itself, generate epistemic
problems of opaqueness or reduced clarity for the people attempting to work with the concepts
that are connected by way of transitive necessity to the system in which they work. An
argument must be given in each instance about whether the epistemic accessibility, to the
relevant actor, of the transitively-connected conditions.
My view is that, even with this less direct and mediated necessary connection, lawyers
should still be able to readily satisfy my first principle of Fullerian lawyering when it is expressed
in terms of “thick moral normativity”. What is required is the ability to reason in a sufficiently
sophisticated way with ethical concepts. There is no reason to think that lawyers do not have
the ability to do this already or with training, especially as it pertains to their own practice area
within law. Even though moral values such as justice do not themselves inhere with the rule of
law, their necessary connection with the rule of law calls for lawyers and judges to not disclaim
their incorporation into law. Moreover, legal officials ought not to deny the moral truths that
are incorporated into the legal system through any kind of necessary connection with law. Thus,
lawyers ought to recognize that doing (moral) justice, especially of the kind that is most relevant
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to the vindication of the rule of law, is a course of action that is valuable to the legal system in
virtue of the legal system’s membership to the conceptual category of law. This also goes for
other moral values that have a necessary connection to the rule of law. That is, lawyers ought to
accept (moral) justice as a legally valuable normative principle. The (admittedly onerous) task in
response to this is to train our minds to be able to better handle the role that moral justice plays
in understanding, advising, and acting upon legal norms. This does not necessarily mean that
lawyers will need a curriculum in philosophical ethics. It does, however, mean that asking ethical
questions and knowing something about ethical reasoning has an important functional and
epistemic role in giving sound legal advice.
Lawyers will not always agree about what is just in a particular instance. Nonetheless,
justice, because of the shape of its necessary connection with the rule of law, illuminates the
law in a particular way when we are considering legal questions to which justice pertains. It is
justice that helps keep us free, as Simmonds says, from the “ungrounded choice[s]” of other
individuals29, including judges, because justice is a standard of orientation and expectation
about the law’s content towards which we expect the judge’s analysis to aim. To return to my
tech expert example, this is like saying that having knowledge about the operating system that is
exclusively able to run the piece of hardware also tells the tech expert something about the
hardware itself. What is desired is for legal officials, including judges and lawyers, to pursue the
acquisition of the interpretive skills and excellences that are required to deal with justice, a
moral value that will illuminate our normative system to us. This means, more generally, that
skills at specific kinds of moral deliberation and interpretation contribute to excellence at legal
interpretation.
To sum up, I argue for my first principle as expressed in the light of the “thick moral
normativity” that Simmonds proposes. Lawyers should recognize the incorporation of (1) a
robust notion of individual autonomy along with (2) the incorporation of moral principles that
can be shown to have a necessary connection with the rule of law. This comes with reasonable
expectations about application to particular moral principles. Even allowing for these reasonable
expectations, however, lawyers are asked to treat moral principles that are incorporated in this
29

The notion of “ungrounded choice” was discussed above in Section 2.3.2) at 51-58, especially Section
2.3.2), note 77 and accompanying text, quoted from Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 12 at 198;
and Section 2.3.2), note 81 and accompanying text, quoted from ibid.
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way as being directly relevant for the purpose of understanding the legal norms to the extent
that the rule of law, or particular aspects of the rule of law, are at stake and can be illuminated
by relevant moral principles such as justice.

4.4) Second Principle of Fullerian Lawyering – The Moral Orientation Thesis
The second principle in my theory of Fullerian lawyering is profoundly connected to the
first principle’s recognition of the truth that the rule of law incorporates moral normativity into
the internal conditions for the existence of law. Additionally, the shape of this second principle,
a principle that I will call the “Moral Orientation Thesis”, will be affected by the question of
whether one comes to the interpretive analysis in the first principle conceiving of the rule of law
in terms of “thin moral normativity” or “think moral normativity”. Either view would generate a
plausible reading of the second principle and may even justify Fuller’s optimism about the
contribution that the rule of law makes to the moral status of law. However, a theory with “thick
moral normativity” goes much further towards providing a foundation for the moral ambitions
that Fuller has for the rule of law.
My Moral Orientation Thesis is inspired by Fuller’s ethically ambitious view (perhaps
overambitious view) about the law tending away from evil generally on the basis of the rule of
law.

30

Under Fuller’s view, which was criticized by Luban, as summarized above31, the rule of

law shapes the nature of law such that it tends away from evil. Such a thesis, without the
development into a theory with “thick moral normativity”, is not as attractive as it could be
(although not completely without appeal) in terms of being an accurate description of the
history and tendencies of legal systems. If all that is required to tend away from evil is that the
law respect individual autonomy (under “thin moral normativity”), then there is great leeway for
legal systems to fulfill this requirement, meet the standards of the rule of law to such an extent
of “thin moral normativity”, and yet instantiate great evils in other ways. If “thick moral
normativity” is the standard, then we have much more robust grounds on which to criticize such

30
31

Above in Section 2.1), note 8 and accompanying text.
See my summary of Luban’s criticism, above, in Section 2.3.3) at 62-63, and Section 3) at 72-73.
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regimes for undermining the rule of law and to thus also show that way in which the rule of law
shapes the nature of law to tend away from evil. 32
Nonetheless, this morally ambitious thesis of law tending away from evil is attractive as
an interpretive principle for the practice of lawyering even when all that we are given from the
rule of law is “thin moral normativity”. Treated as a theory of lawyering and derived after the
discussion of the first premise, I argue that we can recognize this second principle as a proper
interpretive attitude for a lawyer (i.e. the proper internal perspective, to use a Hartian term). At
the general level, and not shaped by a theory that reflects thin or thick moral normativity in
particular, the principle is that the lawyer should approach his/her task of interpreting the law
with the view that the following things tend away from evil: (1) law (when discussing this
category with its internal morality in mind), (2) a legal system abiding by the rule of law, and (3)
the particular rules in any area of law within a legal system that abides by the rule of law (and in
which the norms within the area of law abide by the rule of law). From herein, when I discuss
the satisfaction of the rule of law, it should be read as referring to all of these three levels, with
emphasis on one or more as is relevant to the particular topic under discussion.
Consider first an explanation in which “thin moral normativity” could be the normative
shape of my second principle of Fullerian lawyering. How could moral normativity that arises out
of a thin principle of respect for human autonomy properly33 generate, among lawyers who are
in the course of serving as legal officials, an outlook which says that the law tends away from
evil? In making this first explanation, the scope of the question is very important. If the goal is to
show that lawyers could properly have the view that all valid law (i.e. law that has satisfied the
rule of law) tends away from evil, then that will be impossible if we are limited to “thin moral
normativity”.

32

See an example of these more robust grounds in my reply to Luban’s criticism of Fuller, above, in
Section 3) at 73-76. My reply is ultimately made on the basis of grounds that would fall under the heading
of “thick moral normativity”.
33
I conceived of the word “properly” as referring to moral propriety. As in, “is this a proper moral view to
hold given (1) the value that your role is supposed to serve and (2) the factual information that you
know?” The moral propriety of a view is determined at least by whether it makes sense of central moral
concepts such as justice and whether moral problems have been assessed reasonably using moral
principles in the applied context. Thus, one would not have a proper moral view when failing to realize, at
all, the injustice that can still exist in a society even when the rule of law is achieved under “thick moral
normativity”.
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However, if the task is smaller, such as the more modest project that some legal
ethicists have identified as the focus of legal ethics, then “thin moral normativity” may be up to
the task of properly generating this view among lawyers. Take, for example, Alice Woolley’s
question of “what, in a free and democratic society, the role of the lawyer should be”. 34 When
engaging in this project, one is not taking what is undoubtedly the less attractive position that a
lawyer in any legal system should take the interpretive attitude that their own legal system
generally tends away from evil. As Luban showed, as summarized above35, such a theory would
be implausible because of the great variety of societies that satisfy the rule of law in terms of
“thin moral normativity”, including many which do not tend away from evil (including those that
unjustly exclude people from the community whose autonomy the rule of law seeks to protect).
Given this, “thin moral normativity” is more up to the task of explaining how a lawyer in the
context mentioned by Woolley could properly come to the conclusion that, given the
satisfaction of the rule of law by the legal system of a free and democratic society, the legal
system belongs to a category that tends away from evil.
On to the explanation of the way in which the rule of law under “thin moral normativity”
can properly generate the perspective that my second principle of Fullerian lawyering requires.
The key relationship here is in the contribution that the rule of law and free democracy make to
the goal of tending away from evil. I am not arguing here that, in tending away from evil, the
law, as enacted in accordance with the rule of law, perfectly lines up with the good, or actively
tracks the good. That too would be untenable because it would be incoherent in a situation in
which political parties are elected and pursue differing agendas. Do each of their policies track
the good when they create opposing laws as they have their turn in government? Instead, the
second principle as conceived here is simply that, when law is created in accordance with the
rule of law and in a democratic society, with the values embodied by these two systems (legality
and free, or liberal, democracy) in conjunction, there should be a presumption that the laws
tend away from evil or can avoid evil. This could mean actively pursuing the moral value but also
34

Alice Woolley, “If Philosophical Legal Ethics is the Answer, What is the Question?” (2010) 60 U.T.L.J. 983
at 987. See also these papers that were published as part of a special issue of the same journal: Daniel
Markovits, “Three Issues in Legal Ethics” (2010) 60 U.T.L.J. 1003; W. Bradley, Wendel, “Methodology and
Perspective in the Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics: A Response to Professors Woolley and Markovits” (2010) 60
U.T.L.J. 1011; Tim Dare, “Philosophical Legal Ethics and Person Integrity” (2010) 60 U.T.L.J. 1021.
35
Above in Section 2.3.3) at 62-63, and Section 3) at 72-73.
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pursuing policies that are morally neutral. And a value that would support this within both the
rule of law and democratic government is, for example, respect for the autonomy of persons.
Both the rule of law and democracy hold this value in a central place within their theoretical
underpinnings. The rule of law vindicates respect for autonomy for individuals as a matter of
legal philosophy while democracy seeks to vindicate autonomy as a matter of political
philosophy. When the systems are in place, a lawyer (i.e. an actor within the legal system who
owes fidelity to the law) should give a system that is governed by the rule of law and democracy
a presumption that the laws in the system created according to these two sets of values actually
do tend away from evil, especially with respect to the evils that are contrary to the animating
values of general morality that I just argued underlie them both.
The rule of law, when considered under a theory of “thick moral normativity”, is in a
better position to properly generate the internal perspective in lawyers that the law tends away
from evil. First, the ability of the rule of law to make law tend away from evil, under such a view,
does not depend on a contingent association between itself and a contingent reality. This is to
say, the rule of law conceived in this more robust way is not dependent on whether society
contingently adopts democratic values. In fact, quite the opposite, it is possible that the rule of
law, conceived of in this way, promotes democratic values. If the rule of law has a necessary
connection with justice, but in particular, political justice36, then a society that has the rule of
law will necessarily bring with it democratic values if democratic values are considered an
essential part of political justice. Thus, if the case made just above in favour of the ability of the
rule of law, conceived of in terms of “thin morality normativity”, succeeds at properly
generating our desired internal perspective, then it will also be able to generate the internal
perspective in the case of “thick moral normativity”. Thus, if free democracy and the rule of law
can make the law tend away from evil in terms of “thin moral normativity” it can also do so in
the case of “thick moral normativity”. The difference is that this argument attains its outcome by

36

See generally Rawl’s definition of “the idea of a political conception of justice” in John Rawls, Political
Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) at 11-15.
I recognize that much work would need to be done to prove this particular necessary connection between
the rule of law and political justice. That can be the project of future work. The same can be said generally
for my project of arguing for my two premises of Fullerian lawyering. I am now only making an
explanation of how the two principles, especially the second principle, would work under a Fullerian
account.
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necessity in the case of “thick moral normativity”, rather than by contingency as in the case of
“thin moral normativity”.
Beyond this initial point, the wider-ranging advantage of the rule of law under “thick
moral normativity” is the relationship of necessity between the rule of law and other moral
values, especially justice. Even merely with the necessary connection between the rule of law
and justice37, the lawyer has a strong reason to think that law tends away from evil. If law
cannot even exist (because of a mediated necessary connection) without vindicating, to the
relevant extent, the moral value of justice, then law instantiates a strong indicator of a tendency
away from evil. If there are other moral values, besides justice, that have this same kind of
mediated necessary connection with the rule of law, then the indicators of law’s tendency away
from evil become all the more strong. This is a richer account of the evil-avoiding tendencies of
the law than Luban imagined. If this is the case, then law is morally better than Luban imagined
and the lawyer, having a duty to undertake the internal perspective towards law’s legal
normativity, should also appreciate the moral normativity that is brought in by way of a morally
robust reading of the rule of law.
Treating the law with the recognition that it tends away from evils means two things.
First, the lawyer must show sufficient deference to the positively-stated law that is created, and
maintained, in accordance with the rule of law and under a democratic society. This can mean
something along the lines of Bradley Wendel’s notion of respect for the law under the heading
of political obligation, which entails honouring the legal entitlements of others, not
manipulating the law and not unsettling the positive law by means not recognized by the legal
system. 38 Second, interpreting the details of the positively-stated law with the recognition that
law tends away from evil means reading laws to make the best moral case and justification for
those particular laws insofar as they pertains to the principles of legality. Thus, the principles of
legality and norms within the positive law that further the principles of legality must be read to
give them robust force. This principle is a sort of Dworkinian reasoning for the rule of law.

37

Recall, of course that both of these, (1) the rule of law and (2) justice, are conceived of as functioning
like principles and in terms of degree of achievement, rather than binary achievement or nonachievement.
38
Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 3 at 88, special * footnote.
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If one is to consider the distinction drawn by Dyzenhaus between the legal analysis at
the fundamental level and at the doctrinal level39, the second principle of my Fullerian theory of
reasoning is meant to set up a two-stage process for the provision of legal advice.

40

First, the

lawyer must assess whether the legal system, the law on the particular field and perhaps the
individual legal sources that are relevant to the case at hand, comply with the principles of
legality. This inquiry takes place at the fundamental level. If the law, conceived in terms of these
various degrees of generality and specificity, abides by the principles of the rule of law, then the
second step for the lawyer is to engage with legal analysis at the doctrinal level. Under the
second principle of Fullerian lawyering, this doctrinal analysis will be shaped by the lawyer’s
duty to treat the law as tending away from evil. If one is to fill in the details and take to heart the
idea of analyzing the doctrinal law in a way that tends away from evil, one would perhaps find
suitable interpretive guidance in the theory of Ronald Dworkin and his approach of making the
“best moral case” of and for the law that one is interpreting. As noted above, 41 William Simon
brings Dworkin’s legal philosophy into the field of legal ethics. It is at this doctrinal level of my
second principle of Fullerian lawyering that I can find it particularly helpful to make use of a
theory that has such a rich tie-in between the value-laden/moral nature of law and the process
of doctrinal interpretation. A lawyer’s engagement in a Dworkinian/Simonian interpretive
process is triggered, under my theory of lawyering, by a particular legality-affirming answer to a
Fullerian question at the fundamental level. If the legal system abides by the rule of law and
thus tends away from evil, then let us treat it as doing so, in the general way that Dworkin wants
done as an interpretive strategy and especially in terms of its coherence with justice, as
Simmonds wants. Our concern with justice at the fundamental level should seep into our
doctrinal interpretation, as it cannot help but doing.

39

Above, in the Introduction at 2-5.
I, of course, do not mean to suggest that these two stages are to be treated as silos from one another. It
may be that lawyers and judges, in the way that Simmonds would have it, will need to understand
something about doctrine in order to fully understand the analysis at the fundamental level. I simply
mean to suggest that these are two levels of analysis, mixed though they may be, that are involved once
an interpreter of the law engages in legal analysis under my second principle of Fullerian lawyering.
41
Above, in Section 4.1), especially note 2 and accompanying text.
40
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This outline quickly summarizes the Fullerian interpretive principles of lawyering that I propose:
First Principle of Fullerian Lawyering – The Internal Morality Thesis: Because the
internal morality of law and its principles of legality are necessary conditions for the
existence of law, law cannot disclaim at least this incorporation of morality. Nor can
lawyers and judges, when engaging in legal interpretation, disclaim to know the moral
truths that are necessarily incorporated into the law by the internal morality of law, the
consideration of such moral truths being necessary for the task of legal interpretation.
Second Principle of Fullerian Lawyering – The Moral Orientation Thesis: When the legal
system and the law on a particular field abide by the rule of law, a lawyer has a duty,
from the perspective of legal ethics, to treat and interpret the law as tending away from
evil.
Two Level Analysis of the Moral Orientation Thesis:
(1) Fundamental Level: The lawyer must assess whether the legal system, the
law on the particular field and perhaps the individual legal sources that are
relevant to the case at hand, comply with the principles of legality. 42
(2) Doctrinal Level: If the law on the relevant case does comply with the
principles of legality, the lawyer should treat the law on the subject as if it tends
away from evil. Treating the law as tending away from evil means:
First, the lawyer must show sufficient deference to the positively-stated
law. Second, interpreting the details of the positively-stated law means
reading them to make the best moral case and justification for law
insofar as it pertains to the principles of legality.
4.5) Lawyering and Legal Ontology in Practice
Before closing this development of my two principles of Fullerian lawyering, it is
important to explain that the relevance of my two principles does not end at the requirement to
take specific approaches to the task of legal advice. The theory is not simply a requirement to
think in a certain way while doing law. The duties that I have explicated show the normative
relevance of lawyers to the legal system. How does a lawyer interact with the substance of law?

42

Note that, at the fundamental level, the principles of legality, especially when conceived of in a narrow
way (under the rubric of “thin moral normativity”), may be only one set of evaluative criteria that come to
bear on the question of the ideal of fidelity to law. Another one of the criteria, despite its secondary
position relative to the rule of law, may indeed be the political philosophical aspect of Raz’s authority of
law.
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A lawyer, playing the role of either an advocate or an adviser, cannot have a “rule of
recognition”-style effect over the substance of the positively-stated law. 43
What a lawyer can do, however, is play a role in the use and interpretation of law within
society, which is of great importance when we conceive of “creating” or “making” law in the
robust sense of giving meaning to the law’s norms.

44

This is a substantial involvement in the

process of creating law and in the process that is law, as Allan Hutchinson would argue. In
making his case, Hutchinson criticizes the Dominant Model’s image of the law as failing to make
sense of the degree to which the work of lawyers within the legal system is part of the process
(namely the discursive process that involves the creation of norms and endowment of meaning)
that is constitutive of law. Hutchinson argues that “The law never simply is, and lawyering is
never completely the passive and technical involvement in that is....” 45 He also argues, speaking
practically, that lawyers rarely behave as if “[T]he law is fixed, certain and determinate”. 46 Thus,
Hutchinson argues that lawyers already know, in practice, that it is not just that the law can be

43

By this, I mean simply that lawyers’ interpretation of the law is not a condition of legal validity. A norm
or interpretation does not become law simply because a lawyer has given an interpretation or made a
statement about the law. Of course, I do recognize instances in which the interactions of lawyers with law
can shape the application and use of law for their clients. That is the topic of the next several pages. For
the purpose of the present footnote, I simply acknowledge that the lawyer’s relationship to law has
substantially different implications for legal validity as compared to that of a judge.
At the same time, it will be helpful to recall this in the context of the criticism that Simmonds makes of
Hart’s view about the ontological significance that the rule of law can have as a condition of legal validity.
Simmonds’ criticism has been summarized above in the following notes: Section 2.3.2), note 42 and
accompanying text (citing Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 12 at 159, 170, c. 4), Section 2.3.2),
note 52 (citing ibid. at 188, 191), Section 4.3), note 25 and accompanying text (citing ibid. at 188). With
this argument proposing a much reduced ontological significance for the rule of recognition, which is
typically focused around the work of legislatures and courts, especially, it may be possible to close the gap
between the ontological implications and significance of lawyers’ and judges’ relationships to legal
validity.
44

I will cite Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2006) [Hutchinson, Legal Ethics]. William Simon makes an argument on this point that is similar/related to
the argument that I will cite from Hutchinson and which Simon calls “The Problem of Private Legislation”.
This problem refers to the use of legal rights and maneuvers by private actors to establish binding social
norms that the courts will enforce, or which will take some time to overturn. Such “private legislation” is
often coordinated by lawyers (not necessarily in a nefarious way) for the benefit their clients. This practice
affects the use and experience that people have of the law. See Simon, Practice of Justice, supra note 1 at
46-52.
45
Hutchinson, Legal Ethics, ibid. at 26 [emphasis in original].
46
Ibid.
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shaped by the actions of lawyers in the sense that lawyers are actors within the legal system and
thus use the various levers of the legal system to have the machine spit out an answer that
serves their client. Instead, lawyers’ work in shaping the law, giving meaning, etc., is the process
of law and is constitutive of law.
When thinking about this robust sense of meaning-giving processes that is constitutive
of law, we see that the lawyer’s role has ontological significance for the legal system and its
substantive norms. Such a view can add colour to the advising context, the advising context
being the focus of Fuller’s work and also a focus of this paper and its case study, discussed
below47. Under Hutchinson’s view, which I endorse, there is greater conceptual relevance (in the
sense of being relevant to the concept of law) when we say that the lawyer can affect the way in
which his/her client responds to the substance of the positive law. The same is true when we
recognize that, by playing his/her role within the legal system in different ways, the lawyer can
influence the way in which the client is affected by the substance of the positive law. In both of
these cases, the lawyer is participating in the creation of the substance of the law to which their
client will respond, or by which the client will be affected. 48
Putting Hutchinson’s approach in the context of Fullerian legal theory and Fullerian
lawyering, I argue that the lawyer has the capacity to affect the client’s interaction with the rule
of law and with the moral values that the rule of law incorporates into the legal system. If the
lawyer participates in a process that is constitutive of law, then the lawyer has the capacity to do
work that engages Fuller’s eight desiderata. Many philosophical theories of legal ethics
(including positivist and natural law theories) are, at least under some expressions of the
theories at play, conceptually consistent with the recognition of the ways in which lawyers affect
the experience that the client has with substantive law. These views could also recognize that
the work of lawyers can affect the client’s interaction with the rule of law and its internal or
related values.
The way in which the lawyer’s influence plays out will be determined, in part, by the
approach that the lawyer takes to law. This approach is better-structured when it is in accord
47

Below in Part IV – Applied Legal Ethics.
This characterization is especially relevant when the lawyer works in the OLC and the recipient of
his/her legal services is the executive branch of the federal government of the United States, as I explain
below in the text accompanying Section 6.1), note 12, and as I summarize from Wendel’s criticism of the
“torture memos”, below in Section 6.2) at 142, especially note 82.
48
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with the best philosophical account of law (which I argue includes the insights of Lon Fuller).
Taking Simmonds’ view of the rule of law, which I endorse and which incorporates “thick moral
normativity” into the law, I would argue that the lawyer (through his/her role and because of
the necessary connection between the rule of law and justice) can influence the way that the
legal system makes justice apply to a client’s case. Moreover, “law”, the rule of law and justice
are not always vindicated by the positive law or by the way in which legal officials and citizens
wish to make the positive law play out, including in the process of meaning-giving. The lawyer is
often in a position to affect the degree of coherence of the positive law with “law”, the rule of
law and justice, especially as it pertains to the client’s experience of these things. The lawyer can
influence the client’s interaction with the law, and its internal or related values, so that the
client’s experience either vindicates or deviates from the rule of law and its values. Therefore, it
is appropriate to expect the lawyer to have more normative influence on cases than the
traditional model of lawyering and its positivist proponents would want. This kind of influence is
simply part of the lawyer’s role. The question is not whether the lawyer will have this influence,
but what the character of this influence will be.
The major positivist theories within philosophical legal ethics, through their support for
the traditional model, express a view of lawyering in which the client and the positive law are
the major normative orientations for the lawyer. Positivist theories of legal ethics tell the lawyer
to stop short of the kind of lawyerly normative influence that I argue would be needed in many
instances to vindicate the rule of law and its related values. This is problematic especially in
situations in which the lawyer is the only relevantly-positioned legal official to vindicate the rule
of law either at that stage in a case or perhaps even at all. On the contrary, my theory, along
with the views of other philosophical legal ethicists who take a natural law perspective,
proposes an approach to law and lawyering that provides the framework to encourage the
lawyer to exercise the kind of normative influence that is needed to vindicate the moral values
that are brought into the legal system under our respective theories. In my particular view, the
encouragement of this kind of initiative on the part of lawyers figures in the purpose of my two
principles of Fullerian lawyering. My principles are part of the task of practicing a particular
procedural naturalist approach to lawyering that is valuable in itself. Additionally, however, my
principles are meant to be jointly sufficient, in generating this approach, for the lawyer to
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exercise the kind of normative moral influence that I think is necessary to vindicate the rule of
law and its related values in the particular context of the client’s experience of the law. As
mentioned in the present section of this paper49, the lawyer, because of his/her role, can have
this effect. Orienting lawyers to the true source of their normative duties qua lawyers (i.e. the
category of “law” and the rule of law) provides a sufficient reason for lawyers to structure their
dealings with the client to vindicate the values that are ontologically relevant to law and the
lawyering role.

4.6) Some Ethical Evaluation of Procedural Naturalist Lawyering – Is Fullerian Lawyering a
Theory of Legal Ethics?
With a theory of lawyering that is based on procedural naturalism, especially of the sort
that draws on Simmonds’ rich view, my theory does not make the same error that Allan
Hutchinson identifies in Wendel’s theory of legal ethics. Hutchinson says of Wendel’s Razianinspired (at least in terms of the functionalist authority of law thesis) inclusive positivist theory
of lawyering:
[I]t is not so much an account or justification of legal ethics, but a denial that lawyering is an
ethical undertaking. There is no place for ethics in his political manifesto of professional
lawyering. There is simply the institutional demand that lawyers make good faith efforts to
interpret what the law is in any particular instance in a reasonable manner. This seems to be
such a minimalist and open-ended injunction – ‘be reasonable’ – as to allow lawyers do almost
whatever they want in the name of responsible professional behavior and with the stamp of
ethical approval....Under his scheme of legal ethics, there is little to discuss or wrestle with when
it comes to acting professionally. If this engagement is a mark of ethical conduct (as I will argue it
is), then Wendell has nothing to tell us. For him, the dilemmas of legal ethics can best be
handled by proceeding as if they did not exist. 50

Hutchinson criticizes51 Wendel’s view that “lawyers, when they act in a professional
capacity, should be concerned only with the legal justice of the clients’ situations”. 52
A related criticism of Wendel is made by Trevor Farrow. He says:
What Wendel has done is essentially both to download and upload the role of moral deliberation
in the context of lawyers, clients and society. On his theory, lawyers download to their clients the
49

Namely, in Section 4.5).
Allan C. Hutchinson, “A Loss of Faith: Law, Justice and Legal Ethics”, Book Review of Lawyers and Fidelity
to Law by W. Bradley Wendel, Int J of Legal Profession [forthcoming] [Hutchinson, “Loss of Faith”] at 5 of
draft [emphasis in original].
51
Ibid. at 12 of draft.
52
Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 3 at 28 [emphasis added].
50
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responsibility of deliberating about the morality of choices surrounding individual arrangements
and exercises of power. Further, lawyers upload to judges, politicians and other public officials
the responsibility to deliberate about the morality of collective choices and institutional
arrangements in the public lawmaking sphere.53

Hutchinson and Farrow share at least one common reason for being dissatisfied with
Wendel’s theory because of their observation that it punts the ethical analysis out of the domain
of lawyers. Both discuss the problem that they believe arises from Wendel’s treatment of the
law as if it is a determinate resource that lawyers can access.

54

Hutchinson and Farrow argue

that moral analysis is necessarily part of the work of the lawyer because dealing with the
indeterminacy of law means engaging in moral analysis in order to give meaning to the morallyapt aspects, terms, etc. within the law. 55 One need not subscribe to this particular explanation
in order to be in agreement with the criticism of Wendel’s theory that it is not truly a theory of
legal ethics and that it undermines a necessary part of the interpretive work of a lawyer, namely
moral analysis.
Alternatively, one could make the criticism of Wendel from the perspective of a natural
law theorist who posits the need to engage in moral analysis not on the basis of indeterminacy
but on the basis of a suggested ontological connection between law and morality.

56

Notably,

the key point of common criticism is not that a particular kind of moral analysis is lacking from
the Wendelian theory. Once developed, all of the viewpoints making the present criticism could
also potentially turn to one another and argue that the other theories are lacking in that they do
not demand that the lawyer engage in a particular kind of moral analysis. Rather, the common
criticism is that Wendel’s theory prescribes that the law abdicate moral analysis within the task
of providing legal advice.
The theory of legal ethics that I offer does not suffer the same problem. I place a moral
value at the centre of my legal philosophy and my theory of lawyering. Under the theory of

53

Trevor C.W. Farrow, “The Good, the Right, and the Lawyer”, Book Review of Lawyers and Fidelity to Law
by W. Bradley Wendel (2012) 15 Legal Ethics 163 [Farrow, “Review of Wendel”] at 169.
54
Hutchinson, “Loss of Faith”, supra note 50 at 9-11 of draft; Farrow, “Review of Wendel”, ibid. at 169171.
55
I am in substantial agreement with this thesis even though I have not worked out the extent of the
indeterminacy in light of my Fullerian analysis of law.
56
As with the previous note, I will express, here too, my openness and agreement with such an idea, but
will point to the need to develop the contours of my view with respect to this connection and its
relationship to my Fullerian view of law.
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jurisprudence that I espouse, a moral value cannot help but play such a central role. Similar to
the argument raised by Simmonds against positivist theories of legal reasoning, the authority of
law and reason-giving57, I argue that it is impossible to be “concerned only with the legal justice
of the clients’ situations”. 58 For just as it is necessary, under Simmonds’ criticism of positivism,
for a person to know whether a purported law and/or legal system abides by the rule of law in
order to know whether s/he has a legal reason that s/he must include into his/her process of
practical reasoning, a lawyer applying my Fullerian theory must also ask whether, and in what
way, purported legal norms abide by the rule of law in order to know what it means to seek the
clients’ legal justice as a lawyer. Furthermore, the duty of fidelity to law, and indeed to the legal
justice that the legal system purports to provide, that is owed by the lawyer cannot be assessed
under my view without answering questions about the legal system’s adherence to the internal
morality of law. In terms of the validity and interpretation of legal norms, one must answer the
rule of law question, and thus an ethical question59, before one can answer legal questions
about the law. Consequently, under the Fullerian theory of lawyering that I propose, one cannot
evade, or replace (to refer to idea championed by Raz), 60 ethical questions present in a dispute
by making a legal move. Making legal moves implies functional and ethical support from the rule
of law from start to finish.
Furthermore, on the point of Hutchinson’s criticism of amorality against Wendel,
consider the way in which my Fullerian theory of lawyering satisfies the ethical needs of the
practical and applied level of a theory of legal ethics. Hutchinson gives an account of the
“[P]hases and components of ethical behavior”.

61

These are the elements that would be

57

See Simmonds’ argument about the priority of the rule of law over law’s authority, above, in Section
2.3.2) at 41-44.
58
Wendel, Fidelity, supra note 3 at 28 [emphasis added].
59
Relevant ethical questions pertaining to the rule of law can be asked at every level of moral inquiry,
including meta-ethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. I hasten to note that my mention of these
various levels of moral inquiry does not mean that I believe that one must answer every ethical question
that could arise at every one of these levels before one can ask and answer questions about law.
However, there may be questions at each of these levels of moral inquiry (i.e. questions at each of these
levels that pertain to the rule of law, either directly or indirectly) that are conceptually necessarily for
there to even be questions about the law. I briefly note the possibility of future research on meta-ethics
and the rule of law below, in the Conclusion, at 172-173.
60
Raz’s view of law as an exclusionary reason in practical reasoning is discussed, above, in Section 1.1) at
9-12.
61
Hutchinson, “Loss of Faith”, supra note 50 at 11 of draft.
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necessary for “An Ethical Account of ‘Legal Ethics’”. 62 He provides three elements that are not
simply a list of correct answers to ethical problems, but are rather three kinds of resources on
which lawyers would need to draw in deciding how to behave ethically.

63

These elements are

(1) moral sensitivity, (2) moral judgment, and (3) moral conviction. Hutchinson describes them in
the following way:
Moral sensitivity is the capacity to recognize that a situation has moral dimensions, that it
presents a choice of possible responses, and that its resolution may have implications, large and
small, for all parties involved, including oneself;
Moral judgment is an ethical assessment about what one ought to do and involves drawing upon
a rich understanding of role-expectations, situational balance, likely consequences, and moral
integrity in order to justify a particular line of action;
Moral conviction includes the self-discipline and perseverance to implement the decision by
giving priority to the decided-upon moral course of action over other values or goals (e.g., career
advancement, personal relationships, hedonistic pleasures, etc.). 64

My proposal in this paper certainly does not give, nor does it attempt to give, a robust
account of all three of these “phases and components” that Hutchinson provides. The task of
developing a Fullerian theory in a way that deals with all three of these elements must be left
for the future because it is too great an undertaking for the present paper. Thus, I do not aim to
address in a deep way the issue of moral conviction. Moreover, I can claim to only briefly have
dealt with the topic of moral sensitivity, as I did in light of my first principle of Fullerian
lawyering, the Internal Morality Thesis, which tells lawyers that they must not deny the
presence of morality within law as it has been incorporated by the rule of law.

65

My first

principle means that lawyers must be sensitive in recognizing that legal analysis and lawyering
have certain necessary moral dimensions. Most prominently, the work done in this paper is
focused on developing a resource, namely the idea of lawyerly fidelity to law as structured by
the moral and legal value of the rule of law (and applying this idea to the case of the “torture
memos”) that can be used by lawyers in their practical and doctrinal reasoning with regard to
justifying a particular line of action. Thus, the focus of this paper, in terms of the “phases and

62

Ibid. [italics removed].
Ibid. at 11-12.
64
Ibid. at 12 of draft [emphasis in original]. See also ibid. at 14 of draft.
65
See the case for my first principle of Fullerian lawyering (i.e. the Internal Morality Thesis) in Section 4.3),
above, and a brief synopsis of this first principle, above, at the end of Section 4.4) at 102.
63
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components of ethical behaviour”, is on giving an ethical system that can be used for moral
judgment in the role of lawyering.
Lastly, my theory also deals with an aspect of legal ethics that is of great importance to
lawyers collectively for their role as a profession within society. Hutchinson makes the point that
Wendel’s theory, in its unsatisfactory ethical normativity and stance that amounts to a reimagined defence of the standard model of lawyering66, does not do a great deal to justify the
role of lawyers within society. He argues:
[I]f lawyers are to be properly treated as ‘public actors’ as Wendel intimates, then it is essential
that there is a more informed and fuller appreciation of what public goals and communal
interests are being advanced by lawyers in their professional practice. Without more, there is no
justification for why the public interest should be thought to be exhausted or fulfilled by lawyers’
facilitation of private interests.67

Here too, my Fullerian view does not leave us ethically wanting in the same way that
Hutchinson says Wendel does. 68 Lawyers, under my theory, are to perform their role and show
fidelity to law because of the coherence of their legal system with the rule of law. This means
that the professional work of lawyers is aimed, in substantial ways, at helping the legal system
to vindicate (1) the moral values, namely freedom and independence from the control of others,
that are embodied in the rule of law, and (2) justice, to the extent that the vindication of justice
is a necessary condition for the vindication of the rule of law, the rule of law being conceived of
in term of “thick moral normativity”. The lawyer’s profession, properly conceived, is oriented
towards those public goods and communal interests. These interests are vitally important to
society, and indeed, these values are the cornerstones of livable and liberal community with
other people. This certainly may not be the whole of the explanation of how lawyers can be
conceived of as public actors. But it gives us a strong foundation of ethical norms on which to
ground the role of lawyers as public actors, whereas Wendel’s theory was left wanting for
ethical normativity.
One should be aware, in considering this argument, that the entitlement views of
Wendel and Dare (i.e. the view that the lawyer should pursue the client’s legal entitlements)
66

See Hutchinson reference Wendel’s closeness to the Standard Conception of lawyering, Hutchinson,
“Loss of Faith’, supra note 50 at 3, 4, 6, 14, 15 of draft.
67
Ibid. at 15 of draft [footnote omitted].
68
Here, I will offer an account of the way in which my theory explains how lawyers can be conceived of as
public actors. I will not offer an account of how lawyers can be conceived of as public actors “[B]y lawyers’
facilitation of private interests” through the standard model of lawyering, ibid. [emphasis added].
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have attempted to rein in the duty to zealously pursue the client’s cause even to such a point
that the legal result leads to injustice for others. Wendel and Dare have distinguished between
various kinds of zeal. Recall “hyper-zeal” and “mere-zeal” as proposed by Tim Dare.

69

Thus,

although the lawyer has a duty to protect his/her client’s autonomy, the lawyer ought not,
under Dare’s expression of the Dominant Model, pursue whatever the law can be made to give
to the client. The lawyer should keep to the pursuit of the client’s legal entitlements and not
provide a type of lawyering that will lead to legal injustice for others. However, and
problematically from a moral perspective, the lawyer does have a duty to vigorously pursue the
client’s legal entitlements basically without limit to zealousness. Even with the duty of
zealousness being limited to the client’s legal entitlements, the ability of the Dominant Model to
advise lawyers, in their role as lawyers, to evade moral injustice is , as Hutchinson argues70,
limited to the degree to which the client’s legal entitlements happen to align with moral justice
or do not lead to moral injustice. To put things differently in a way that takes stock of Simon,
Wendel and Dare’s accounts of the Dominant Model, and Hutchinson’s criticism of the revised
Dominant Model, one could say, using Simon’s language71, that the Dominant View (in the
terminology that Simon uses in the chapter just cited), asserts that the client has a right to have
the lawyer pursue his/her legal justice even when such lawyering leads to extra-legal (or moral)
injustice for others.
My theory of legal ethics does not have this kind of dissonance between the zealousness
that lawyers are permitted (or even encouraged to practice) and goal of pursuing ethical justice.
That is to say, lawyers are not permitted or encouraged, under my view, to pursue their clients’
69

For summaries of the relevant arguments, see above, in Section 1.2) at 16-18, for Dare’s work, and
above, in Section 1.3) at 23-24, for Wendel’s contribution.
70
Hutchinson, “Loss of Faith”, supra note 50 at 12-14 of draft.
Within his criticism of Wendel, Hutchinson says, at 12 of draft:
“When the going gets tough, Wendel has nothing to say other than ‘show fidelity to law’. He concedes
that ‘there is nothing wrong with having a moral dialogue with clients about whether to exercise the
client’s legal entitlements’. But, apart from the fact that it is unclear what the Wendelian lawyer would
say qua lawyer in such a dialogue, such concessions are unhelpful if moral considerations are simply not
part of the lawyer’s discursive universe: ‘lawyers, when they act in a professional capacity, should be
concerned only with the legal justice of the clients’ situation’” [footnotes omitted].
71

Simon, Practice of Justice, supra note 1, c. 2 for the phrase “right to injustice”.
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positively-granted legal entitlements without regard to the need to tailor this pursuit to align
with the demands of moral justice.
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Part IV – Applied Legal Ethics
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5) Facts and Law: “The Torture” Memos
I do not intend, in this paper, to undertake a detailed exposition of the events
surrounding the “torture memos”. Nor will I provide a detailed analysis of the contents of the
“torture memos” and the overwhelming case that can be made, and indeed has been made, to
show that the legal reasoning in these memos is flawed. I will give a brief summary of the
relevant facts of this case study as well as the criticisms that have been made in some of the
numerous academic articles, cited throughout sections 5) and 6) of the present paper1, that
have taken on the task of explaining (1) the ways in which the “torture memos” give an incorrect
account of the law on torture and (2) the ways in which the authors of the memos breached the
basic and codified ethics of the legal profession in authoring these flawed memos. Finally, I will
present my own Fullerian criticism of these memos.
The documents dubbed the “torture memos” were produced by the United States
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (the OLC) in the early stages of the Bush
Administration’s “War on Terror” following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The Office of
Legal Counsel has the delegated role of the Attorney General to provide legal opinions to the
executive branch of the government of the United States. 2 Several “torture memos” exist and
have been drafted by various authors on the numerous questions posed to them by the Bush
administration. 3 The ones that have received the most attention were written by John Yoo, the
then Deputy Assistant Attorney General under the direction of then Assistant Attorney General
Jay Bybee. 4 When I refer to “the authors of the ‘torture memos’” or “the OLC lawyers” let it be

1

See also several other pieces by authors who have been critical of the “torture memos” below in Section
6.1), note 2.
2
See 28 U.S.C. § 511 (2000) “The Attorney General shall give his advice and opinion on questions of law
when required by the President”; 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000) “The Attorney General may from time to time
make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer,
employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General”; 28 C.F.R.
§0.25(a) (2005), which spells out one of the duties of the OLC to include “Preparing the formal opinions of
the Attorney General; rendering informal opinions and legal advice to the various agencies of the
Government; and assisting the Attorney General in the performance of his functions as legal adviser to
the President and as a member of, and legal adviser to, the Cabinet”.
3
See the memos as collected in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road
to Abu Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) [Greenberg, Torture Papers].
4
See especially Memo 6, January 22, 2002, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, and William J. Hayes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defence, Application of Treaties
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees [Memo 6, Application of Treaties] in Greenberg, Torture
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understood that I am also speaking about lawyers other than Yoo and Bybee, but that these two
memos and authors are my central examples.
In their various anti-terrorism efforts, including the war in Afghanistan, the United
States captured individuals who were alleged to have been involved with terrorist activities,
particularly the al-Qaeda terrorist network. Wanting to extract information from these captured
individuals, the Bush Administration sought to use various interrogation techniques, including:
head slaps, forced nudity, dousing detainees with water and keeping them in a cold room, sleep
deprivation, the use of insects to exploit fears, and waterboarding, among others. 5 Additionally,
the administration wanted to provide some assurance to the CIA operatives carrying out the
interrogations that they would not be prosecuted for the methods used and that superiors
would not be prosecuted for ordering the use of those methods. Notably, there have been
allegations that the Bush administration, rather than earnestly seeking the legal advice, sought it
more for cover in the same way that certain corporate executives sometimes make use of
lawyers for the purpose of claiming cover under a legal opinion that purported to tell them that
their course of action was legal. 6 Finally, some of the “torture memos” were said to have been
written after the interrogation methods were already in use, turning the memos into more of an
exercise in retroactive justification-seeking than legal opinions sought for the genuine purpose
of assuring that the administration would carry out interrogations in accordance with the law. 7

Papers, ibid. at 81-117; Memo 14, August 1, 2002, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A [Memo 14, Standards of
Conduct] in Greenberg, Torture Papers, ibid. at 172-217.
5
Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, “Interrogation Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A.” The New York
Times (16 April 2009), A1 April 17 2009, online: The New York Times Company
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17detain.html?pagewanted=all> [Mazzetti & Shane,
“Harsh Tactics”]; Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, “CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described” ABC
News
(18
November
2005),
online:
ABC
News
Internet
Ventures
<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1322866#.T6jFJetYtuI>
[Ross & Esposito,
“Techniques Described”].
6
David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Luban,
Legal Ethics] at 200-201; W. Bradley Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005)
91 Cornell L. Rev. 67 [Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”] at 121, n. 200.
7
See George C. Harris, “The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of
Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11” (2005) 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 409 [Harris, “Rule of Law”]
at 443-445. Harris provides a detailed argument that significant portions of the legal reasoning in the
“torture memos” were done as an after the fact justification. Harris’ argument is given through the
framework of the guidelines, especially the aspect relating to the problem of “lock-in”, for OLC lawyering
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In an interview with PBS’ Frontline, Yoo, for his part, claimed that his advice was given in
a fully-proper manner. He said:
At the Justice Department, I think it's very important not to put in an opinion interpreting a law
on what you think the right thing to do is, because I think you don't want to bias the legal advice
with these other considerations. Otherwise, I think people will question the validity of the legal
advice. They'll say, ‘Well, the reason they reached that result is that they had certain moral views
or certain policy goals they wanted to achieve.’
And actually I think at the Justice Department and this office, there's a long tradition of keeping
the law and policy separate. The department is there to interpret the law so that people who
make policy know the rules of the game, but you're not telling them what plays to call,
essentially. ...
I don't feel like lawyers are put on the job to provide moral answers to people when they have to
choose what policies to pursue. For example, it's not the Justice Department's job to say: ‘Here
are the things you should do. We have conducted this examination of interrogation techniques
worldwide, and these are the 10 that seem to work best. And so go ahead and do those.’ 8

Unfortunately, the authors of the “torture memos” did bias the legal advice in a myriad
of ways. 9 I will cite two key examples of unbalanced and faulty legal analysis from perhaps the
most prominent memorandum, Memo 14, dated August 1, 2002.

10

This memo was signed by

Jay Bybee, then the Assistant Attorney General, but is known to have been written largely by

provided by Harold Koh. See also Harold Hongju Koh, “Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself”
(1993) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 513 [Koh, “OLC”] at 515-516.
8
“Frontline Interview with John Yoo” PBS (18 October 2005), online: WGBH Educational Foundation
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html> [“Frontline Interview”].
9
Trevor Farrow says generally of the analysis within the memos, “[T]he advice improperly tipped the
scale [in favour of security and away from the protection of human rights] in terms of any sense of
professional, balanced views of how domestic and international law understood and prohibited torture.
The opinions contained in the memos, put simply, could not be sustained on a fair and balanced reading
of the law”, in Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers” in David L. Blaikie, Thomas A. Cromwell and
Darrel Pink, eds., Why Good Lawyers Matter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 167 [Farrow, “Post-9/11
Lawyers”] at 177.
10

Memo 14, Standards of Conduct, supra note 4.

Note also a memo written by Yoo to Alberto Gonzales on August 1 st, 2002 around issues related to
questions discussed in the Bybee Memo of August 1st: see Memo 15, August 1, 2002, Memorandum
addressed Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President [This is not the title of Memo 15. Memo 15 is
untitled], in Greenberg, Torture Papers, supra note 3 at 218. I do not discuss Memo 15 in this paper, but it
is useful to consider for the purpose of having a fuller understanding of the “torture memos” and the
specific legal advice given on various issues.
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John Yoo. 11 These two examples are some of the most problematic interpretations of the law on
torture. They are (1) the author’s reading of the term “severe pain” within the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 12 and (2) the
suggestion that the administration and the agents carrying out the torture might use the
defence of necessity to avoid criminal prosecution. I have chosen these two examples for
several reasons. These examples are particularly fanciful accounts of the law. The conclusions
reached in the analysis of these issues point towards the moral ills of allowing torture. Finally,
the examples have also been chosen by philosophical legal ethicists such as David Luban and
Bradley Wendel. 13 Since my paper aims primarily at dealing with the case study of the “torture
memos” as an opportunity to explore issues and develop theories in the philosophy of legal
ethics, it will be simpler to keep the details of our case study the same rather than focusing on a
different part of the story that would require additional factual and legal unpacking that has not
already been done in the field of philosophical legal ethics.
For now, let us merely consider the ways in which the law was incorrectly interpreted in
these two key examples. First, take the issue of the authors’ reading of “severe pain” in the
Convention Against Torture (herein “CAT”). Article 1(1) of CAT defines torture in the following
way:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions. 14

11

Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 162; Kathleen Clark, “Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture
Memorandum” (2005) 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 455 [Clark, “Ethical Issues”] at 457, n. 15, in which Clark
cites sources that indicate Yoo’s participation in the authorship to the August 1 st Bybee Memo: Tony Locy
& Joan Biskupic. “Interrogation memo to be replaced” USA Today (22 June 2004), online: USA Today
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-06-22-justice-usat_x.htm>. Clark’s citation
details are different only because she is citing to the printed source.
12
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [Torture Convention], art. 1.
13
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 167-168, 177-180 for “severe pain” and 167, 177 for the defence of
necessity; Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 6 at 81-82 for “severe pain” and 82-84 for the
defence of necessity.
14
Torture Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(1).
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The United States Senate ratified the CAT in 1994. Congress implemented provisions of
the convention that define torture in a similar way and provide criminal sanctions for the breach
of the norm against torture. 15 The OLC lawyers, within a memo that was written for the purpose
of providing advice about the criminal standards pertaining to torture and the limits to which
interrogators could go, looked to Medicare statutes to define “severe pain”.

16

These Medicare

Statutes contained a definition of the term “medical emergency”, which then also mentioned
the term “severe pain”. The Medicare statute defined a “medical emergency” as:
[M]anifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a
prudent layperson . . . could reasonably expect the absence of immediate medical attention to
result in...(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily
organ or part. 17

Various authors, on whose analysis I rely, have commented about how Yoo’s
interpretation reads this definition outside of its purpose, thus misconstruing what the Medicare
statute is doing, namely outlining conditions for providing medical assistance (to patients), not
to drawing a threshold of pain that the state may inflict (on prisoners).18 With the statute’s
purpose in mind, we see that, rather than defining “severe pain” through the clause that speaks
to organ failure, the elements in this section of the Medicare statute define “medical
emergency” such as can be used to assess the need for medical treatment. Yoo himself makes
some recognition of the fact that he is using the definition outside of its purpose. In the August
1st memorandum, he writes:
Although these statutes address a substantially different subject from [18 USC § 2340 (2000),
supra note 15], they [the Medicare statutes] are nonetheless helpful for understanding what
constitutes severe physical pain. They treat severe pain as an indicator of ailments that are likely
to result in permanent and serious physical damage in the absence of immediate medical
treatment. 19

Despite admitting the “substantially different subject[s]” of the Medicare statute and
the criminal prohibition on torture, Yoo, in a conclusory fashion, states that the Medicare
statutes are helpful (i.e. have some transferrable meaning) for the purpose of understanding the
15

18 USC § 2340 (2000).
Memo 14, Standards of Conduct, supra note 4 at 176, Yoo cites 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000); 42 U.S.C §
1395w-22 (2000); id. § 1395x (2000); id. § 1395dd (2000); id. § 1396b (2000); id. § 1396u-2 (2000).
17
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d) (3) (B) (2000); see the citation in Memo 14, Standards of Conduct, ibid.
18
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 178-179; Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 6 at 8082.
19
Memo 14, Standards of Conduct, supra note 4 at 176.
16
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meaning of “severe pain” in the statutes dealing with the subject. But given Yoo’s admission of
the substantially different subject matter, and the differing purposes of the statutes, it is clear
that he owes quite a bit more of an explanation here. Why can we draw on the same term found
in such a different statute (i.e. the Medicare Statute)? How does this comparison help the
reader understand what “severe pain” means in the context of torture. And, perhaps most
importantly, what are the limits and potential pitfalls of this comparison of terms? Yoo does not
provide answers to any of these questions.
Second in our examples of problematic and incomplete reasoning in the “torture
memos” is the claim that the administration, as well as those carrying out the acts of torture,
might be able to rely on the defence of necessity to avoid criminal guilt. 20 Legal ethicists have
pointed out that the OLC authors’ particular discussion of the defence of necessity flies in the
face of prohibitions on torture. 21 It goes specifically against norms of international law because
in Article 2(2), the CAT clearly states, “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may
be invoked as a justification of torture”.

22

This non-derogation provision is unequivocal and

contemplates scenarios that are much harsher and more imminent than what the US
government was facing while it was engaging in the torture of detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
Additionally, although the non-derogation provision had not been implemented into US law,
there are various legal sources that would lean strongly against the view that derogation was
possible under US domestic law.

23

Thus, the case in favour of the defence of necessity is very

weak indeed.
In sum, despite the protestations of Yoo and others to the contrary, the OLC “torture
memos” are critically mistaken in their assessment of the law. The interpretations fail to account

20

Memo 14, Standards of Conduct, ibid. at 207-209; see also the rest of Yoo’s discussion of other defences
at 209-213.
21
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 179; Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 6 at 82-84.
22
Torture Convention, supra note 12, art. 2(2).
23
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 6 at 179, n. 60; citing a report given by the United States government to
the
UN
Committee
Against
Torture
on
October
15,
1999,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/torture_intro.html, and the Supreme Court case of
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001), on the more general topic of
the availability of the defence of necessity in relation to federal crimes in the Unites States.
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for basic points of law. The authors read terms incorrectly and/or out of context to reach their
troubling conclusions.
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6) Legal Ethics and the “Torture Memos”
The “torture memos” have become a central, if not the central, case study in
contemporary legal ethics.

Of importance to understanding the place of this argument in

relation to the broader context of reasoned arguments against torture itself is that the
arguments in legal ethics do not purport, as a primary focus, to provide reasons for opposing
torture. Rather, legal ethicists concentrate on demonstrating flaws in the legal advice given by
the OLC lawyers in this case. Thus, I will consider arguments with limited scope in relation to the
issue of torture (though this is not to say that legal ethicists’ arguments about the “torture
memos” do not take into account criticisms of torture itself). There are two groups of authors
whose work I will cover. These are (1) doctrinal legal ethicists and (2) philosophical legal
ethicists. The former deal directly with the codified and positive norms that relate to the legal
profession. The latter, to modify a phrase from David Dyzenhaus’ definition of legal reasoning at
the fundamental level, confront the question of the ideal of fidelity to law and lawyering itself,
since they are faced with questions about what legality and the role of the lawyer, in relation to
the concept of law and the values of legality (the desiderata of the rule of law), require. 1

6.1) Doctrinal Legal Ethics
The authors of the “torture memos” have faced an armada of scholarly opponents who
have criticized them severely for their legal analysis2. The critiques from the perspective of
doctrinal legal ethics are generally expositions of either (1) the badly mistaken substantive legal
1

David Dyzenhaus, “The Grudge Informer Case Revisited” (2008) 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1000 [Dyzenhaus,
“Grudge Informer”] at 1002; cited above, in the Introduction, note 6 and accompanying text.
2
In addition to the authors and pieces cited frequently in this paper, consider several papers in Karen J.
Greenberg, ed., The Torture Debate in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) [Greenberg,
Torture Debate], including “If Afghanistan Has Failed, Then Afghanistan Is Dead: ‘Failed States’ and the
Inappropriate Substitution of Legal Conclusion for Political Description” 214 by David D. Caron [Caron,
“Failed States”], “Is Defiance of Law a Proof of Success: Magical Thinking in the War on Terror” 118 by
Stephen Holmes, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb” 35 by David Luban, also cited infra note 33
as published in another source, and “Renouncing Torture” 247 by Michael C. Dorf; Robert K. Vischer,
“Legal Advice as a Moral Perspective” (2006) 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics” 225; Jeremy Waldron, “Torture,
Suicide and Determinatio” (2010) 55 Am. J. Juris. 1; Jesselyn Radack, “Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of
the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism” (2006) 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1. Other scholars have also
remarked on the vast criticism that the “torture memos” have received; see e.g. Trevor C.W. Farrow,
“Post-9/11 Lawyers” in David L. Blaikie, Thomas A. Cromwell and Darrel Pink, eds., Why Good Lawyers
Matter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 167 [Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers”] at 177, nn. 30, 31 and
accompanying text.
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analysis contained within the “torture memos” or (2) an account of the defects of the
approaches that were taken by the authors of the memos. The first kind of exposition involves
consulting with the relevant legal sources such as international law (including treaties and
customary international law), and US domestic law and regulations (including the Unites States
Constitution, statutory law, government regulations and case law). The second kind of
exposition requires one to look into (i) the proper role of OLC lawyers, (ii) how that role is to
determine the kind of advice provided by the OLC, (iii) the relevant professional codes of various
regulatory bodies and, finally, (iv) how that role and process of advising was compromised by
political influence, institutional pressure and groupthink, as well as the OLC lawyers’ own
ideological biases. I have already given a sampling of what has been described, to say the least,
as the problematic legal analysis. 3 Thus, I will focus here on the defects of the approaches that
were taken by the authors of the memos.
Defects in approach can be divided into two categories. Those two are (i) defects that
the OLC lawyers took with them going into the interpretation of the law and (ii) defects in the
interpretation itself (including specific interpretive stances such as an overreliance on textual
interpretation). Consider the former, defects going into the interpretation. A defect going into
the interpretation would have been created by political and contextual pressures. Simply, the
authors of the “torture memos” would have felt impelled to reach a particular conclusion when
writing their opinion. This pressure has been noted to have come from Vice-President Dick
Cheney and his counsel (and future Chief of Staff) David Addington.

4

This includes the well-

documented insistence on legal interpretations that were “forward-leaning” in the way that
they dealt with laws pertaining to the war on terror. Additional impetus may have come from
the fact that many of the interrogation tactics to which Yoo’s memos gave the green light were
already being put into practice before he wrote the memo, putting some pressure on him to
protect government officials and CIA agents retroactively. 5

3

Above in Section 5).
David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Luban,
Legal Ethics] at 173.
5
See George C. Harris, “The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of
Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11” (2005) 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 409 [Harris, “Rule of Law”];
Harold Hongju Koh, “Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself” (1993) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 513
4
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As another example of the defects going into the interpretation, scholars have cited
Yoo’s prior scholarly and intellectual commitments from his own work. This point is perhaps less
problematic for Yoo than the other issues because it is difficult to imagine anyone doing such
highly specialized legal work as Yoo was doing in the OLC without coming into it with some
preconceived notions developed properly after years of study. Yoo, as other lawyers in any field,
would have picked up these commitments from his own work in the field and from mentors in
the legal profession, such as the conservative Federalist Society or federal judge Laurence H.
Silberman, of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for whom Yoo clerked.
Coming into the interpretation with an opinion already formed is not in itself problematic and
may even be inevitable. Rather, what is troubling is that Yoo presented his views as a
straightforward account of the law without admitting that his understanding was indeed out of
the mainstream and even highly idiosyncratic. 6 All of these elements can be seen to have biased
Yoo’s approach going into the writing of the memos and distorted the substance of the advice.
In the case of defects within the actual interpretation itself, I have already cited
examples of words and terms that the authors of the memos interpreted out of their context.
This includes, in particular, terms such as “severe pain”, which Yoo used to draw the line up to
which interrogators may legally go. Yoo’s misinterpretation of the term “severe pain” was
discussed earlier. 7 Later in this paper8, I will present arguments from legal philosophers David
Luban and Jeremy Waldron that Yoo’s approach to defining “torture” was also itself flawed. This
flaw would also be present in Yoo effort to define “severe pain”. Yoo attempted to set out a
bright line by which the interrogators could measure their actions and be assured that they were
not crossing into illegal activities such as cruel and degrading treatment and, particularly into
the zone of illegality which was reserved for torture. Both Luban and Waldron argue that this
[Koh, “OLC”]. These sources and their relevance to this point are discussed in more detail above in Section
5), note 7 and accompanying text.
6
For Yoo’s own interpretation of the nature of his work at the OLC, see “Frontline Interview with John
Yoo”
PBS
(18
October
2005),
online:
WGBH
Educational
Foundation
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html>
[“Frontline
Interview”];
quoted above in Section 5), note 8 and accompanying text. For Luban’s criticism of Yoo on this point in
relation to the “torture memos”, see Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 164, n. 5 and accompanying text.
7
Above, in Section 5) at 117-119.
8
See my summary of Luban’s argument, below, in Section 6.2) at 130-132; Waldron’s argument, below, in
Section 6.2) at 132-137, especially 136-137; as well as Wendel’s favourable citation of Waldron’s
argument in Section 6.2), note 68 and accompanying text, below.
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approach is itself flawed, not merely the result that it produced in terms of the flaw substance
of the advice.
One of the primary discussions that legal ethicists have around the “torture memos” is
the question of what the proper role of the OLC is within the United States Justice Department.
Specifically, to what extent should the OLC take on their role from the perspective of advocacy
vs. the perspective of providing legal advice? Of course, as mentioned above, OLC lawyer John
Yoo, who has been accused of taking too strong of a posture of advocacy in writing the “torture
memos”, would himself reject the characterization of his work as advocacy rather than objective
advice on the law.

9

However, Yoo’s scholarly critics argue that his analysis in the memos is

characteristic of a posture of advocacy rather than advising.

10

They point out that a lawyer

acting in an advisory role, rather than in one of advocacy, would not perform the kind of
interpretive missteps, and flawed analysis catalogued above. 11 Legal ethicists argue further that
advocacy is an inappropriate interpretive posture in the context of the kind of advisory work
that Yoo was doing in the OLC. This is because the client’s interests are not the same in an
advisory lawyering context as in the advocacy lawyering context and the checking mechanisms
of the adversarial system are missing. This would be true of any case in which lawyers act as
advocate when they should be acting as advisors, but is compounded in the present case study
by the fact that the OLC, having been delegated the Attorney General’s power to interpret law
on behalf of the executive branch12, will often have its opinions acted on by the state. This is
different from a client whose lawyer may provide him/her with advice that is more along the
lines of advocacy but who may be checked by the court system into which the client will find
himself/herself, at least if s/he is contemplating litigation. 13

9

“Frontline Interview”, supra note 6; quoted above in Section 5), note 8 and accompanying text.
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 197-204; Marjorie Cohn, “Advising Clients to Commit War Crimes
with Impunity: An Unethical Practice” (2011) 10 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 249 at 258, 260; Kathleen
Clark, “Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum” (2005) 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 455 [Clark,
“Ethical Issues”] at 465-469; Harris, “Rule of Law”, supra note 5 at 431-435.
11
Above in Section 5).
12
28 U.S.C. § 511 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 510 (2000); 28 C.F.R. §0.25(a) (2005), all three legal provisions
quoted above in Section 5), note 2. See also the discussion of this topic in Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note
4 at 203.
13
I am thankful to Alasdair Robertson for pointing out a similar issue in the case of legal counsel that is
provided to large private organizations. We might recognize this problem as the “problem of private
legislation”, discussed above in Section 4.5), note 44. Although it is not the state that will be acting on the
10
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Indeed, David Luban, citing journalism professor Mark Danner, raises the possibility of a
causal connection between the OLC “torture memos” and the prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. Luban argues:
Compelling evidence suggests that the migration [of detainee mistreatment and interrogation
techniques] resulted when the Guantánamo commander, General Geoffrey Miller, was sent to
Iraq to ‘Gitmoize’ intelligence operations there (although Miller denies it).If so, the implications
are enormous: it would mean that Abu Ghraib does not represent merely the spontaneous
crimes of low-level sadists, but rather the unauthorized spillover of techniques deliberately
exported from Guantánamo to Iraq as a high-level policy decision. That would imply a direct
causal pathway connecting the advice of the torture lawyers to the Abu Ghraib abuses via
General Miller. (A former State Department official traces the policy back to Cheney’s then
general counsel David Addington). 14

Luban, in a portion of his work dealing with doctrinal legal ethics, cites the fact that, in
2004, 19 former OLC lawyers drafted a document called the Guidelines for the President’s Legal
Advisors15, outlining guiding principles for lawyers in that same position.

16

They affirmed the

standard view of the role of an OLC lawyer as an independent legal advisor, rather than as an
advocate.

17

Provocatively, Luban asserts, almost in passing, that the Bush administration OLC

lawyers do not agree with the 19 OLC lawyers’ affirmation of the standard view of the OLC
lawyer because these Bush administration lawyers would not sign this document. Given the case
just presented and the mountains of well-reasoned criticism made elsewhere18, one cannot help
but conclude that Luban’s needling remark is well-founded.
Related to Yoo’s failure to describe his position as highly idiosyncratic, a major issue
with the memos is the lack of disclosure of differing opinions on the law. This is especially so
given that these differing opinions were not themselves also highly specific to their authors, as
opinion (as in the case with the OLC), it is true that a large private institution that takes hyper-zealous
advice from their attorneys and acts on it can make a great deal of things happen on the basis of that
advice before the issue ever comes before a court. Thus, one should also take note of the way in which
the advice of attorneys to private clients can also have, at a practical level (and perhaps even at the de
jure level, in the case of legal defences made on the basis of having received advice from counsel), a role
or influence (and perhaps thus also should have accordant duties) comparable to those of the quasijudicial role of the OLC.
14
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 183 [footnotes omitted].
15
“Guidelines for the President’s Legal Advisors” (2006) 81 Ind. L.J. 1345 [“Guidelines for Advisors”].
16
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 204.
17
“Guidelines for Advisors”, supra note 15 at 1349. This document did not explicitly revisit the criticisms
made of the “torture memos”, but the authors of the “Guidelines for Advisors” do note at 1348, that the
“Guidelines for Advisors” were written with an eye towards preventing the recurrences of such situations
in the future.
18
A sampling is listed above at note 2.
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Yoo’s was, but were rather the view that the mainstream of lawyers had on the law in this field.
A key example of this is Yoo’s failure to engage with mainstream views about the applicability of
the protections of the Geneva Conventions to detainees. Yoo failed to discuss the arguments for
the view that all detainees are legally entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. 19
Scholars also criticize Yoo because he did not attend to arguments made by State Department
legal adviser William H. Taft IV, who, after seeing Yoo’s January 9th draft version of the memo20,
wrote a memo to Yoo21 specifically criticizing Yoo’s draft argument22 that detainees who were
members of the Taliban were not legally entitled to the protections found within the Geneva

19

Harris, “Rule of Law”, supra note 5 at 435-436. Harris criticizes Yoo for failing, in his January 22nd memo,
Memo 6, January 22, 2002, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William
J. Hayes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defence, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda
and Taliban Detainees in Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel, eds., The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu
Ghraib (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) [Memo 6, Application of Treaties] [Greenberg,
Torture Papers] at 81-117, to discuss the position held by the International Committee of the Red Cross,
which held a view contrary to that of Yoo.
20
See the draft version: Memo 4, January 9, 2002, Memorandum for William J. Hayes II, General Counsel
of the Department of Defence, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees [Memo
4, Draft Application of Treaties] in Greenberg, Torture Papers, ibid. at 38-79. Memo 4 is the draft version
of Memo 6, Application of Treaties, ibid.
21
Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, to John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Your Draft Memorandum of January 9” Torturing
Democracy (11 January 2002), online: National Security Archive, George Washington University Gelman
Library
<http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020111.pdf>
[Taft,
“Your
Draft
Memorandum”]. Attached to this Memorandum was a draft of Taft’s official reply to Memo 4.
22
See the argument that Taft criticized in Memo 4, Draft Application of Treaties, supra note 20 at 53. This
argument of Yoo’s also made its way into the final version of Yoo’s memo in Memo 6, Application of
Treaties, supra note 19 at 95.
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Conventions because of the idea that Afghanistan was a “failed state”. 23 In his extensive reply to
Yoo, Taft called Yoo’s factual assumptions and legal analysis “seriously flawed”. 24
In an advocacy role, Yoo’s peculiar view would have been checked by opposing lawyers
in the adversarial process, making it less of a concern that he did not disclose opposing views.
However, in relation to the quasi-judicial role of the OLC, legal ethicists have pointed out that
there is not the same opportunity to check a one-sided legal opinion that has intentionally
omitted consideration of important differing opinions.

25

This becomes a problem given the

ability of the OLC to determine the interpretation that the executive branch takes on the law. 26
As has been done by other authors before27, I suggest that we compare this failure in
the memos just discussed to the preferable performance by the OLC on the issue of the
availability of habeas corpus to detained “enemy combatants”. Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court rejected the kind of advice that was given on this topic in the “torture memos”28,

23

Scholarly criticisms of Yoo’s failure to address the mainstream views on this topic, including the
feedback received from Taft can be found in Harris, “Rule of Law”, supra note 5 at 437-439. Harris, at 437438, tracks the history of Yoo’s January 9th memo, Taft’s reply to the memo and the internal debate that
took place over the advice within and topic of the topic of Yoo’s memo at various levels within the
executive branch with the State Department, including Secretary of State Colin Powell, taking a
particularly strong stand against Yoo’s advice. The history of the January 9 th memo is also tracked in
Caron, “Failed States”, supra note 2, in Greenberg, Torture Debate, supra note 2, at 219-220.
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 199-200, especially n. 118. Luban is critical of Yoo’s failure to address
Taft’s criticism over the issue of the application of the Geneva Conventions to the United States in its
treatment of captured members of the Taliban.
24

Taft’s criticism of Yoo’s memo as “seriously flawed”, can be found in Taft, “Your Draft Memorandum”,
supra note 21 at 1; Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s ‘Extraordinary
Rendition’ Program” The New Yorker (14 February 2005), online: Condé Nast Publications Inc.
<http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6>; citing the criticism made in the draft
memo.
25
Notably, in Section 6.2) at 141-143, below, especially notes 80, 82 and accompanying text, where I
summarize the analysis that the philosophical legal ethicist Bradley Wendel provides of the OLC “torture
memos”. Wendel’s criticism is of Yoo’s failure to act properly in the OLC’s advising context.
26
See below, in Section 6.2), note 82 and accompanying text.
27
Clark, “Ethical Issues”, supra note 10 at 456; Ross L. Weiner, “The Office of Legal Counsel and Torture:
The Law as Both a Sword and Shield” (2009) 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 524 at 533-536.
28
See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [Rasul], in which the US Supreme Court ruled that US federal
courts have jurisdiction to rule on the legality of detentions (i.e. to hear habeas corpus submissions)
coming from detainees held at Guantánamo Bay.
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the advice on this topic more actively engaged with the opposing views and provides a balanced
assessment in terms of the merits of various arguments and their probability of success. 29
Finally, and of relevance to the philosophical analysis in my paper as well as Yoo’s failure
to cite contrary legal opinions, the authors of the “torture memos” did not properly include
moral analysis in the memos. Scholars have mentioned, citing relevant professional regulatory
codes, that lawyers are permitted to provide additional advice to clients beyond the law. This
advice may be moral, economic, social, and political. 30 Yoo did not abide by the appropriate way
in which to have given such extra-legal advice under the positively-stated permission to do so.
Although we saw above that Yoo claimed to have given purely legal advice31, it is clear from the
case made by legal ethicists32 that his personal theoretical, including moral, commitments
distorted the legal advice that he provided. Thus, in a sense, Yoo did give moral advice to the
clients, but it was hidden behind a purported presentation of the law in its pure positive form. In
addition to his hidden ideological nature of the advice, however, is the problem again of leaving
out contrary moral advice from consideration. There are powerful moral, political, and even
military arguments against the use of torture.

33

With my jurisprudential stance in this paper, I

welcome the inclusion of moral and other considerations into legal advice. However, such advice
must be comprehensive and forthcoming, especially in the advising context. Given the

29

Memo 3, December 28, 2001, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dept. of Defense,
from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Asst. Attorneys General, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over
Aliens Held in Guant[á]namo Bay, Cuba [Memo 3, Habeas Jurisdiction] in Greenberg, Torture Papers, supra
note 19 at 29, 33-34.
30
A leading regulatory source that scholars often cite is the American Bar Association, Model Rules of
Professional
Conduct,
online:
American
Bar
Association
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professio
nal_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html> [ABA, Model Rules], r. 2.1.
See some of the scholarly attention to this point discussed above in Section 4.1), note 1 and
accompanying text, as well as below in Section 7.2), note 56 and accompanying text.
31
“Frontline Interview”, supra note 6; quoted above in Section 5), note 8 and accompanying text.
32
Discussed in Section 5), note 9 and accompanying text, above; Section 6.1), the present section at 123,
above; Section 6.2) at 143, especially note 83 and accompanying text, below; Section 7.2), especially note
50 and accompanying text, below.
33
David Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb” (2005) 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425; W. Bradley
Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005) 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67 [Wendel, “Legal
Ethics & Separation”] at 121-126; Jeremy Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the
White House” (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681 [Waldron, “Torture & Positive Law”]; Douglas P. Lackey, The
Ethics of War and Peace (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989) at 79-80; Jeff McMahan, “Torture in
Principle and in Practice” (2008) 22 Public Affairs Quarterly 111.
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importance that deliberation plays in moral reasoning, it is irresponsible for a lawyer in Yoo’s
role to have omitted mention of the moral arguments against torture and mistreatment of
detainees, especially when such moral positions are made part of the positive law in major
international treaties and American domestic law, including in the form of statutes and case
law/legal history. 34

6.2) Philosophical Legal Ethics
The theorists under consideration in this section of the paper are in agreement about
the question of (1) whether the use of torture should be permitted and (2) whether it was
justifiable, according to the norms of the legal profession, to offer the kind of advice provided in
the “torture memos”. The answers given by the theorists about to be considered resoundingly
affirm that the chorus of criticism in the previous section is correct. In their views, torture is
neither morally permissible, nor legally permitted, and the lawyers who advised clients that the
interrogation practices used on detainees held in locations such as Guantánamo Bay35 were not
prohibited by law – although such interrogation practices, in fact, were legally prohibited –
violated their ethical duties as lawyers or did not live up to the standards of their office. 36

34

For sources making moral arguments, ibid. For codification in law, see especially Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [Torture Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Geneva
Convention, Civilian Persons]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [Geneva Convention, Prisoners of War].
For a one of the definitive scholarly accounts of the case law and history relating, in particular, to
waterboarding, see Evan Wallach, “Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts”
(2007) 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 468 [Wallach, “Water Torture in U.S. Courts”]; see also M. Katherine B.
Darmer, “Waterboarding and the Legacy of the Bybee-Yoo ‘Torture and Power’ Memorandum: Reflections
from a Temporary Yoo Colleague and Erstwhile Bush Administration Apologist” (2009) 12 Chapman L. Rev.
639; Eric Weiner, “Waterboarding: A Tortured History” National Public Radio (3 November 2007), online:
National Public Radio <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=15886834>.
35
Above, in Section 5), note 5 and accompanying text, see my summary and citation of the interrogation
practices used.
36
Luban’s doctrinal criticisms have been discussed in sections 5), 6.1), above. For Wendel’s views on the
doctrinal issues, see Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 33 at 67-85. Finally, Waldron’s
criticisms in this front can be found in Waldron, “Torture & Positive Law”, supra note 33 at 1703-1713,
with 1708 being especially noteworthy.
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Philosophical legal ethicists recognize that the primary case against torture itself comes
from morality. Arguments against the “torture memos” should be read within the limited scope
of criticizing the OLC, although philosophical legal ethicists do take account of criticisms against
torture itself while criticizing the OLC lawyers. The most prominent analyses of the “torture
memos” within philosophical legal ethics have been given by David Luban and Bradley Wendel.
Jeremy Waldron’s work in legal philosophy is also highly relevant. In considering the present and
subsequent sections of this paper (Section 7), that this analysis should be seen under the
fundamental/doctrinal rubric offered by David Dyzenhaus summarized above.

37

Especially

because of the OLC’s quasi-judicial role, we must consider the view that the authors of the
“torture memos” have, or should have had, about the nature of law, at the fundamental level,
and, given answers at the fundamental level, how they then interpreted, or should have
interpreted, the substantive law on the matter at the doctrinal level. As Dyzenhaus said about
the judges in the Grudge Informer Case, we must regard the authors of the “torture memos” as
“[B]eing under a duty to find an answer that coheres with the animating principles of that levelrespectively, the fundamental principles of legality and the principles of the substantive body of
law”.

38

The subsequent analysis in this paper will show the ways in which the authors of the

memos failed in their interpretive task at both levels of analysis, thus not providing legal advice
in a way that “coheres with the animating principles” of law at either level of legal analysis.
Take the work of David Luban. I discussed some of his criticisms of the “torture memos”
with respect to the facts and law of the case, as well as doctrinal legal ethics. 39 He skewers the
legal reasoning in the “torture memos” as being everything from “debatable” to “loony” and
having the “mad logic of the Queen of Hearts’ arguments with Alice”.

40

Luban has clearly

identified several ways in which the OLC lawyers were badly mistaken in their legal analysis and
the unethical way in which the lawyers approached their work. However, beyond that, Luban
makes a philosophical criticism that shows the way in which the arguments in the “torture
memos” undermine the value of legality itself. The point is that playing with technicalities and
bright lines to avoid the purpose of law has different jurisprudential (i.e. philosophical)
37

Above, in the Introduction at 2-5.
Quoted above, in the Introduction, note 8 and accompanying text; quoted from Dyzenhaus, “Grudge
Informer”, supra note 1 at 1010.
39
Above in sections 5), 6.1).
40
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 177.
38
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consequences depending on the norm and area of law with which the lawyer is dealing.
Attempting to use loopholes in one’s analysis in certain fields will be expected and
unproblematic, or certainly less philosophically problematic. In other cases, because of the role
of the particular norms in the legal system, 41 it will actively undermine the rule of law and the
legal system’s ability to produce the moral values linked to, and expressed by, legality. Luban
argues:
It is one thing for boy-wonder lawyers to loophole tax laws and write opinions legitimizing
financial shenanigans. It is another thing entirely to loophole laws against torture and cruelty.
Lawyers should approach laws defending basic human dignity with fear and trembling.
To be sure, honest opinion-writing will only get you so far. Law can be cruel, and then an honest
legal opinion will reflect its cruelty. In the centuries when the evidence law required torture, no
lawyer could honestly have advised that the law prohibited it. Honest opinion-writing by no
means guarantees that lawyers will be on the side of human dignity.
The fact remains, however, that rule-of-law societies generally prohibit torture and [cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment which does not amount to torture], practices
that fit more comfortably with despotism and absolutism. For that reason, lawyers in rule-of-law
societies will seldom find it easy to craft an honest legal argument for cruelty. 42

Here, Luban takes the view of a relatively strong relationship between the rule of law
and morality by arguing that practices such as torture are more consistent with despotism
rather than the rule of law and that rule of law societies will generally prohibit such practices.
Luban also identifies the issue that is at stake for philosophical legal ethics in the case study of
the “torture memos”. He argues:
Torture is among the most fundamental affronts to human dignity, and hardly anything lawyers
might do assaults human dignity more drastically than providing legal cover for torture and
degradation...The most basic question, then, is whether the torture lawyers were simply doing
what lawyers are supposed to do. If so, then so much for the idea that the lawyer’s role has any
inherent connection with human dignity.43

Luban, of course, thinks that the OLC lawyers were not, in fact, doing what they were
supposed to be doing. However, even beyond the question of whether, doctrinally, the authors
of the memos were doing what they supposed to be doing, there is a strong jurisprudential

41

See my summary of Waldron’s argument about the special importance of some legal norms as “legal
archetypes” just below, in the current section at 132-136, and, particularly, note 61 and accompanying
text, with respect to the archetypal status of the prohibition on torture.
42
Luban, Legal Ethics, supra note 4 at 205 [footnote omitted]. The portion of the quote that is in brackets
is the full form of the terminology that is summarized by the acronym “CID”. Luban defines this in ibid. at
190.
43
Ibid. at 163 [footnote omitted].
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argument provided by Jeremy Waldron that they were not engaging in an appropriate kind of
analysis for lawyers in their position within the OLC. This argument plays into Luban’s case that
attempting to evade the prohibitions on torture is not equivalent to trying to avoid just any legal
rule. This is especially so when Waldron’s arguments are understood within the frame of Luban’s
imaginative reading of Lon Fuller’s idea of the internal morality of law. 44
Look first at the way in which Waldron’s argument buttresses Luban’s view that the
prohibition on torture is not to be considered on the same level as other kinds of legal norms,
e.g. a particular tax rule. In his paper, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House45, Waldon develops the idea of a legal archetype to describe specific kinds of legal norms.
Waldron draws on the concept of an archetype from literary analysis to develop this rich idea.
He writes:
When I use the term ‘archetype,’ I mean a particular provision in a system of norms which has a
significance going beyond its immediate normative content, a significance stemming from the
fact that it sums up or makes vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of
law. Like a Dworkinian principle, the archetype performs a background function in a given legal
system. But archetypes differ from Dworkinian principles and policies in that they also operate as
foreground provisions. They work in the foreground as rules or precedents, but in doing so, they
sum up the spirit of a whole body of law that goes beyond what they might be thought to require
on their own terms. The idea of an archetype, then, is the idea of a rule or positive law provision
that operates not just on its own account, and does not just stand simply in a cumulative relation
to other provisions, but operates also in a way that expresses or epitomizes the spirit of a whole
structured area of doctrine, and does so vividly, effectively, and publicly, establishing the
significance of that area for the entire legal enterprise. 46

As examples of legal archetypes or the embodiment of legal archetypes, Waldron cites
rights such as habeas corpus47 and the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment to the US
Constitution48, as well as case law pertaining to constitutional rights, such as Brown v. Board of
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Luban’s reading is summarized above in sections 2.3.3) & 3).
Waldron, “Torture & Positive Law”, supra note 33.
46
Ibid. at 1723.
47
Ibid. at 1724. The positive law groundings of habeas corpus are strewn throughout US law. For the
purpose of this citation, consider the constitutional grounding of habeas corpus in US Const. art. I, § 9, cl.
2 [US Const]; see also the following examples of the recent case law on habeas corpus in the context of
the war on terror and Guantánamo Bay: Rasul, supra note 28 and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771
(2008), in which the US Supreme Court ruled on habeas corpus submissions from detainees held at
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Education49. He says that Brown’s archetypal power is “staggering” and that it became “...an
icon of the law’s commitment to demolish the structures of de jure (and perhaps also de facto)
segregation and to pursue and discredit forms of discrimination and badges of inferiority
wherever they crop up in American law or public administration”. 50 In additions to cases such as
Brown, Waldron says that one could also add cases such as Donoghue v. Stevenson51 for its
statement of the neighbor principle in the English law of negligence and a myriad of other cases,
statutes, and other legal norms from a variety of positive-law categories.
There is no cut and dry way to identify a legal archetype, according to Waldron. As
support for this view, he cites the Dworkinian argument against positivism52, which states that
legal principles cannot be identified by a litmus test found in the rule of recognition. Dworkin
says that the origin of legal principles:
[L]ies not in a particular decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness
developed in the profession and the public over time. Their continued power depends upon this
sense of appropriateness being sustained....True, if we were challenged to back up our claim that
some principle is a principle of law, we would mention any prior cases in which that principle was
cited, or figured in the argument. We would also mention any statute that seemed to exemplify
that principle....Unless we could find some such institutional support, we would probably fail to
make out our case, and the more support we found, the more weight we could claim for the
principle. Yet we could not devise any formula for testing how much and what kind of
institutional support is necessary to make a principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight at
a particular order of magnitude. We argue for particular principles by grappling with a whole lot
of shifting, developing and interacting standards (themselves principles rather than rules) about
institutional responsibility, statutory interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts of
precedent, the relation of all these to contemporary moral practices, and hosts of other such
standards.53

Although it is not possible to identify a legal archetype through a simple rule of
recognition, positivists may indeed be pleased that the existence of a legal archetype is
dependent on social facts, albeit social facts that develop in a way that is akin to the way that
Dworkinian principles do. Waldron says:
The spirit of a cluster of laws [as embodied in archetypes] is not something given; it emerges
from the way in which, over time, we treat the laws we have concocted. We begin to see that the
norms and precedents we have established hang together in a certain way. We begin to see that
together the provisions embody a certain principle, our seeing them in that way becomes a
49
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shared and settled background feature of the legal landscape, and we begin to construct legal
arguments that turn on their coherence and their embodiment of that principle. 54

Therefore, just as the identification and application of principles are interpretive
exercises, so too are the identification and application of legal archetypes.
Waldron states a limitation of his argument that is similar to a criticism often levelled
against the Internal Morality Thesis that Fuller expounds through his eight principles of legality.
Waldron says:
From a normative point of view, archetypes might be good or bad; they may be archetypal of
good law or bad law. Lochner v. New York is or was archetypal of a certain approach to economic
regulation which married the freedom-of-contract provisions of the U.S. Constitution to the
dogmas of laissez-faire economics, and that archetype was discredited when the general legal
doctrine was discredited. Indeed, the shock to the system of disrupting or undermining an
archetype may well be part of an effective strategy for necessary legal reform. An archetype is
only as important as the spirit of the area of surrounding law that it epitomizes. And it is up to us
to make that estimation. 55

I will not disagree with Waldron on this matter. He is correct to point out essentially that
the importance of a legal norm to a whole cluster of norms does not ensure that the norm is
good. And in the same way, the rule of law does not become morally important (in a way that
accords with the good) just because of its functional importance to the legal system. One could
not defend the moral status of the rule of law simply on the basis that it is a necessary condition
for the existence of law. The arguments that I summarized earlier, from the work of several legal
philosophers, in defence of the moral relevance of the rule of law and its moral effects on a legal
system56, were moral arguments dealing directly with the relevant moral norms concerned,
rather than merely with the functional importance that the rule of law has to law. Notice also
how this point relates to Luban’s argument summarized above that honest legal interpretation
does not provide reassurance that the law that is being interpreted and applied tends away
from evil and towards the good.

57

A lawyer’s honest legal interpretation can reflect law’s

(and/or society’s) cruelty or humaneness, its indifference or compassion. In the same way, every
legal archetype must have its ethical status assessed in relation to its moral attributes rather
than on its importance to the legal system or a cluster of norms.

54

Waldron, “Torture & Positive Law”, supra note 33 at 1722 [emphasis in original].
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Notably, for the purpose of this paper, Waldron argues that the prohibition on torture is
a legal archetype. Thus, the relevant questions to ask are the following, taken in the same order
with which Waldron presented them. First, if the prohibition against torture is an archetype, of
what is it an archetype?

58

That is, which values does it prominently embody? Second, is the

prohibition on torture indeed an archetype?

59

In the case of the first question, recall that

Waldron said that archetypes emerge from the way that we treat our laws and the norms that
the laws embody. 60 Thus, to answer the question fully, one would, of course, need to canvass
an entire network of norms in order to assess what underlying and unifying norms emerge as
archetypes. For now, in this summary portion of my paper, let us simply accept Waldron’s
account of the values that the purported archetype against torture embodies. Waldron says
that:
The rule against torture is archetypal of a certain policy having to do with the relation between
law and force, and the force with which law rules….Law is not brutal in its operation. Law is not
savage. Law does not rule through abject fear and terror [as in the gunman scenario], or by
breaking the will of those whom it confronts. If law is forceful or coercive, it gets its way by nonbrutal methods which respect rather than mutilate the dignity and agency of those who are its
subjects….People may fear and be deterred by legal sanctions…but even when this happens, they
will not be herded like cattle or like broken horses….Instead, there will be an enduring
connection between the spirit of law and respect for human dignity... 61

Given Waldron’s account of the system of norms of which the prohibition against
torture would be archetypal, he asks the question of whether the prohibition is indeed a legal
archetype. Recall that we are able to identify a legal archetype by the way that we use it in our
legal system. Thus, one would need to survey the legal system, including statutes, important
cases and other sources in order to identify whether a particular legal norm such as the
prohibition against torture is archetypal. Waldron does precisely this in his piece. He identifies
several areas in which the courts use the prohibition against torture as a conceptual benchmark
in their reasoning and rhetoric, as would be done in the case of a legal archetype. I will not
explain them in detail, but the examples include cases dealing with the eighth amendment to
the Unites States Constitution (dealing with the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment), the law on procedural due process (dealing especially with criminal cases) and
58
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substantive due process (also dealing with the criminal law). 62 If Waldron is correct in his survey
of the suggested archetype that is the prohibition against torture, and if an archetype can be
said to exist when a norm summarizes or underwrites the spirit of a whole area of law, then he
has shown the prohibition against torture to be a legal archetype.
With an understanding of the broad outlines of Waldron’s theory of legal archetypes
and of his application of that theory in arguing for the special status of the prohibition on
torture (an argument for which for which, as is clear from the quote above63, Luban would have
sympathy) let us consider Waldron’s argument that the authors of the “torture memos” treated
the prohibition against torture without reverence for its proper place in the legal system as a
legal archetype. One example of this failure is seen in Yoo’s treatment of the prohibition against
torture as if it were proper for him to interpret this law in such a way that the client is in a
position to know how to do anything just short of breaking the prohibition. Thus, Yoo attempts
to draw a bright line that defines the difference between torture and interrogations tactics that
do not rise to the level of torture. Waldron argues that such an approach is inappropriate for
norms like torture. He compares such an approach to the professor who says “‘I have an interest
in flirting with my students and I need to know exactly how far I can go without falling foul of
the sexual harassment rules’”. 64 In response to this, Waldron says, “There are some scales one
really should not be on, and with respect to which one really does not have a legitimate interest
in knowing precisely how far along the scale one is permitted to go”.65 I cite this issue of an
effort to make a misplaced bright-line interpretations because, of all of the other ways
examined by Waldron in which one can undermine the prohibition on torture (including the
arguments of Alan Dershowitz, a lawyer and law professor)66, this misplaced bright-line
interpretation is one that can readily be undertaken as part of the core advising activities of the
lawyer. It is evidence of an approach to legal interpretation that deeply misunderstands the
meta-issues of legal interpretation, including the relationships between norms in the legal
62
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system and the weight that an individual norm can carry beyond its own immediate purpose and
function.
In short, both Luban and Waldron object to the “torture memos” on the ground of
philosophical legal ethics because, in addition to the doctrinal criticisms presented above67 (and
to which Luban and Waldron would agree), the authors of the “torture memos” deeply distorted
the treatment that should be given to specific kinds of norms that are especially conceptually
and doctrinally relevant, i.e. legal archetypes.
Having looked at the work of Luban and Waldron, whose reasoning focused on the
importance of the prohibition against torture within the legal system, an argument that is
Dworkinian in some respects, let us consider the work of Bradley Wendel, who makes
arguments, which are clearly positivist, against the authors of the “torture memos”. Note that I
do not argue that Wendel would reject the arguments of Luban and Waldron summarized above
in the present section of my paper. In fact, in his paper, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law
and Morals, Wendel cites and uses Waldron’s argument about norms that are not proper
candidates for a bright-line definitional approach. 68
Additionally, at the level of doctrinal legal ethics, Wendel makes the arguments
endorsed by many legal ethicists about the pressure to be “forward-leaning” and the fact that
the memos do no mention opposing positions, were more akin to advocacy rather than advising,
and did not take sufficient input from the other widely-adopted points of view on the matter. 69
That said, Wendel’s critique is rooted firmly in even broader notions of law and lawyering. This is
evidenced when Wendel says, “Although it is possible to criticize the OLC lawyers on a theory of
government-lawyers' ethics, I believe the critique of the torture memos is general, and applies
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Above in Section 6.1).
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 33 at 119.
69
As an example of Wendel’s agreement with these critiques, take the following quote and the discussion
surrounding it in ibid. at 70:
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“What accounts for the poor quality of legal reasoning displayed by the [OLC torture] memos?... [T]he
explanation is that the process of providing legal advice was so badly flawed, and the lawyers working on
the memos were so fixated on working around legal restrictions on the administration's actions, that the
legal analysis became hopelessly distorted. For example, the drafting process included only proponents of
broad executive power and unilateralism in foreign policy...administration lawyers faced considerable
pressure to think in a ‘forward-leaning’ way, on the assumption that the September 11th attacks had
created a kind of normative watershed”.
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to all lawyers, public and private. The reason is that the grounds for the criticism are furnished
by the law itself, not by considerations specific to any particular lawyering role”. 70
Wendel’s argument, being positivist in nature, will refer to social facts, the rule of
recognition, and the thesis that there are no necessary connections between law and morality.
In his book, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law, another source in which Wendel deals with the topic of
the “torture memos”, he says:
The position defended in this book [and also in Wendel’s paper, Legal Ethics and the Separation
of Law and Morals] is that the most relevant critical standard for evaluating the legal ethics of
the torture memos is not the horribleness of torture from the point of view of ordinary morality.
The objection to the advice given by lawyers for the Bush administration is not that it is bad
moral advice; rather, it is bad legal advice. 71

From this statement, one would easily conclude that Wendel means to say that what is
wrong with the “torture memos” from the perspective of legal ethics is that their authors get
the law wrong. That is true from the perspective of doctrinal legal ethics. However, Wendel
means to go further than that. Getting the law (i.e. the “primary rules” of the legal system, to
use Hartian terminology about doctrinal law72) wrong, in the way that Wendel argues the OLC
lawyers got it wrong, means something very specific to a positivist theory of law and to the
specific kind of inclusive positivist philosophical legal ethics that Wendel endorses. 73
As explained above74, the approach that Wendel brings to the philosophy of legal ethics
is a mix of (1) Razian authority and reason-giving and (2) Hartian inclusive legal positivism. To
reiterate the first item, Wendel, like Raz, believes that a necessary condition of law is that law
exercise authority over in the relevant practical reasoning deliberations of a society. This
argument on authority is designed to show how law deals with a problem in political philosophy.
Raz argues that, for something to be law, it must play the particular role that he posits for the
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category of law in resolving societal disputes between differing viewpoints.

75

These disputes

inevitably crop up given viewpoint diversity, especially about “the good life”.
In order for a norm to have the status of law, it must be possible to identify its
normative force in a way that is independent of the underlying substantive reasons that a party
might have for taking the course of action that is recommended by the legal norm.76
Consequently, the authoritativeness of a legal reason for practical action comes from outside of
a dispute between viewpoints, rather than from within. The law cannot simply give another
reason which factors into a person’s practical reasoning. It must replace the underlying
substantive reasons (i.e. the substance of the underlying debate and motivations for the various
sides of the dispute), as reasons for action. Put differently, and in a way that is often left
unstated in the philosophical debate, an authoritative reason should not prove any of the
disputing viewpoints right in the grand scheme of things. If it does so, the purported legal reason
implicates itself again with the underlying substantive reasons that would justify the substantive
positions in the dispute. The law is identified solely by its pedigree, in that law is the system in
which the various viewpoints have an opportunity to be heard and which is given binding force
in determining the shared norms of society. 77 Law gains this normative force essentially because
it is a special process of primary rule creation (i.e. a special process for creating the doctrinal
norms that govern society).
While following Raz up to this point, Wendel departs from the theory on the question of
whether law, in this process of reason-giving, can incorporate morality, by way of the rule of
recognition, into the legal system, and, specifically, as a condition for the validity of law within
the particular legal system. Unlike Raz, Wendel is an inclusive legal positivist and believes that
this is possible. Wendel’s inclusive legal positivism is relevant because it makes him a candidate
for being more of an intellectual ally to the Fullerian than an intellectual opponent.
If Wendel is going to give a theory of lawyering that is based on a Razian view of the
function of law, then Wendel may also run into a particular problem in the case of lawyering.
How, one might ask, does a Razian deal with lawyers who claim that they are making novel
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arguments about the law? What does it mean to say that the law is an exclusionary reason for a
citizen or government when lawyers are actively presenting legal arguments about exactly what
the law says? If a lawyer is faced with a regime of law on a particular subject, in which particular
norms are interpreted in an almost uniform, or consistent, way by other lawyers in the field, but
which an individual lawyer believes can be changed, or advanced, by presenting creative
arguments, must this potentially innovative lawyer proceed only with caution and toe the most
widely adopted line, or current interpretive framework, for fear of upsetting the ability of law to
act as an exclusionary reason? Wendel addresses the question in his critique of Yoo and points
out that Yoo goes well beyond the scope of offering novel arguments. Wendel says:
It is true that lawyers should not be hyper-cautious, but one can lean only so far forward without
rejecting the ideal of a ‘government of laws, not of men.’ As David Luban has argued, the legal
reasoning in the torture memos suggests that the lawyers regarded the law only as a fig leaf, or
as a way of providing cover for administration officials who had already made up their minds
about what they wanted to do. Moreover, if my claim about the authority of law is correct, the
forward-leaning attitude toward the law becomes a forward-leaning attitude toward morality,
because the law is legitimate only insofar as it enables citizens to settle on a provisional collective
position with respect to some contested moral issue. 78

Thus, Wendel argues here that Yoo’s mistake as a lawyer is evidenced by the content of
what he said. The content of what Yoo said was evidence of a kind of practice of law that is
inconsistent with the Razian functions of law for which Wendel argues. When a lawyer practices
in such a way that s/he treats the law as an obstacle or reintroduces the moral conflict that was
supposed to be answered in a provisional way by the positive law, or when the lawyer plans
around the law (the key normative source of the legal system and, for a positivist, the only
normative source of the legal system) rather than being guided by the law and the legal
entitlements of the various parties, then the lawyer, under Wendel’s view, undermines the basic
conceptual underpinnings of the system in which s/he is meant to function. In Wendel’s view,
then, Yoo’s advice was not a mere attempt to provide a novel argument to advance the law. The
attempt, rather, was to manoeuvre around the legal entitlements of the detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, thus sidestepping the provisional settlement rather than earnestly seeking to
change the provisional settlement via a novel argument in the appropriate context. 79
78

Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 33 at 120.
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law in the “torture memos”, as just summarized, see Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers”, supra note 2 at 179, in
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For the purpose of telling us how we might distinguish between novel arguments to
advance the law and attempts to sidestep the law, Wendel discusses various contexts in which
such efforts might be made and the procedural, practical or technical features of each that
would shape the question of how to properly perform the lawyerly task of advancing the law
through novel arguments. Wendel says:
My argument is not that a lawyer must always offer the most conservative legal advice or,
metaphorically, handle the law with kid gloves. There are many mechanisms within the law for
pushing the boundaries or seeking change. In the context of litigation, lawyers are permitted to
take aggressive stances toward the law, subject to the requirements that the position not be
frivolous, that any contrary authority be disclosed, and that the lawyer make no misstatements
of law or fact. Some measure of aggressiveness is permissible in litigation because of the
checking mechanisms built into the adversary system... In transactional representation, however,
these checks and balances are absent, and the lawyer in effect assumes the role of judge and
legislator with respect to her client's legal entitlements. 80

As Fuller would do also81, Wendel distinguishes between the various modes of lawyering
and sets out the differences between the litigation and transactional contexts. The key

zealous advocacy being an interpretive stance that several scholars have argued is inappropriate for
lawyers within the advisory role of the OLC; see also my summary of the criticisms that have been made
of Yoo for inappropriately taking an advocacy stance while writing the “torture memos”, when he should
have taken an advising posture, above in Section 6.1) at 124-129; and immediately below, in the current
section at 141-143, especially notes 80, 82 and accompanying text. Rather than merely criticizing the OLC
lawyers for taking a particular posture in the wrong context, Farrow, arguing otherwise in ibid., says, “If
the lawyers did in fact engage in a balanced review of the law, and further, if they did not exhibit what
appears to have been a strong preference for the underlying conclusion that their memos sought to justify
and that drove their findings, then the lawyering exercise that resulted in the production of the Torture
Memos could potentially be seen as an exercise of traditional zealous advocacy. And, particularly given
the result, there would be reason to criticize that process...However, that is not what happened. It is clear
that [the relevant OLC lawyers’] reading of the law was not balanced (or fair)…. It appears that the authors
of those memos not only reached the edges of the zone of zealous advocacy, they in fact crossed that line
into the territory typically occupied not by neutral lawyers but rather by partisan clients and cause
advocates” [footnotes omitted]. Scholars already discussed would likely join Farrow in this criticism.
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(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Fuller, Social Order] at 272-273. This is not to say that Fuller would agree
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Law, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Voice of America, 1972) 35.
I have left the issue of the adversarial model of adjudication and lawyering mostly untouched throughout
this paper because the adversarial model is potentially compatible, and might be made to cohere with,
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difference cited by Wendel in this particular quote is the role of the adversarial system as a
checking mechanism. The adversarial system, here, is the mechanism that lawyers can rely on in
the litigation context to provide the means by which they can adopt an aggressive posture of
lawyering and novel take on law and yet still practice law in such a way that is consistent with
the Razian function of law.
Wendel then discusses how the OLC lawyers, specifically, failed to take account of the
way in which the context of their practice of the law would affect, and provide, the limits within
which they could engage in particular postures of lawyering and yet still remain within the
bounds of treating the law as an peremptory reason and as a provisional settlement of the
underlying dispute that calls for the procedural resolution that can be provided by the law. In
the case of the OLC lawyers and the “torture memos”, the critiques that Wendel provides focus
particularly on the extra level to which the approach taken by lawyers such as Yoo was
particularly ill-suited to the context of OLC lawyers. Not only did the practice role of the OLC lack
the safeguards of the litigation context that are provided by the adversarial model, but the
position of the OLC lawyers as quasi-judicial officers exacerbated the degree to which their
approach to lawyering undermined the Razian function of law. Wendel argues:
If a government lawyer says, for example, that the President has the authority as Commander-inChief to suspend the obligations of the United States under various international treaties, then
for the purposes of that act, the lawyer's advice is the law. If the lawyer's advice is erroneous, the
consequences for the government could be disastrous, but only if they are discovered. Secrecy,
combined with an aggressively "forward-leaning" stance toward the law, essentially creates an
unaccountable legislature within the executive branch. Rather than assisting the client to comply
with the law, the government lawyers in this case simply abandoned the ideal of compliance
altogether in favor of their own, custom-built legal system. 82

competing philosophical theories of law and lawyering. At the same time, my theory of Fullerian
lawyering, both in terms of “thick moral normativity” and “thin moral normativity”, is potentially
compatible with a range of adjudicative models, including with various expressions of familiar models
such as the adversarial system. The task of exploring preferred adjudicative models, or of specifying the
way in which my Fullerian theory, and other theories of philosophical legal ethics, would relate to the
features of various adjudicative models, is briefly noted as an item for future research in the Conclusion,
at 174-175, below. Nothing should be taken from my discussion of the adversarial model as it related to
the case study in this paper other than that I am providing an illustration of how my Fullerian model of
lawyering would apply to the particular details of a prominent case study within legal ethics. Doing this
case study simply means working with the institutional details that are part of the context of the “torture
memos”. These details include the adversarial system of adjudication.
82
Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 33 at 120-121.
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Couching his critique in the jurisprudential theory of exclusionary reason-giving and the
political philosophy on which it depends, Wendel provides the summation of what his theory of
lawyering would say about what went wrong in the case of the “torture memos”:
At bottom, the vice of the torture memos is the ethical solipsism of lawyers who sincerely
believed they were right, despite the weight of legal authority against their position. Academic
defenders of the administration cite the works of ‘dynamic young constitutional scholars’ whose
views are better than those that have carried the day in the Supreme Court, Congress, and the
forum of international treaty negotiation. No matter how brilliant these scholars are, their views
are not the law. They have not been adopted by society, pursuant to fair procedures, as a
resolution of the moral issue [of the permissibility of torture]. Lawyers functioning in a
representative capacity have no greater power to act on the basis of an all-things-considered
moral judgment than do their clients. If clients are bound by the law, then lawyers are bound to
advise them on the basis of the law, not on the basis of the lawyer's own judgment about what
the best ‘forward-leaning’ social policy would look like. Criticizing the administration's lawyers for
their lack of fidelity to law is not an evasion of the moral horror of torture. It is a recognition of
the moral entitlement of the law to respect, and a critique of the separate act of wrongdoing
perpetrated by lawyers who deny the authority of law. 83

Thus, according to Wendel, the OLC lawyers’ biggest mistakes involve a breach of not
just any duty of lawyering, but of a duty that derives its force from what he argues is one of the
necessary conditions for the existence of law, namely, the condition of law’s authority. It
therefore also goes against what positivist view as one of the basic values of the law in terms of
its worth in solving one of the basic issues in political morality, namely the law’s ability to
procedurally resolve issues that spring up from viewpoint diversity about morality and other
issues. This is especially troubling for lawyers tasked with the quasi-judicial role of the OLC. One
might say thus that, according to Wendel, Yoo’s work, when understood not in the way that Yoo
falsely presents it but with all of its flaws and true underlying commitments revealed, might
even imply, to some extent, a theory of adjudication that is inconsistent with legal positivism’s
basic conditions for the existence of law. This would indeed merit deep criticism from legal
philosophers and legal ethicists of the positivist stripe.
I have presented a focused look into the cases that legal ethicists, both doctrinal and
philosophical, make against the “torture memos”. The criticisms are like bunker busters in their
ability to penetrate deep and explode the core of the problematic legal ethics of the OLC
lawyers who wrote the “torture memos”. I will argue that a great deal more can be gained in
this same vein with a look into the work of a particular legal philosopher.
83

Ibid. at 126-127 [footnote omitted].

Page | 143

7) Fullerian Lawyering and the “Torture Memos”
Like authors considered in the two previous sections, I do not claim that the case that
follows takes the place of moral reasons to oppose torture. Nor do I claim that my arguments
give the most important reason for a lawyer, as a moral actor, to oppose torture. The moral
arguments against torture are the most important reasons that any person should have at the
top of his/her mind regarding to torture itself. Rather, the following is a moral/legal argument
that takes into account the objections against torture itself, but which primarily gives the lawyer
a basis, internal to his/her practical reasoning as a lawyer, for criticizing the “torture memos”.

7.1) The “Torture Memos” and the First Principle of Fullerian Lawyering
Taking the interpretive theses offered in sections 4.3) and 4.4) of this paper, how did the
authors of the OLC “torture memos” perform? Consider the first of my Fullerian Principles of
Lawyering. Are the “torture memos” written in a way that respects the fact that moral truths are
incorporated into the legal system by the internal morality of law? Those moral truths are the
direct moral truths of the principles of legality themselves (e.g. the moral truth that it is wrong
to retroactively punish a person for an offence) and perhaps also the foundational moral truths
that the principles of legality are supposed to embody (such as the moral truth that personal
autonomy over one’s own life is a moral value of law and is morally good). Recall that, as I
argued above, “The lawyer can influence the client’s interaction with the law, and its internal or
related values, so that the client’s experience either vindicates or deviates from the rule of law
and its values”. 1 So, another question is whether the OLC lawyers provided advice in a way that
made the executive branch’s approach to, and experience of, the law vindicate the rule of law
and its values or deviate from those same standards. In keeping with the distinction drawn
above between “thin moral normativity” and “thick moral normativity”, especially as applied to
my principles of Fullerian lawyering, 2 I take stock of the fact that this question can be asked and
answered to varying degrees of moral robustness. Thus, first, are the “torture memos” written
in a way that respects the “thin moral normativity” and/or “thick moral normativity” that has
been incorporated into the law by way of the rule of law? And did the OLC lawyers provide
1

Above, in Section 4.5) at 105.
My distinction between “thin moral normativity” and “thick moral normativity” is found above in Section
4.2) and is used to shape the principles of Fullerian lawyering that I provide in sections 4.3) and 4.4).
2
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advice in a way that vindicated the rule of law and its necessarily connected values in terms of
the executive branch’s approach to and experience of the law? The answer, at both levels of
moral normativity, is that memos, and the statements of authors such as John Yoo, do not
recognize the morality that has been incorporated into the legal system by the rule of law.
As a first and general matter that is relevant to both thin and thick moral normativity,
one should consider the way in which Yoo’s approach to his work as a lawyer fails to live up to
the standards of the first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Yoo fails to even acknowledge that
there are moral issues that, by way of their incorporation into the law via the rule of law, are
relevant to his analysis. 3 As quoted above, Yoo understands of his work as the amoral retrieval
of legal standards. 4 The conception of law that is the starting point for his legal analysis as a
lawyer is thus incomplete. His first step on the road of legal analysis is one that fails to pick up
on the insight of Fuller’s legal philosophy and its most direct incorporation into lawyering as
manifested in my first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Of course, there is also the question,
raised elsewhere5, of whether Yoo actually stuck to this approach of amoral retrieval. However,
even according to Yoo’s defence of his approach, we can tell, from a Fullerian perspective, that
he was not looking for law, or for norms that are relevant to determining the law, in all of the
places that he should have explored. The normativity of law, notably, of law pertaining to
torture, is obscured by an amoral lens. This is a failure to abide by the principles of Fullerian
lawyering whether these principles are conceived of in terms of thin or thick moral normativity.
Having looked at a general problem of approach with regard to the first principle of
Fullerian lawyering, it is appropriate to discuss specific ways in which Yoo’s legal advice failed to
live up to the standards of the first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Whereas the previous
paragraph showed Yoo’s failure to recognize the effect that the rule of law has on the
normativity of law, the subsequent paragraphs will show the way in which the OLC “torture
3

See my discussion on the importance of recognizing the incorporation of morality into law as part of my
first principle of Fullerian lawyering, above in Section 4.3.1), where I deal with the ontological reasons for
this need. See also Section 4.3.2), where I discuss the shape of my first principle and some epistemological
issues that arise around the shape of the first principle and the shape of the internal morality of law.
4
“Frontline Interview with John Yoo” PBS (18 October 2005), online: WGBH Educational Foundation
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews/yoo.html>
[“Frontline
Interview”];
quoted above in Section 5), note 8 and accompanying text.
5
Discussed in Section 6.1) at 128-129, especially note 32, above; Section 6.2) at 143, especially note 83
and accompanying text, above; Section 7.2), especially note 50 and accompanying text, below.
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memos” contain direct violations of the principles of the rule of law. Thus, this failure to abide
by the first principle of Fullerian lawyering is an actual normative violation, rather than what one
might say is “merely”6 a failure to have the proper outlook towards the normative relevance of
the rule of law. It is a failure of action rather than a failure to hold in proper regard. This failure
to abide by the first principle of Fullerian lawyering is more robust than the approach-based
criticism discussed just above, however, it is clearly still consistent with the first principle of
Fullerian lawyering when this principle is conceived of in terms of “thin moral normativity”. An
advocate of “thick moral normativity”, such as I am, would certainly find this criticism
compelling, but the substance-based case is, nonetheless, one that falls squarely within a view
of the rule of law that could be adopted by a sympathetic positivist, such as Hart when he is
equivocating in favour of the moral status of the rule of law, as discussed above. 7 Therefore, let
me discuss the way in which Yoo acted against the norms by which he was supposed to abide
under the first principle of Fullerian lawyering.
The “torture memos” actively undermined the rule of law with respect to the
prohibition on torture. Even apart from the specific theory of Fullerian lawyering presented in
this paper, the authors of the “torture memos” did not abide by the rule of law as stated by Lon
Fuller, in the very desiderata themselves. 8 Recognizing this point, Bradley Wendel criticizes the
authors of the “torture memos” in a way that makes use of rule of law principles. Beyond
philosophical theories of lawyering, the “torture memos” are in discord with theories of law. Or,
to put things differently, the “torture memos” are not merely inconsistent with notions or
aspects of lawyering that have been derived by philosophical legal ethicists on the basis of
philosophical theories of law, but also with the legal theories that give the conceptual grounding
for the philosophical theories of lawyering. Wendel, for example, makes criticisms of the
“torture memos” in ways that demonstrate the disrespect that the authors of the “torture
memos” showed for the basic notions of the positivist legal theories that ground Wendel’s
theory of lawyering. 9 Additionally, going beyond famous positivist notions such as the authority

6

The word “merely” is in quotation marks, of course, because a failure to have the proper outlook is
actually quite the failure, even on its own.
7
Above, in Section 4.3.2) at 86-89.
8
See my summary of the desiderata above in Section 2.1), note 4 and accompanying text.
9
Above in Section 6.2), note 83 and accompanying text.
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of law, Wendel deals with the topic of the failure of the OLC lawyers to abide by the desiderata
of the rule of law, says:
Whatever the attractiveness of a strong executive as a political matter, it is difficult to square this
conception of separation of powers with a theory of law that permits it. The reason is that for a
decision to count as lawful, as opposed to merely being in the executive's interest, it must
comply with certain internal criteria such as generality, publicity, consistency, and clarity. If the
government seeks to act under law (because it seeks the legitimacy or prestige of lawful action),
then it may not be able to be as energetic as it desires. 10

Since the OLC has a quasi-judicial role in determining the interpretation that the
executive branch has of the laws of the United States, the poorly-reasoned and incorrect memos
would have contributed to the creation of a policy, and perhaps quasi-legal framework, that
violated the principles of legality because the framework was not promulgated11, was
retroactive12, stated rules that were contradictory as judged against the law on torture13, and

10

W. Bradley Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005) 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67
[Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”] at 115.
11
Despite the fact that the advice has an important role in determining the policies of the executive
branch, the advice, coming in the form of a memo, is understandably not made public and is thus
practically unreviewable. This means that the people subject to the executive’s rule and subject to
classification as enemy combatants would have had no way of knowing of the policies to which they were
subject. In fact, all of the legal standards of which they would have known, including the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [Geneva Convention, Civilian Persons]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [Geneva Convention, Prisoners of War];
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [Torture Convention],
would have told them the opposite of the conclusion to which the “torture memos” came.
Interestingly, Bradley Wendel speculates that the “torture memos” would have been drafted very
differently if the authors has known, going in, that they would have had to defend the memos in public, in
“Legal Ethics & Separation”, ibid. at 85. In light of that, the unreviewability of these quasi-judicial opinions
calls for extra care in drafting OLC opinions. I have summarized and noted arguments that such care was
not taken. See Section 6.1) at 124-129, Section 6.2) at 141-142, especially note 80 and accompanying text,
above, for my summary of the criticisms in legal ethics about the OLC “torture memos” in relation to
some lawyers within the OLC taking an adversarial interpretive stance in a situation that did not have
adversarial checking mechanisms, and Section 6.2) at 142-143, especially note 82 and accompanying text,
above, for my summary of Wendel’s arguments about the same topic but made in light of the specific
contextualizing fact (for the purpose of determining proper interpretive stance) that is the quasi-judicial
role of the OLC.
12

Because the memos, in part, provided a sense of legitimacy (see Section 5), note 6 and accompanying
text, above) to illegal practices (including the classification of prisoners as enemy combatants and the
torture of these prisoners) by way of forward-looking legal advice, that had already been implemented.
The use of legal advice to provide a sense of legitimacy for illegal practices that were already underway
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broke the congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.14 Just to
consider one of these violations in particular, broken congruence between rules as announced
and actual administration, the violation was undeniable. The relevant and promulgated law
prohibited torture with criminal sanctions. Torture was clearly understood to be illegal.

was discussed in Section 5), note 7 and accompanying text, above, citing George C. Harris, “The Rule of
Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of
9/11” (2005) 1 J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 409 [Harris, “Rule of Law”] and Harold Hongju Koh, “Protecting the
Office of Legal Counsel from Itself” (1993) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 513 [Koh, “OLC”].
13
Because they counseled in favour of practices, and thus had a determinative role in setting executive
branch policies (including classification of prisoners as enemy combatants and torture of these prisoners),
that were contradictory to the explicit and positively-stated legal norms, including the Geneva
Conventions, supra note 11, in the case of the classification of the status of prisoners, and the Torture
Convention, supra note 11, in the case of the torture of prisoners.
14
Namely, again, referring to the legal prohibitions on torture, including in the Geneva Conventions, ibid.,
and the Torture Convention, ibid., and the actual use of torture; see my summary of the use of torture in
Section 5), note 5 and accompanying text, above, citing Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, “Interrogation
Memos Detail Harsh Tactics by the C.I.A.” The New York Times (16 April 2009), A1 April 17 2009, online:
The
New
York
Times
Company
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/us/politics/17detain.html?pagewanted=all> [Mazzetti & Shane,
“Harsh Tactics”]; Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, “CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described” ABC
News
(18
November
2005),
online:
ABC
News
Internet
Ventures
<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1322866#.T6jFJetYtuI> [Ross & Esposito,
“Techniques Described”]. Additionally, there is the lack of congruence between the Geneva Conventions’
positive law about the classification of the status of prisoners, Geneva Conventions, ibid., and the invented
and incongruous enemy combatant classification found in the “torture memos”.
Furthermore, the lack of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration was
continued in the United States’ (especially the Justice Department’s) failure to criminally prosecute the
perpetrator of torture and to civilly discipline, in any way, the authors of the “torture memos”. See Carrie
Johnson & Julie Tate, “New Interrogation Details Emerge as Administration Releases Justice Department
Memos” Washington Post (17 April 2009), online: The Washington Post Company
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/16/AR2009041602768.html?hpid=topnews>; “CIA Off The Hook For Past
Waterboarding” CBS News (18 June 2009), online: CBS Interactive Inc. <http://www.cbsnews.com/2100503723_162-4950212.html>; Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, “Harsh Tactics”, full citation in the current
footnote; David Cole, "The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers," The New York Review of Books
56:15
(8
October
2009),
online:
NY
REV
Inc.
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torture-memos-the-case-against-thelawyers/>; Rupert Cornwell, “Torture: Obama's painful legacy from the Bush years” The Independent (23
April 2009), online: The Independent <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/tortureobamas-painful-legacy-from-the-bush-years-1672721.html>. See also Claire Finkelstein & Michael W.
Lewis, “Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted for Authorizing Torture?” (2010) 158 U. Pa. L.
Rev. PENNumbra 195 for a scholarly debate on the question of whether the Bush Administration law
should be criminally prosecuted, a subject which is related to the subject of this paper, but which goes
beyond my professional ethical focus.
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Additionally, some specific interrogation practices, such as waterboarding, had received judicial
consideration. 15 The accused in those cases received severe legal punishments. 16 Yet, the OLC
memos advised that the practices were legal. The advice was thus not in congruence with the
law as announced.
One would do well, in considering this section, to keep in mind Fuller’s discussion of the
practicalities of abiding by the rule of law and its desiderata. Fuller says that “[I]nfringements of
legal morality tend to become cumulative. A neglect of clarity, consistency, or publicity may
beget the necessity for retroactive laws. Too frequent changes in the law may nullify the
benefits of formal, but slow-moving procedures for making the law known”. 17 One could argue
that the violations of one or more desiderata discussed here begot violations of the other
desiderata that were mentioned. For example, incongruence between the rules as announced
and the actual administration of the rules could be said to nullify the benefits of prospective and
promulgated law.
Additionally, under the same focus on practical aspects of abiding by the rule of law,
Fuller says “[T]he stringency with which the eight desiderata as a whole should be applied, as
well as their priority of ranking among themselves, will be affected by the branch of law in
question, as well as by the kinds of legal rules that are under consideration”. 18 Fuller argues, for
example, that in fields such as criminal law, the desideratum of prospectivity is of heightened
importance. I would argue that, as it pertains to advice given by the OLC, generally speaking, the
desideratum of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration
takes on extra importance. When doing the work of the OLC, lawyers should pay special
attention to their abidance of the desideratum of congruence. This is especially so when OLC
lawyers are providing advice on the topic of a crucial legal archetype such as the positivelystated prohibition on torture.

19

The failure of the OLC lawyers to abide by the desideratum of

congruence in the case of the “torture memos” is thus particularly troubling with respect to the
15

Above in Section 6.1), note 34, especially Wallach, “Water Torture in U.S. Courts”.
Above in Section 6.1), note 34, especially Wallach, “Water Torture in U.S. Courts”.
17
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) [Fuller, Morality of
Law] at 92.
18
Ibid. at 93.
19
Above, in Section 6.2) at 132-137, particularly note 61 and accompanying text, see my summary of
Waldron’s discussion of the archetypal importance of the legal prohibition of torture and the ways in
which the authors of the “torture memos” undermined that legal archetype.
16

Page | 149

vindication of the rule of law. With this and other examples, the OLC lawyers failed in stunning
ways to live up to the first principle of Fullerian lawyering that I advocate in this paper. 20 They
did not abide by the desiderata of the rule of law. They did not meet the basic conditions for
abiding by the norm that is the rule of law. Both thin and thick conceptions of my first principle
would take this to be a failure to abide by my first principle of Fullerian lawyering.
Having said that, one will also want to consider the way in which more morally robust
views of the first principle of Fullerian lawyering apply to the case of the “torture memos”. Such
an analysis will be based on “thick moral normativity” and will thus engage broad notions of
individual autonomy as well as the possible incorporation of other values (such as justice) into
the legal system by way of their relationship with the rule of law. Recall above,21 where I built an
account of the shape of my first principle of Fullerian lawyering by drawing upon the legal
philosophy of N.E. Simmonds and the “thick moral normativity” that I find therein. Simmonds
argues that one cannot abide by the rule of law without also satisfying the demands of justice
insofar as the various facets of justice have a necessary connection with the rule of law. For a
lawyer to satisfy my first principle on such an account, s/he must recognize the robust moral
values that are bought into the law or have a necessary connection to law (by transitivity
through the necessary connection that these moral values have with the rule of law and which
the rule of law has with law). Recognizing these moral values is partly a matter of approach, as
discussed above22, but, more onerously, is also a matter of lawyering in a way that is in
accordance with the demands of “thick moral normativity”, such as the demand to actually do
justice. Applying this account, I argue that Yoo also failed to live up to the demands of my first
principle of Fullerian lawyering when the principle is expressed in terms of “thick moral
normativity”.
For the sake of simplicity, I will keep my analysis to the moral demands of a robust
notion of respect for individual autonomy and of justice. These are two norms that have already
been discussed as being demands of “thick moral normativity”. Thus is will discuss no other
moral values that may also have a necessary connection with the rule of law and thus also with
20

See my presentation of my first principle of Fullerian lawyering (the Internal Morality Thesis), above, in
Section 4.3), and a brief summation of this principle at the end of Section 4.4) at 102.
21
Above, in Section 4.3.2) at 92-96.
22
Yoo’s failure to explicitly recognize the moral aspects of law in his legal analysis is discussed above in
this same section at 144-145.
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law. I begin by discussing the robust notion of respect for individual autonomy. As noted
immediately above in my application of “thin moral normativity” to the case study at hand, the
“torture memos”, in their departure from the desiderata of the rule of law, fail to show even the
minimal kind of respect that legal systems, by their very nature as participants in the category
called “law”, are to show to individual autonomy. In addition to this failure of minimal respect,
which undermines all notions of legal systems’ respect for individual autonomy, what can be
said about the “torture memos” and their relationship with rich notions of autonomy, such as
the one defended by Simmonds, being not merely the fact of having the law guide one’s human
conduct, but as being defined by the “notion of freedom as independence from the power of
others”23 and providing “domains of optional conduct that are independent of the will of
others”? 24 The answer is that Yoo fails to respect these notions and thereby does not live up to
my first principle of Fullerian lawyering. Rather than recognize the thick moral notion of respect
for individual autonomy that is incorporated into the law by way of the rule of law, Yoo
undermines the “thick moral normativity” of the rule of law.
Yoo’s approach to legal advice in the case of the “torture memos” undermines thick
notions of individual autonomy because of the particular moral impropriety to which his legal
advice gave approving comfort. The violation of the rule of law happened with respect to a legal
prohibition that guards against an activity that involves dehumanizing its victims. In the act of
torture, victims, far from being independent from the power of others or having a domain of
optional conduct, are put under the full control of other people (in this case without the benefit
of due process) and are subject to extreme force in the pursuit of the will of others. The values
that are directly violated in the act of torture include, in a prominent way, the values that are
embodied in the rule of law. Because of the violence it does, the violation of the conditions of
the rule of law, in this case, is particularly damaging and is an extreme infringement of the
values embodied in the rule of law, especially as conceived of under “thick moral normativity”.
Even when torture is not done in a way that infringes any of Fuller’s desiderata of the rule of
law, its use is nonetheless inconsistent with the rule of law because torture violates the basic
moral value of which the rule of law is an embodiment. It is of great importance to note, in
23

N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) [Simmonds, Law/Moral
Idea] at 191.
24
Ibid. at 188.
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considering this point, that the violation of the desiderata is a sufficient condition for a
purported law or government action to be inconsistent with the rule of law and thus to be ruled
as non-law based on the Fullerian theory. The desiderata are not, however, necessary
conditions, the violation of which are the only ways in which to a law or government action to
be inconsistent with the direct rule of law (and not just with associated necessary conditions
such as justice). To fail to see this would be to miss the forest for the trees. It is the functionality
and the morality that is the key to the rule of law, not the desiderata, which tell us specific ways
in which the functionality and morality of a purported law or government action can be assess
across the dimensions of the rule of law’s functionality and morality.
Furthermore, the prohibition on torture, taking Waldron’s argument into account, is a
legal archetype that is particularly salient to the issue of the use of force and the protection of
individual autonomy within the legal system. If the prohibition on torture is archetypal of the
relationship between law and force, as Waldron says25, then I ask the question of what the
relationship is between law, force and individual autonomy (the value of which the rule of law is
an embodiment). Waldron, although not dealing directly with this topic, goes some way towards
answering this question. In describing the way in which the prohibition on torture constraints
the state’s use of force upon people subject to the power of the state and its laws, Waldron
says, “People may fear and be deterred by legal sanctions…but even when this happens, they
will not be herded like cattle or like broken horses….Instead, there will be an enduring
connection between the spirit of law and respect for human dignity”. 26
The use of torture, and the breach of this legal archetype, deviates from respect for
human autonomy in a way that undermines this particularly poignant legal value that Waldron
identifies. The treatment of people when torture is used, namely the breaking and herding of
people through force and fear, is a deep rejection of the value of human dignity and human
autonomy and thus of the rule of law. One cannot have any control over one’s own life when
one is receiving treatment that is literally not far removed from being shocked along the desired
path by a cattle prod. Thus, the use of torture represents its own avenue of disrespect for the

25

I quote Waldron on this point above in Section 6.2), note 61 and accompanying text, where I cite
Jeremy Waldron, “Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House” (2005) 105 Colum. L.
Rev. 1681 [Waldron, “Torture & Positive Law”] at 1726-1727.
26
Quoted above Section 6.2), note 61 and accompanying text; quoted from ibid.
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value of human autonomy. That is to say, the use of torture does not need to directly violate the
rule of law’s desiderata in order to be an act of disrespect for the value of human autonomy and
thus the rule of law.
In the particular case of the “torture memos”, the lawyers participated in the disrespect
of individual autonomy by way of their failure to abide by the rule of law when performing their
role as legal advisors. At least as far as the OLC lawyers are concerned, the case of the “torture
memos” represents a substantive disrespect for human autonomy and the moral concern of the
rule of law (in the very pursuit of torture) through a procedural disrespect for individual
autonomy in the violation of the desiderata of the rule of law. It is difficult to envision a case in
which my first principle of Fullerian lawyering, conceived of in terms of “thick moral
normativity” and focusing on a robust value of individual autonomy, could provide greater
grounds for condemning the actions of lawyers. The OLC lawyers’ failure on this front is of
massive moral proportions.
The difficulties do not stop there in terms of the critique that could be made from my
first principle of Fullerian lawyering when it is conceived of in terms of “thick moral
normativity”. Recall that, in addition to a robust notion of respect for individual autonomy, my
first principle, thickly-interpreted, also supports the consideration of moral values that have
necessary connections with the rule of law.

27

The discussion of justice, the rule of law and

lawyering in this “torture memos” case study is particularly interesting.
As noted above, Simmonds makes the argument that as the law’s substance moves
further away from justice, the law thereby offers less interpretive guidance and leaves more
room “[F]or the exercise of ungrounded choice by the judge who must interpret its provisions”.
28

The relevance of justice for the purpose of this particular analysis is the necessary connection

that justice has with the rule of law. Simmonds argues that the relevance of justice in the
context of rule of law analysis is the relationship that the justice of legal norms has to the ability
of the legal system to vindicate the value that the rule of law embodies. As Simmonds says,
“Since legality is the set of conditions within which we can be independent of the power of
others, and since subjection to the choices of the judge is a clear subjection to the power of
27

Above, in Section 4.3.2) at 92-96.
Quoted above in Section 2.3.2), note 54 and accompanying text; quoted from Simmonds, Law/Moral
Idea, supra note 23 at 198.
28
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another, significant departure from justice tends to breed departure from legality”. 29 Here, he is
surely talking about deviation found in the positive law and in the actions taken by government
and such deviations substantively being in discord with justice. As argued previously30, although
lawyers cannot have a direct “rule of recognition”-style influence on the substance of the law,
lawyers can participate in the interpretation and use of the law and thereby influence the
experience that their clients have with the substantive positive law, the rule of law and, notably
for the purpose of my present point, with the necessarily-connected moral value of justice and
its relationship to the law and the rule of law.
The question, then, is whether Yoo’s memos shaped the executive branch’s experience
(and the experience that those who were tortured) of the legal system such that justice was
vindicated within the legal system or, conversely, such that the legal system and the experience
thereof deviated from the requirements of justice, especially to the extent that the value of
justice is necessarily tied to the rule of law. Additionally, to take account of the particular
relevance that Simmonds says justice has for the rule of law, but to also put that relevance in
terms of the way that lawyers are able to affect the client’s experience of the rule of law31, the
question that I ask (coming from the discussion in the previous paragraph) is whether Yoo’s
advice in the “torture memos” affected the parties’ experience of the law such that the law
governing this field was characterized by the law’s (and the legal system’s) justice-facilitated
respect for the autonomy of the individuals governed by it. Or, on the contrary, was the law
governing this field characterized by the justice-infringing ungrounded choice of some
individuals determining the way in which other individuals were treated? 32
My answer is that Yoo’s work in the “torture memos” deviated from justice in a way that
undermined the rules of law as stated in Simmonds’ robust conception. I argue that Yoo’s legal
opinion undermined procedural justice, retributive justice and restorative justice as they pertain
to the issues at stake. Rather than allowing the positively-stated law to govern, the functional
29

Quoted above in Section 2.3.2), notes 54, 80 and accompanying text; both quoted from ibid. at 198.
Above in Section 4.5).
31
Again, not as a matter of having a “rule of recognition”-style effect at the level of legal philosophy, but
rather an effect on the interpretation and use of the positive law, the rule of law and related values, as
explained above in Section 4.5).
32
The notion of “ungrounded choice” was discussed above in Section 2.3.2) at 51-58, especially Section
2.3.2), note 77 and accompanying text, quoted from Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea, supra note 23 at 198;
and Section 2.3.2), note 81 and accompanying text, quoted from ibid.
30
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effect of the advice given by Yoo and the authors of the “torture memos” was to facilitate the
movement of the practice of the executive branch away from the positively-stated law and the
law’s ability to bring justice to bear on the situation. I summarized earlier33 the clear arguments
that legal ethicists, and scholars in other fields of law, have made for the idea that the
interrogation techniques undertaken by the Bush administration in relation to prisoners at
locations such as Guantánamo Bay were illegal and that substantive law calls for criminal
sanctions for this illegal action. Yoo’s advice, especially given his role at the quasi-judicial OLC,
played a great role in determining the experience of justice for those government officials who
would undertake (and had undertaken already, even before Yoo’s advice was rendered) the
various practices of torture under discussion in this paper. From the perspective of the persons
who were subjected to torture, their cases are left without the vindication of justice (albeit after
the fact, of course) which would have been achieved within the legal system if the torturers had
been subject to criminal prosecutions.
With this being the case, the legal system and the government experience of the law on
the matter did not vindicate the demands of justice (especially as justice is relevant to the
protection of individual autonomy), and also did not thereby prevent the law governing this field
from being characterized (at least in the sense in which was experienced by the individuals being
acting upon and being affected by the state and its application of the law governing the field) as
the “ungrounded choice” of some individuals determining the way in which other individuals are
treated. Instead, the advice in the “torture memos” had the effect of making it so that the law as
experienced by the parties involved (the government officials, on one hand, and the prisoners,
on the other), was characterized by the lack of respect for the individual autonomy of individuals
(namely the prisoners) and the “’ungrounded choice’ of some individuals [i.e. government
officials] determining the way in which other individuals [i.e. prisoners] are treated”. This goes
against the idea of government by law rather than by people.
How, specifically, did the “torture memos” have the functional effect of insulating
government officials from the reach of procedural, retributive and restorative justice in such a
way that it undermines the vindication of justice? The basic idea that I present on this front is

33

See above in Section 5), especially note 12 and in Section 6.1), note 34; the latter citing especially
Wallach, “Water Torture in U.S. Courts”.
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that Yoo functionally removed the relevant legal obstacles (which were especially needed in the
case of a legal infringement as fundamental as torture) that would have vindicated justice in this
case study. This includes procedural justice ex ante, which was not respected while the
interrogations were taking place and while the government was considering the legality of
engaging in torture and actually approving its use, with the consultation that took place in the
“torture memos” being highlighted for the purpose of this paper. The “torture memos”
additionally undermined certain kinds of after-the-fact substantive justice (namely restorative
justice and retributive justice) that (1) might influence the behaviour of government officials
involved with the impugned means of interrogation, either as a deterrent or (after the fact) as a
normative (especially legal) impetus for corrective action to make amends or (2) would vindicate
the demands of moral desert vis-à-vis the relevant government officials. Whichever avenue of
after-the-fact substantive justice one might prefer34, both are undermined. So too is the ex post
legal protection of procedural justice that would be used to arrive at the two after-the-fact
forms of substantive justice.
How did the “torture memos” remove these legal obstacles? Consider the content of
the advice given in the “torture memos”. From the perspective of changing the relationship that
government officials have with the value of justice on this particular topic, it is, first, necessary
see how the OLC and the Bush administration participated in the creation of a situation that
engages justice issues. Yoo’s advice does so to the extent that it engages the conditions of any
one or more of the demands of justice, including especially the conditions of any of the
particular kinds of justice, such as procedural justice, retributive justice and restorative justice.
Procedural justice is engaged simply by the fact that the prisoners are subject to
government action. In a society of laws, governments must abide by the procedural justice
34

I am, of course, aware that these ideas of after-the-fact justice, especially the idea of moral desert, are
contested in terms of their legitimacy or desirability as forms of justice. See Michael Davis, “Punishment
Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from (about) 1957 to 2007” (2009) 13 Journal of
Ethics 73; Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, “Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the
Satisfaction of Multiple Goals” (2009) 43 (1) Law & Soc’y Rev. 1; Michael Wenzel et al., “Retributive and
Restorative Justice” (2008) 32 (5) Law and Human Behaviour 375; and a short survey of the debate around
the question of the relationship between desert and justice in Owen McLeod, "Desert", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008), Edward N. Zalta, ed., online: Center for the Study of Language
and Information, Stanford University <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/desert/#5>;
Nonetheless, people will tend to find the vindication of at least one of these kinds of after-the-fact justice
(retributive, restorative or both) to be desirable.
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guaranteed in the legal system and are also called to meet the moral standards of procedural
justice to the extent that these are conditions for the existence of law. The “torture memos”
thus engage procedural justice merely by virtue of the fact that they are intended to provide
legal advice to government officials for the purpose of shaping their conduct in relation to
persons who are under the government’s influence. Procedural justice is engaged here already
in the sense that government officials are legally and morally obligated to abide by the
requirements of procedural justice. Additionally, however, different concerns of procedural
justice are raised when procedural justice is violated by a government official and when
procedural justice thus makes additional demands for the appropriate ways in which to handle
such a violation (and for the consideration of the values at stake). Thus, there are at least two
levels at which one can fail to vindicate procedural justice. Retributive justice and restorative
justice, conversely, are engaged at only one of these two levels, namely, after the violation of, or
deviation from, the demands of justice, morality generally, or certainly the positive law and any
of its relevant norms. Procedural justice is also engaged in this second way though. As I noted
just now, the “torture memos” and the practices of the executive branch that are the subject of
the case study, engage procedural justice concerns merely because of the involvement of the US
government. What about the relationship that can be generated by what I will call “engagement
through violation or failure to vindicate”?
The criticisms of the “torture memos” discussed in the previous two sections of this
paper35 refer to instances in which the authors of the “torture memos”, and the government
officials who carried out the torture, engaged the conditions of procedural, retributive and
restorative justice by way of their violation of moral and legal norms. But how did the “torture
memos” specifically violate these conditions? In terms of procedural justice, the authors of the
“torture memos” violate both moral and legal requirements of procedural justice. This includes
procedural failures committed by the OLC, such as the failure to mention opposing legal and
moral opinions despite the level of idiosyncrasy of the opinions rendered36, and the problem of
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Above in sections 5) and 6).
I noted Yoo’s failure to describe his own view as idiosyncratic, above in Section 6.1), note 6 and
accompanying text. Above, in Section 6.1) at 125-129, see my discussion of Yoo’s failure, in the “torture
memos”, to address (highly noteworthy) mainstream legal opinions that differed from his own view.
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lock-in37 (which was generated both by the lawyering dynamic and by the actions of an
executive branch that undertook deeply legally problematic practices without consulting the
OLC). It includes not abiding by the protections to which the prisoners would have been entitled
under the Geneva Conventions38. The failures just discussed also engage the collateral
procedural demands that procedural justice makes about how the US government and legal
system are to deal with these violations of procedural justice. Additionally, the procedural
violations themselves raise collateral questions of retributive justice and restorative justice. The
question that arises is: how will the legal system deal with the procedural failings in terms of
retributive justice, which is about dealing out normative (whether moral or legal) desert, and
restorative justice, which is centred on the idea of rectifying the procedural wrongs? These are
after-the-fact considerations of justice show the depth of the way in which the procedural
justice issues are engaged and even the way in which the violation of procedural justice, by way
of “engagement through violation or failure to vindicate”, raises issues of other kinds of justice.
The following, however, is the perhaps most important engagement of justice issues.
The normativity is strongest because of the seriousness of the substantive violations. This is the
engagement of justice issues by the violation of the moral and archetypal legal prohibitions on
torture. The very fact of the practice of torture itself brings some of the most serious questions
of justice to bear on the case study at hand. What does justice have to say about the
commission of acts that degrade humans? How should the legal system respond to the
treatment that detainees received, including, as discussed above39, waterboarding, head slaps,
sleep deprivation, and a whole host of other tactics? If the OLC lawyers who drafted the “torture
memos” had been acting in accordance with my first principle of Fullerian lawyering, as
conceived of in terms of “thick moral normativity”, they would have been alert to these
demands of justice in providing their advice. They would do their legal work in such a way as to
vindicate the demands of justice in terms of the use of the relevant legal norms, the experience
that people have of the relevant legal norms and the legal system as a whole. Thus, lawyers
acting according to my Fullerian standards would have sought the vindication of procedural,
37

Discussed above in Section 5), note 7 and accompanying text; Section 6.1), note 5 and accompanying
text; and in the present section, note 12 and accompanying text.
38
Sources discussing these protections are cited above in Section 6.1) at 125-129, especially notes 19, 21,
23, 24, 34.
39
Above in Section 5), note 5 and accompanying text.
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retributive and restorative justice in the use of legal norms and the experience that detainees
and Bush administration officials had of the legal system. This is true in terms of the previolation engagement of justice issue and also of cases where justice issues are engaged by a
violation of moral of legal norms.
Having discussed the question of how justice issues are engaged by the case study at
hand, it is appropriate to ask whether justice was indeed vindicated. Given the role that justice
plays in the Simmonds-inspired theory of Fullerian lawyering that I have developed, the strong
prohibitions on torture in the positive law and the archetypal importance of the norm against
torture (as conceived of by Waldron), the answer to this question of justice is essential to the
task of determining whether the legal system lives up to the standards of a robust rule of law.
This answer is necessary for the task of assessing whether the legal system shows respect for
the autonomy of the individuals who are governed by it or whether the legal system’s use in the
field is characterized by the “’ungrounded choice’ of some individuals determining the way in
which other individuals are treated”. 40
Rather than vindicating the demands of these various kinds of justice that were just
discussed, the “torture memos” that Yoo and Bybee drafted had the function of undermining
the vindication of justice. The way in which Yoo did this was by failing, as a lawyer within the
OLC, to give an accurate and full substantive account of the positive law on the matter of
detainee rights and the interrogation of prisoners. This failure has substantive and procedural
aspects to it. At the substantive level, Yoo’s failure to give a full and accurate account of the
substance of the positive law on the matter (including the positive law that would pertain afterthe-fact of a violation of the prohibition against torture and impose sanctions on individuals
involved in the perpetration of torture) turned the legal system and the executive branch away
from the positively-enacted and morally-sound41 norms against torture.
Consider the following example of the way in which the “torture memos” advise in such
a way that facilitates a substantive deviation from the vindication of justice. Yoo discussed his
view that interrogators may be able to avoid criminal responsibility for torture through the use
of the defence of necessity. In such a case, after-the-fact issues of justice are raised because of
40

Introduced above, in the current section, in the context of the “torture memos” case study at 153-155.
Sound in the strong substantive sense of being the norms that actually bind according to external
morality.
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the violation of legal and moral norms against torture. An answer consistent with the
substantive demands of ex post justice (including the deterrent, and thus the ex ante effect that
is part of the focus of after-the-fact justice) would seek the vindication of procedural, retributive
and restorative justice. The way for a lawyer to vindicate this kind of justice in the provision of
legal advice in a memo (recall that the “torture memos” are situated ex ante in relation to some
actions of torture and ex post in relation to other actions of torture42) would be, first, to provide
advice that is a full and accurate representation of the positive law on the topic of criminal
responsibility for the commission of acts of torture.
Additionally, the lawyer, because of his/her recognition that moral values make their
way into the law by way of the rule of law, should interpret the law such that the content of the
interpretation, the use and the experience of the law are consistent with the rule of law. Given
the violation of the substantive moral and legal norm against torture, the positively-stated
criminal law and other legal sources, including case law, that deal with this matter,

43

an

interpretation of the law in a way that is consistent with the moral norms incorporated into the
law by way of the rule of law (especially in the morally thick way for which I am currently
arguing) would call for the OLC to advise that the US legal system does call for criminal liability
for the commission of acts of torture. Doing so would vindicate both the ex ante and ex post
demands of retributive and restorative justice that are required both as a moral matter and as a
legal matter when justice issues are raised in such a way. Does the advice contained within the
“torture memos” do so?
On the contrary, as summarized above,

44

Yoo makes the morally and legally fatuous

argument that the perpetrators of torture may be able to avoid criminal responsibility by making
a necessity argument. Such an argument, if it were to have substantive sway and have full or
inchoate instantiation with the legal system45, would undermine one of the main avenues that
42

Above in Section 5), note 7 and accompanying text; citing Harris, “Rule of Law”, supra note 12 at 443445.
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Referenced above in Section 6.1), note 34, especially Wallach, “Water Torture in U.S. Courts”.
44
Above, in Section 5) at 119.
45
To some extent, the authors of the “torture memos” did have some capacity to have their arguments
adopted because of the role of the OLC in advising and determining the policy of the executive branch.
This quasi-judicial role means that the arguments in the “torture memos” were closer to actual
instantiation within the legal system. Thus, the memos’ substantive departure from the vindication of
justice means quite a bit more than it might mean in the case of lawyers who do not advise the executive
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the legal system has to provide restorative and retributive justice to the victims and to society
for the legal and moral wrongs committed by the perpetrators of torture. Remember that justice
is here conceived of as a moral concept.
On the retributive side, such arguments attempt to undermine the legal system’s ability
to provide those responsible for torture with their moral and legal desert.

46

If there is

exculpation from criminal liability, or even no legal liability or consequences at all, for that
matter, then the legal system loses some or even all of its impetus for pursuing both moral and
legal desert in the case at hand. Why pursue desert if there is exculpation from the
consequences of the illegal action? On the restorative side, Yoo is making an argument that, if
adopted would undermine almost any ability that the legal system (especially the criminal law)
has to have the perpetrators of torture make amends to the victims and society. Again, if there
is exculpation from the violation of the legal norm, then what exactly must the offender rectify?
Or, put differently, why would the offender be responsible for rectifying anything?
This flies in the face of the demands that after-the-fact justice would make for the
justice issues that arises from the violation of the moral and legal norm against torture, which
would call us to abide by the demands of retributive and/or restorative justice. The OLC’s advice
also does so by undermining a positively-stated legal norm and by making the argument as a
justification of the dehumanizing practice of torture. Yoo’s memo thus notably undermines the
vindication of justice (i.e. advises a break with justice) in a way that directly disrespects
individual autonomy and turns the experience and use of the law into the normatively

branch of government. That is not to say, of course, that substantive divergence from the demands of
justice does not count for lawyers who do not work for the government. Even in those cases, given the
ability of lawyers to influence the use and experience of the legal system, as explained above in Section
4.5), lawyers can make their substantive legal advice have some instantiation within society. Finally, I do
not mean to suggest by this argument that a lawyer’s substantive deviation from the vindication of justice
matters only when the lawyer has some capacity to instantiate his/her substantive views within the
experience and use of law. Any substantive deviation from the vindication of justice is problematic
because, under my theory, lawyers are to advise their clients in a way that is consistent with the rule of
law and the moral values that are incorporated into the legal system because they have a necessary
connection with the rule of law.
46
Moral desert, here, is the concept of desert discussed in moral philosophy. Legal desert is a term that I
am using to refer to the application of legal penalties in situations that merits those penalties (merit being
conceived of merely in terms of engaging/meeting the substantive necessary conditions of instantiating
the relevant infraction that carries the specific legal punishment). While there is no necessary connection
between the two, legal desert may vindicate moral desert.
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underground (both legally and morally ungrounded) choice of individuals (both the individual
choice of the torturers and the authors of the legally and lawyerly-faulty “torture memos”). This
argument about the necessity defence is one example of the way in which the “torture memos”
substantively undermine justice, therefore also the rule of law, and finally thus fail to abide by
my first principle of Fullerian lawyering. However, the “torture memos” also procedurally
undermines the vindication of justice.
The mere provision of Yoo’s particular legal advice serves to procedurally undermine all
three kinds of after-the-fact justice (including procedural, retributive and restorative justice) and
thus to undermine legality in this context. As noted previously, even if a court were to
substantively reject Yoo’s advice, the people who relied on the advice in the “torture memos”
(or who were ordered to perform acts of torture by superiors who were relying on the advice in
the memos) could use the legal advice in an Enron-esque fashion as a shield against criminal and
legal liability. 47 Essentially, if the perpetrator of torture were to face legal troubles, they would
attempt to escape legal sanction by claiming that they were merely acting in accordance with
the legal advice that they received from their lawyer (in this case from the very heights of the
OLC). Yoo’s role as a lawyer (and a special kind of government lawyer in terms of function and
influence on government action, given his role in the OLC) is especially relevant to the way that
his memos functionally subvert the ability of the legal system to impose criminal and other legal
sanctions and thus to mete out some of the restorative and retributive justice that it would
normally impose. It also undermines the procedures that would normally be used to mete out
retributive and restorative justice. The lawyer, here, can functionally undermine the ability of
the courts to vindicate the positive law and justice in part due to his/her role as an officer of the
court. This is a dissonance between the law as enacted and the law as enforced (a departure
from one of Fuller’s eight desiderata), making it a direct affront to the rule of law.
It is worthwhile to note that this procedural aspect of the effect of the “torture memos”,
as a position taken by legal and government officials, has not even had to make its way to the
courts and may never have to do so. The reason is that, either as a political matter or a matter of
prosecutorial discretion (depending on your perspective), criminal prosecution has not been
47

Above in Section 5), note 6 and accompanying text; citing David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Luban, Legal Ethics] at 200-201; Wendel, “Legal Ethics &
Separation”, supra note 10 at 121, n. 200.
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forthcoming for those who were involved in the torture of detainees at locations such as
Guantánamo. This lack of charges has continued under the tenure of President Obama and
Attorney General Eric Holder. 48 The US Justice Department has largely let the legal matter drop.
The problem discussed here is perhaps the most troubling issue of all in terms of justice and the
rule of law. Justice, especially in the aspects of which have necessary connections to the rule of
law, cannot be vindicated in such cases if the behaviour in question never has a hearing in court
(meaning never faces the adjudicative process as fully expressed in the US by the adversarial
system).
Turning back to the procedural divergence from justice and the rule of law as achieved
directly just by way of Yoo’s “torture memos”, I argue that this procedural aspect stifles the legal
and moral justice pursued by the legal system, thereby undermining the rule of law’s “thick
moral normativity”. This defensive strategy is accomplished through Yoo’s role as a lawyer and
has the extra ability to protect the relevant legal officials because it does not have to withstand
substantive scrutiny. Rather, the defence is able succeed on the basis of Yoo’s merely having
provided the advice and perhaps having himself believe in its correctness, despite stinging
rebukes from other members of the legal community.49
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Ewen MacAskill, “Obama releases Bush torture memos” The Guardian (16 April 2009), online: Guardian
News and Media Limited <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/16/torture-memos-bushadministration>; See also the New York Times’ editorial criticism of the prosecutorial decisions of the
Obama Administration on this matter in “No Penalty for Torture,” Editorial, The New York Times (4
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In considering the fact that Yoo may have believed in the correctness of his interpretation, it is always
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negative feedback from elsewhere in the legal community before the memos were published (e.g. Taft’s
memo to Yoo), as discussed above in Section 6.1) at 125-127; citing especially Memorandum from William
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Recall the chronology of the exchange of memos discussed above in Section 6.1), note 23; citing David D.
Caron, “If Afghanistan Has Failed, Then Afghanistan Is Dead: ‘Failed States’ and the Inappropriate
Substitution of Legal Conclusion for Political Description” in Karen J. Greenberg, ed., The Torture Debate in
America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 214 [Caron, “Failed States”] [Greenberg, Torture
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The preceding analysis has been an account of the way in which the “torture memos”
fail to live up to Fullerian legal theory both in terms of the rule of law and in terms of the way in
which that central legal value is expressed in relation to a lawyer’s work within the legal system.
The “torture memos” fail in terms of a thin account of the normativity of the rule of law (“thin
moral normativity” being a view which some positivists might find amenable) and in terms of a
thick account of the normativity of the rule of law (the thick account being one that I endorse
and which would cohere more with natural law theories).

7.2) The “Torture Memos” and the Second Principle of Fullerian Lawyering
Having made a critique of the OLC “torture memos” on the basis of my first principle of
Fullerian lawyering, let me turn to the application of my second principle, the Moral Orientation
Thesis. Given that the United States has a legal system that accords with the principles of legality
and that the laws prohibiting torture do the same (meaning that the relevant provisions of the
positive law are consistent with the rule of law at the fundamental level) were the “torture
memos” written in a way that treats the prohibitions on torture as tending away from evil? The
answer to this is a resounding no. The memos do not show evidence of the OLC lawyers
regarding the law as tending away from evil. Or, stated in a way that recognizes that the work of
lawyers like Yoo may have substantially involved incorporation of the OLC lawyers’ own moral
views and previous intellectual commitments into the legal opinions50, the memos show
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Curtis A. Bradley, a law professor who has written skeptically about international law, is quoted as
saying “One concern that people have raised is that John [Yoo] had a lot of these views going into the
government and was perhaps overeager to write them” in Tim Golden, “A Junior Aide Had a Big Role in
Terror Policy” The New York Times (23 December 2005), online: The New York Times Company
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/23/politics/23yoo.html?pagewanted=all>.
In the same article, Timothy E. Flanigan, former deputy White House counsel is quoted as saying “John
Yoo, given his academic background and interests, was sort of the go-to guy on foreign affairs and military
power issues”. Flanigan continues, “[Yoo] was the one that Gonzales and I went to to get advice on those
issues on 9/11, and it just continued”.
As a specific example of Yoo’s own views determining his view of the law, consider Bradley Wendel’s
discussion of Yoo’s analysis of the possibility of CIA interrogators using the defence of necessity to
exculpate themselves from criminal liability. Wendel argues that the authors of the “torture memos”
brought in their own moral views to the provision of legal advice, but importantly, that the particular
moral views that they brought were not in any way founded on the positive law that they were supposed
to be interpreting for the client (in this case, the executive branch of the US federal government). Wendel
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evidence that the authors treated the law on torture, as clearly stated in the relevant legal
sources as, in fact, tending away from the good and towards the evil. On this second reading,
the authors of the “torture memos”, take an unstated premise, and true impetus for their
reasoning, to be the thesis that an absolute prohibition against torture gets the moral analysis
wrong in, for example, the ticking time-bomb scenario.
The problems with Yoo doing so are twofold. First, the legal system of the United States
and the law on torture easily satisfied Fuller’s principles of legality and were thus entitled, under
the Fullerian interpretive principles proposed in this paper to be treated by Yoo, especially in his
quasi-judicial role as a lawyer at the OLC, as tending away from evil. This includes tending away
from the evils of the ticking time-bomb scenario and other instantiations of evil that would have
been part of Yoo’s own moral reasoning in relation to the law on torture. Simply, in the role of
the lawyer, Yoo was supposed to view or treat the laws as tending towards the morally right
answer.
If we conceive of the second principle in terms of Dyzenhaus’ two levels of legal
reasoning, we might say that Yoo, either ignored the second step, the doctrinal step, in the
second principle of Fullerian lawyering, or smuggled in a fundamental level legal analysis that
determined his reading of the doctrinal level and which either did not include the appropriate
rule of law fundamental analysis, or did not pay heed to it despite the conclusions that one
could not help but draw from it, i.e. the conclusion that the law on torture does accord with the
principles of legality. In each of these possibilities, Yoo’s result is perverse. It is unsound to say
that the law regulating torture in the United States failed to abide by the principles of legality.
says: “The error here is not strictly a jurisprudential one; the OLC lawyers acknowledge that moral
considerations (such as the balance of harms) are relevant to interpreting the law. The fault in the
reasoning instead lies in the careless extension of the ticking-bomb hypothetical to the far more mundane
scenarios actually confronting investigators, in which there are no background facts to suggest a
substantial likelihood that a given detainee is likely to have critical, time-sensitive information”, Wendel,
“Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 10 at 84. Therefore, the particular use of morality in Yoo’s legal
analysis was unacceptable from the perspective of Wendel’s inclusive legal positivist theory of lawyering.
Later, in his paper, ibid. at 121-126, Wendel also gives an argument about why, even taking the ethics on
its own apart from the legal analysis, the moral position supporting the use of torture that is implicit in
Yoo’s use of the necessity defence is problematic.
See also Trevor Farrow’s discussion of this issue in Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers” in David L.
Blaikie, Thomas A. Cromwell and Darrel Pink, eds., Why Good Lawyers Matter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012)
167 [Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers”] at 184.
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The rules were general, promulgated, prospective, etc. Given this, Yoo should have undertaken
a doctrinal analysis of the law that reached a vastly different result. He should have treated the
doctrinal law as being entitled to be seen to avoid evil. The way to have done so would be to
give a robust reading to the values, such as respect for the dignity and autonomy of persons,
actually expressed in the law and the values of the legal system.

51

Yoo should not have

substituted a wildly incorrect analysis that, as we shall see next, was based on his own different
view of good and evil.
Second, the moral reasoning that would have been used by Yoo as he substituted his
own morals for the morality of the law on torture is problematic in its ethical reasoning and is
ultimately morally false. Thus with respect to the structure of Yoo’s deviation from the second
interpretive principle, he replaces a law (and its moral content) that is entitled to be treated as
tending away from evil, with an interpretation of the law that not only breaks the structural
aspect of the second interpretive principle but which also ultimately is flawed in its moral
reasoning. See the failure to abide by justice catalogued above. 52
Consider, additionally, the deviation from the requirements of my Fullerian theory of
legal ethics if one were to indeed take the prohibition against torture to be an archetype in the
way that Jeremy Waldron does. Thus, let us assume Waldron’s theory about the disruptive
effect on other legal norms that can take place when one undermines a legal archetype.

53

In

that case, one would see that the legal ethics failures of the “torture memos” also raise the

51

A relevant discussion for this purpose, from the perspective of what might fall under the rule of law
conceived of in terms of “thick moral normativity”, is seen in the work of Farrow and his analysis of
interpretive guides such as the “public interest”. Similar to the suggestions that I have made here, Farrow
argues that the reading of terms such as the “public interest” in cases such as that of the “torture memos”
should be “[G]rounded in robust notions of not only rule of law values, but also with a contextual
understanding of the requirements of substantive justice and equality. On this view, reasonable limits on
rights cannot be justified by just any grounds, but rather only by grounds that resonate loudly with
fundamental rule of law values as contemplated in a free and democratic society. And the notion of a
society about which I am talking here must be a pluralistic one”, Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers”, ibid. at 189
[footnote omitted]. Farrow also makes the point that the issues that he raises in his piece are relevant to
the question of how we “[Conceive] of the rule of the law, in a rights-seeking, diverse society in which we
are fundamentally guided by robust notions of the public interest, justice, substantive equality, and the
rule of law”, ibid. at 168.
52
Above, in Section 7.1) at 153-164.
53
See my summary of Waldron’s theory of legal archetypes above in Section 6.2) at 132-136, especially
note 55 and accompanying text, for a mention of the disruptive effect that undermining a legal archetype
can have.
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following question: if the OLC torture lawyers do not give the prohibition against torture its
proper consideration as a law, or set of laws) that tends away from evil, how will these lawyers,
and the rest of the executive branch, respond when it comes time to consider the question of
the degree to which related legal norms tend away from evil and may thus be worthy of the
moral regard that is due to provisions, legal systems and areas of law that cohere with the
principles of legality but run contrary to the personal and idiosyncratic morality of lawyers like
Yoo? Given the undermining of the anti-torture archetype, how else will Yoo also readily allow
his own view of morality to colour his legal advice and thus again fail to use the interpretive
approach of granting to legal norms the judgment that, at least from the internal perspective of
a lawyer, they tend away from evil? With this archetypal constraint on executive behaviour
removed, we have loosened important restraints on state power.
When the authors of the memos were asked to give their analysis and felt the political
and institutional pressure on them, they should have done the following. First, they should have
known that the kind of advice that the administration was seeking for them to produce would
deviated from the positive law on torture, from the principles of legality and from their duty, as
lawyers, to abide by these principles. Second, they should not have provided such mistaken
advice. Third, any of the individual lawyers, seeing that the advice given by their co-workers was
undermining the rule of law, should have pushed back against it in defence of the rule of law.
This could have been done as an activity under the heading of legal advice provided to the
relevant government officials or as direct communication with the lawyer who provided the
impugned advice (such a reply was given to Yoo by state department lawyers)54, on the grounds
that the OLC was badly misinterpreting the law. Another option would have been to provide
advice under the heading of topics besides direct interpretation of law. As Trevor Farrow argues,
“[The lawyers needed to have a very frank discussion with their instructing officials about the
moral, ethical, practical, and political implications of the potential available courses of action
(regardless of what the outcome was of their legal deliberations and regardless of the personal
preferences or desired results of either the lawyers or their instructing officials”.

55

Farrow

points out that exactly this kind of advice would have been contemplated under the permission
54

As discussed above in Section 6.1) at 125-127; citing especially Taft, “Your Draft Memorandum”, supra
note 49.
55
Farrow, “Post-9/11 Lawyers”, supra note 50 at 186.
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found in Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules, and would have been called for as part of the role of
government lawyers. 56 If they saw no ability to effectively push back, their duties as lawyers and
in advising the President in a quasi-judicial role obliged them to refuse to be involved in the
perpetuation of violations of the rule of law. Finally, to give a brief hint at the way in which I may
apply my theory of Fullerian lawyering to the issue of fidelity to law in future work, one might
say that, after engaging in a contextual analysis of fidelity under the second principle of Fullerian
lawyering that I present in this paper, the lawyers involved in dealing with the “torture memos”,
upon seeing the legal regime surrounding torture descend into a state of non-compliance with
the principles of legality, would at least have had a positive duty, not just a permission, to
undermine the brave new interrogation regime in a way that was consistent with the relevant
laws of the United States for doing so, e.g. through any whistleblower legislation, internal
reporting, etc. Lawyers, especially those tasked with ensuring that the executive branch
faithfully executes the US Constitution, as in the case of the OLC, owe their duty as lawyers, first
and foremost, to the law as enacted and read in accordance with the principles of legality.

56

Ibid. at 186-187. Refer also to the American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
online:
American
Bar
Association
<http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professio
nal_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html> [ABA, Model Rules], r. 2.1.
This rule is discussed above in Section 4.1), note 1 and accompanying text and Section 6.1), note 30 and
accompanying text. Notably, under my view, however, the furnishing of such moral advice would be
required under my second principle of Fullerian lawyering, rather than simply permitted, as it is in the
ABA Model Rules.
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Conclusion
Recapitulation
Philosophical legal ethics has, in recent years, taken one of the most normatively fruitful
turns that it could have taken through its focus on the jurisprudence of the great legal
philosophers of the 20th century. If we are seeking to know more about the relationship
between lawyers, legal ethics and law, some natural sources to which we can turn are theories
about the relationship between law and morality. I have argued that Lon Fuller, among the great
legal philosophers, has been overlooked and that his theory of legal philosophy explains one of
the central pieces of legal philosophy, and therefore also the philosophy of legal ethics.
The theory of law’s internal morality, as articulated by Fuller, shows a necessary
connection between law and morality that goes straight to the core of the conceptual category
of “law”. The ability of the rule of law to be an internal morality of law is seen in powerful ways,
both in terms of widely-agreeable “thin morality normativity” and the more morally rich “thick
moral normativity” that authors such as Simmonds introduce. Nigel Simmonds’ work on this
topic calls for special mention for his particular development of Fuller’s ideas. In presenting a
theory that I categorize as expressing “thick moral normativity”, Simmonds turns the focus
around from dealing only with the rule of law in terms of its role as a necessary condition of law.
He also asks what some of the necessary conditions of the rule of law are. In Simmonds’ view,
among the necessary conditions of the rule of law is condition of vindicating robust moral values
such as justice. We see in the work of Simmonds that the rule of law is so powerful because the
necessary connection that it has with law is so deep that it takes criterial priority in relation to
other conditions for the existence of law. The theory thus deals with the categories of law and
morality in a profoundly foundational way. Also worthy of special note for his analysis of Fuller is
David Luban, who provides an innovative reading of Fuller that focuses the morality of law on
the role played by the relevant legal officials within a legal system, especially lawyers. Luban’s
work demonstrates what may be a unique ability of Fuller’s theory of law. It may have the
capacity to be more than a theory of legal philosophy which can also be translated into a theory
of legal ethics. Legal philosophy, under such a view, becomes more than that thing out there to
which we also have to pay attention to be good lawyers. Some questions of legal philosophy and
legal ethics are, in substantial ways, the same project.
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Philosophical theories of legal ethics take account of the insights that can be gained
from doing legal philosophy. As noted above from the work of Tim Dare, “The point of the
institution which supports a given role will feature significantly in any justification of that role
and its role-obligations”. 1 From the arguments considered in this paper, it is clear that a theory
of lawyering that is based on legal positivism misses significant aspects of the point or function
of a legal system. It thus misses some of the necessary conditions of a legal system and thus the
justification of the roles and role-obligations of lawyers as actors within the legal system.
Given the richness of a Fullerian account of the point of the law, Fuller’s ideas ought to
also feature significantly in the justifications of the lawyering role and its role-obligations. With
this in mind, I have developed the Fullerian theory of lawyering presented in this paper. My two
principles of Fullerian lawyering, the Internal Morality Thesis and the Moral Orientation Thesis,
provide guidelines for the project of lawyering in a way that coheres with legality as a necessary
condition of law. The application of these two principles implies a vision of fidelity to law that is
steeped in the necessary moral normativity of law and which may deviate significantly in its
approach to fidelity when compared to the positivist theories of philosophical legal ethics. My
Fullerian-inspired theory proposes strong fidelity to law, to legality, to the category of law.
When the legal system abides by the rule of law, this means strong fidelity to the positive law
within that legal system and a particular moral outlook with respect to that legal system. When
the legal system does not abide by the rule of law, I argue that lawyers are to recognize the
divergence between the legal system and the rule of law and maintain their fidelity to the latter.
My two principles of Fullerian lawyering also draw on the ethical robustness of Fuller’s
work and subsequent Fullerian theory. Moreover, the theses both respect notions of client
autonomy and, at the macro level, advance the experience of autonomy that all citizens have in
their interactions with the legal system. A theory of legal ethics that works on the basis of my
Fullerian principles, and indeed many theories that allow and encourage lawyers to engage their
clients in more substantial discussions about the ethics of their case, avoids many of the issues
involved in the combination of legal positivism and the zealous model of advocacy.

1

Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?: A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role (Farnham,
UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009) [Dare, Counsel of Rogues] at 59; discussed above in Section 1.1), note 8.
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Finally, in favour of the theory of legal ethics presented in the present paper, because of
the criterial precedence that the rule of law has, it is able to connect law and morality at a level
that cannot be pre-empted by positivist concerns. The rule of law and Fullerian theory (both in
general jurisprudence and legal ethics) are not subject to the particular criticisms of theories of
law that have not based their support for the connection between morality and law on as strong
an ontological criterion as the rule of law. At the same time, because of the normatively, and
morally, modest core substantive claims of Fuller’s procedural naturalist Internal Morality Thesis
(especially when expressed in terms of “thin moral normativity”)2, there is much in the Fullerian
theory of law and lawyering that proponents of some forms of positivism would either not find
objectionable or perhaps even find attractive.
The case study presented in this paper is used to illustrate the application of my
Fullerian theory of lawyering and the justification that my theory makes for the role and roleobligations of lawyers. The authors of the “torture memos” did not live up to lawyering
obligations that take account of the insights of Fullerian legal philosophy. The authors of the
“torture memos” engaged in a kind of legal reasoning that brings law, lawyers, and the
administration of justice into disrepute. Several kinds of theories have been offered to explain
the wrongness of the OLC lawyers’ actions, not least of which are those criticisms based on the
moral objection to torture. Legal ethicists have been prominent among the voices calling for
more from our lawyers. If there is a position other than general morality from which to criticize
the “torture memos”, it is certainly from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession,
the role of which the authors of the “torture memos” were to have been performing.
Philosophers of legal ethics bring their criticisms from the perspective of philosophy of law as
well as legal ethics. In this paper, I have argued that legal philosophy is particularly helpful for
the purpose of understanding the ethical duties of the legal profession and for explaining the
failures of the authors of the “torture memos” to abide by the ethics of the legal profession. The
lawyer’s task is shaped in significant ways by the functional moral conditions for the existence of
law. If lawyers are to live up to the hope of the project of law, they must take account of the

2

Meaning that Fuller’s Internal Morality Thesis, a kind of procedural naturalism, does not make claims
that wide-ranging substantive norms are necessarily incorporated into the substance of law.
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excellences that are particular to law. Instead, the authors of the “torture memos” moved away
from the values of legality and facilitated a regime that disengaged from the morality of law.
As I have noted at times throughout this paper, the work of Lon Fuller has not received
the attention that it deserves in the fields of legal philosophy or philosophical legal ethics. I hope
to have contributed to a scholarly movement which says that this can no longer be the case. The
power of the substance of Fullerianism and the depth of the understanding that it shows of the
foundations of law warrant a new regard for the relevance that the rule of law has for both legal
philosophy and legal ethics. By looking at the work of Lon Fuller, and to the rule of law, legal
ethicists can engage the normativity of lawyering more fully and ground our appreciation of this
normativity more firmly in law’s nature. We can better appreciate the normativity of legal ethics
by seeing the concept of “good lawyering” as both a moral and legal idea. 3

Looking Forward
My hopes for further developing a Fullerian theory of philosophical legal ethics are
ambitious and will lead me to consider the way in which fundamental questions of philosophy
and reasoning pertain to legal ethics and lawyering. At the most theoretical level, truly
understanding Lon Fuller’s theory of legal philosophy and the way in which it applies to lawyers
will require substantial inquiry into meta-ethics, the field in which we ask questions about the
nature of morality. Specifically, the focus is on the basic metaphysics and epistemology of
morality, namely, what morality is and how we can gain knowledge about morality. Particular
theories about the metaphysics of morality may make better sense of the morality that is
necessarily connected to law and also of the moral duties of lawyers.
In terms of moral epistemology, which I expect will be my primary focus, I want to
explore the question of how it is that the lawyer has the epistemic capacities to do the things
that are required of him/her under my principles of Fullerian lawyering. I am calling for an
account in which lawyers can develop the ability to apply epistemological methodologies, such
as intuition, reflective equilibrium, conceptual analysis and logical deduction, 4 to morality and
3

Borrowing the phrase “law as a moral idea” from N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007) [Simmonds, Law/Moral Idea].
4
Methodologies of moral epistemology, such as reflective equilibrium and intuition, are discussed in
Michael R. DePaul, “Intuitions in Moral Inquiry” in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory
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to the connections that morality has with law. In addition to discussing the epistemology of
individuals, I would find it particularly worthwhile for my Fullerian theory of lawyering to include
a proposal about the way in which lawyers’ use of such methodologies of moral epistemology,
play into the larger epistemic structures of legal systems and the way in which these legal
system make use of various actors to arrive at the knowledge (such as about the material facts
of cases) that the legal systems seek to obtain.
Posing questions about the moral epistemology and Fullerian lawyering in this social
way reveals social epistemology as an illuminating take on the epistemology of lawyers. The
philosopher Karen Jones describes social epistemology in the following way:
Social epistemology is not an epistemological theory as such, but rather a research project
characterized by a commitment to understanding the role of social relations and institutions in
the production of knowledge. Social epistemology is a normative and not merely a descriptive
project inasmuch as it aims to evaluate and not merely describe our epistemic practices....Central
questions in social epistemology include the justification of testimony, the role of epistemic
divisions of labour and norms for cognitive authority, the role of social interests in inquiry, and
the role of socially available background beliefs in justification. 5

Social epistemology is thus committed to understanding the epistemic relationships
between actors. Fuller himself was interested in the social organizing role of lawyers

6

and I

expect that social epistemology will be helpful in explaining Fuller’s internal morality of law,
including both the desiderata themselves (e.g. prospectivity and retroactivity) as well as the
embodied moral value of individual autonomy.
Coming out of my interest in moral epistemology, I recognize that it will be fruitful to
discuss the internal deliberative process of the lawyer and how this process plays into the
epistemic role of the lawyer, especially the engagement of the lawyer (the core ethical actor in

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 595 [DePaul, “Intuitions”]; Gerald Dworkin, “Theory, Practice, and
Moral Reasoning” in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006) 624 [G. Dworkin, “Moral Reasoning”].
5
Karen Jones, “Moral Epistemology” in Frank Jackson & Michael Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of
Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 63 [Jones, “Moral Epistemology”] at 64.
Note that there is every reason to believe that Fuller would have been deeply interested in these projects
given his work on legal theory and social organization, especially with respect to the topics of “epistemic
divisions of labour and norms for cognitive authority” discussed by Jones. Above, in the Introduction, note
1; citing Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller, rev. ed. by Kenneth I.
Winston (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Fuller, Social Order], I briefly referenced an example of Fuller’s
work that pertains to this topic.
6
See the previous note.
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the social epistemology of the internal morality of law) the internal morality of law.
Hutchinson’s “phases and components of ethical behaviour” provide insight into this internal
deliberative process. 7 The “phases and components” include moral sensitivity, moral judgment
and moral conviction. 8 Importantly, the particular “phases and components” that any individual
uses are the subject of evaluation of both traditional epistemology (which concentrates on the
individual) and social epistemology. A person’s method of moral judgment, for example, may be
assessed for its capacity to lead to true and justified beliefs in the individual and in the legal
system at large as the individual plays his/her role as an actor (e.g. as a lawyer) with the system.
I noted above9 that, for the purpose of this paper, I was mostly interested, among Hutchinson’s
three “phases and components”, in providing a framework for moral judgment within the field
of legal ethics. In future work, it will be useful to develop my theory in a way that deals with the
issues of lawyers’ moral sensitivity and moral conviction.
The broad outlines that I have mentioned in the present section will structure my future
research. Such questions are interesting in their own right, but they also provide promising
pathways from which to approach other topics in legal philosophy and legal ethics. For example,
we may be able to gain insights about the question of what it is to be a lawyer because a full
explanation of the conditions of being a lawyer should involve discussions of how a person
qualifies to be recognized for, and operate within, the role that the lawyer plays in a legal
system’s social epistemology. It may include questions about whether there are universal and/or
localized functional, moral or social epistemic conditions10 that a person must meet in order to
be a lawyer in any legal system. Related to the conditions of being a lawyer, it is important to
consider which of the competing theories makes better sense of the ethical values that are
associated with different adjudicative models (especially the adversarial model of adjudication

7

Allan C. Hutchinson, “A Loss of Faith: Law, Justice and Legal Ethics”, Book Review of Lawyers and Fidelity
to Law by W. Bradley Wendel, Int J of Legal Profession [forthcoming] [Hutchinson, “Loss of Faith”] at 11 of
draft; discussed above in Section 4.6), note 61 and accompanying text.
8
Recall the definitions cited from ibid. at 12 of draft [emphasis in original], and reproduced above in
Section 4.6), note 64 and accompanying text.
9
Above, in Section 4.6) at 109-110.
10
And, from a Fullerian perspective, functional conditions that may also be moral conditions.
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and the European inquisitorial model of adjudication),

11

and the values that lawyers should

pursue as they perform their functions within these adjudicative models.
We should be aware of the way in which the topic of political obligation engages the
lawyer’s social epistemic role (especially the lawyer’s role in making knowledge about law
socially available). The question of the lawyer’s moral duty to abide by the law can have
important implications for the way and degree to which the lawyer makes knowledge about law
socially available. The ethical appropriateness of a lawyer’s fidelity to, or withdrawal of fidelity
from, the legal system, in both the advising and advocacy contexts, should be considered in light
of the epistemological role of the lawyer in the legal system. Finally, one ought to consider
Hutchinson’s account of the “phases and components of ethical behaviour”, particularly moral
judgment and moral conviction, in relation to the topic of political obligation. Understanding
these issues means understanding the internal deliberative process in which a lawyer engages in
making a decision about his/her own abidance of law.
The future projects mentioned here are varied and extensive. They touch many aspects
of legal philosophy and legal ethics at multiple levels of abstraction, ranging from meta-theory
to applied theory. However, a complete and sophisticated theory of lawyering needs to engage
in inquiry at every level.

11

Above, in Section 6.2), note 81, I noted the potential compatibility of my theory of Fullerian lawyering
with various adjudicative models.
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